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EDITOR'S NOTES 
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of The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association. Prior to that date, all papers presented at the 
annual meeting were automatically eligible for inclusion in the Proceedings, if the presenter wished for the paper to 
be published. Beginning with the 1995 issue, only those papers deemed acceptable by the editorial board are 
put>lished. Some papers may appear as abstracts. Presenters retained the option of not allowing a paper to be 
published. Hence, inclusion or exclusion does not automatically connote rejection of a paper. 
The Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association is a rcfel"ccd journal that contains selected papers aoo 
abstracts of papers presented at the annual meeting. The editor(s) and the Executive Board serves as the editorial 
board. The editor(s) of The Proceedings disclaim(s) any responsibility for the scholarship, statement of fact aoo 
opinion, and/or the conclusions of the contributors. 
COPYRIGHT 1996 
The South Carolina Historical Association supplies THE PROCEEDINGS to all of its members and affiliates. 
Beginning in 1935, every fifth number contains an index for the preceding five years. 
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Long-Tenn Origins of the Social Security Act of 1935 
Tammy S. Sugarman 
Representing the American Association for Social Security, Abraham Epstein testified before the House of 
Representatives Ways and Means Committee in 1935 that" ... all of the proposals [concerning the Economic 
Security Act] that you have before you are not something revolutionary or new .... It is merely because we have 
neglected it [provisions against insecurity] for so long that the whole thing looks so new."l The proposals of the 
Social Security Act of 1935 conceived by the Committee on Economic Security (CES) charged with drafting social 
security legislation in 1934-1935, were not based on original investigations. J. Douglas Brown, a staff consultant 
to the CES, observed that the committee "was in large measure but extending and supplementing the principles 
inherent in the succession of old-age pension bills which had already been urged on Congress. "2 
Prior to the Great Depression, legislation in the area of old age pensions and unemployment compensation 
was primarily confined to the state and local levels. Agitation for social security may have continued in that direction 
if the abominable economic conditions that prevailed during the Great Depression had not brought widespread public 
attention to the plight of the unemployed and destitute elderly. Once existing sources of aid such as private charities, 
almshouses, business and industry proved unable to provide adequate economic assistance and mitigate social unrest, 
the public looked to the federal government for direct and active responses.3 Because the Depression redirected a long-
standing American tradition of social insurance, the long-tenn origins of social security can be defined as social 
insurance measures in existence before 1933. These include the Civil War pension system, public and private 
charity, trade union and industrial pension plans, social insurance reformers and reform movements, and individual 
state plans. 
Early agitation for social insurance in the United States centered on providing financial relief and benefits to 
the destitute elderly. The first large association of Americans to benefit from a federal pension program were Union 
veterans of the Civil War. The first pension law, enacted in 1862, and intended to provide assistance to veterans aoo 
their dependents, classified benefit payments as "military costs," not welfare expenditures. With the pension plan 
federally funded and centrally administered by the Pension Bureau in Washington, Republican Party politicians 
gained support at election time by promising voters generous benefits, obtainable as a result of the constant 
liberalization of pension criteria.4 By 1906, the condition of "old age" (age sixty-two years and older) was considered 
a sufficient "disability" to receive a pension.5 By 1912, the Civil War pension program had developed into an 
elaborate welfare system that provided benefits to many of the country's disabled, elderly and destitute.6 Isaac 
Rubinow, a prominent social insurance advocate of the time stated, "It is childish ... to speak of the millions spent 
for war pensions as the cost of the 'Civil War.' We are clearly dealing here with an economic measure which aims to 
solve the problem of dependent old age and widowhood. "7 Regardless of how expansive the Civil War pension 
system had become by the early twentieth century, it was nevertheless originally intended to benefit people in a 
specific category; those considered to have made a valuable contribution to the country by fighting to preserve the 
Union. As Rubinow observed, "a very large majority of the wage-working class get very little of the war pension."8 
One legacy from the Civil War pension system to the Social Security Act of 1935 was the idea that 
pensioners should not be supported solely because they were elderly or poor, but should "earn benefits." Because the 
party patronage system following the Civil War resulted in ever-increasing demands for expanded benefits, mistrust 
regarding the competence of federal government administration lingered. Social insurance advocate Henry Seager put 
it this way in 1910: "Our experience with national military pensions has not predisposed us to favor national 
pensions of any kind. "9 
The American ethic at the beginning of the twentieth century included a "commitment to individualism . . . 
and self help" to alleviate the needs of the elderly and unemployed. to The elderly and unemployed were expected to 
live on accumulated savings or depend upon family members for support. For persons without these means, social 
welfare and relief centered on private charity, local poor-laws and public almshouses. Benevolent homes for the aged 
and destitute, run by churches, fraternal organizations and other private groups, were usually only open to people 
meeting specific qualifications, and required monthly maintenance fees from residents.11 Local poor-law relief, 
extended to poor persons in the fonn of food and/or clothing assistance, was equally sparse. A 1930 Report of the 
New York State Commission on Old Age Security described the residents of public almshouses as "inmates. 
regimented as though in a prison or penal colony," and concluded:" ... our present public almshouse care of the 
aged, as of all inmates, is inadequate and altogether unsuited to meet the varying needs of the poor." 12 A 1925 study 
by the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare concluded that, "The relief given [to the needy] ... is rarely adequate or 
constructive or humane; and always it carries with it the stigma and the reproach of pauperism." 13 
Despite the blatant inadequacy of private charity and public assistance to aid the indigent in the early part of 
the century, most Americans were staunch advocates of these types of systems of relief. People believed that if social 
welfare benefits were easily obtained or not stigmatized as charity, others would have no incentive to work hard aoo 
accumulate personal savings to support themselves. Opponents of state sponsored relief also argued that use of 
public funds would lead to socialism, moral decay, and higher taxes. As late as 1932 President Herbert Hoover 
defended the effectiveness of private charity remarking, "We can take courage and pride in the effective work of. . . 
voluntary organizations for the provision of employment, for the relief of distress.. . never before in a great 
depression has there been so systematic a protection against distress."14 Social workers disputed the effectiveness of 
this "systematic protection." As Leon Swift of the Family Welfare Association of America declared before the United 
States Senate in 1931, "Many of us have said for a long time ... that it is impossible through the raising of private 
funds to meet even the normal relief needs of most American communities." 15 Unfortunately, "voluntarism became 
the great American substitute for social action and policy," even though it could not meet the demands of the aged 
and poor. 16 
The inadequacy of private and public facilities, the high cost of sustaining almshouses, and the stigma 
attached to people who sought relief from these mechanisms all contributed to Roosevelt's insistence that a national 
social security system should not be administered as a "dole" for poor relief. Provisions in the Social Security Act of 
1935 for compulsory employee contributions to old-age insurance were in part a response to public sentiment 
favoring annuity rights in ol~
1 
age earned as a result of worthwhile contributions to society after many years of haxd 
work,17 and the" ... logical result of the failure of the voluntary systems."18 
Trade unions and industry provided a limited number of pensions to workers. Murray Latimer, later a 
member of the Technical Board of the CES, noted in his 1928 study of old age pensions that most trade union 
pension funds" ... have remained solvent only because of expansion in membership."19 Because unions found it 
nearly impossible to increase members' assessments during the Depression, many plans went bankrupt. In this 
period of rising unemployment when pensions were most needed, associations were unable to provide benefits.20 
Epstein concluded that" ... the trade union old age benefit funds are generally insecure and, at best, they can help 
only a small number [of workers]."21 
In the years after World War I, Americans embraced the idea of "welfare capitalism" which promoted the 
belief that the business community could and would provide economic security for Americans. One way industry 
appeared to do this was through the establishment of industrial pension plans run by employers to provide benefits 
to retired workers. Industry was basically interested in using pensions to control workers and maintain a stable labor 
force, so most pension plans restricted workers' mobility; minimum continuous service requirements of 20 to 25 
years to qualify for a company pension were common.22 And, because industrial pension plans were ..... established 
without actuarial provisions and no legal guarantees [for the beneficiaries]," they" ... could be suspended, reduced or 
revoked at the employer's option."23 The inability of industrial pension schemes to". . . provide any large 
proportion of industrial workers with protection against old age dependency," and the high cost and instability of 
these plans, convinced labor and industry leaders that substantial federal support was required if company plans were 
to be effective.24 
Trade union and industrial pension plans served "as examples in framing the Social Security Act of 
1935. "25 While realizing "the shortcomings ... of private pension plans in meeting the needs of the whole 
population"26 the CES hoped that the best concepts of the private plans "might properly be reflected in a general 
program for old-age security;"27 In an effort to abolish the prohibitive length-of-service stipulations that existed in 
many industrial plans, the CES recommended establishment of a uniform federal old age pension system to eliminate 
the loss of benefits arising from workers' mobility between industries and across state lines. The CES also took into 
consideration the trade union and industrial plans' problems with insufficient accumulation of reserve funds by 
recommending to President Roosevelt that the federal government financially contribute to the old age pension 
system to guarantee its stability.28 r 
Critics of private pension plans in the 1920s and 1930s charged that "industrial pension and welfare work 
can never meet the demands of the aged workers; in no [other] country have ... voluntary provisions been used as a 
substitute for social legislation or insurance."29 In response to the inadequacies of the prevailing mechanisms, social 
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insurance reformers advocated "a broad social policy rather than . . . haphaz.ard individual and charitable methods of 
relief to assist the aged and unemployed.30 Most social reformers agreed that this meant a federally-sponsored and, 
many hoped, federally-funded old age insurance and unemployment compensation plan. 
Prior to 1935, social insurance proponents investigated European old age and unemployment insurance 
programs, introduced theories concerning causes and remedies for unemployment in the United States, and publicized 
their findings in books, articles, at conferences and through organizations such as the American Association for 
Labor Legislation (AALL), the Fraternal Order of Eagles, and the American Association for Old Age Security 
(AAOAS). Reformers initially concentrated on encouraging state legislation. After 1930, when the depression 
overshadowed the American public's apprehension of government abuse of welfare spending, these reformers helped 
in " .. focusing public consciousness on the need for a nationwide social insurance system."31 The AALL, the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles and the AAOAS each embraced disparate philosophies regarding unemployment and old age 
insurance, and translated their ideas into different proposals for a "nation-wide" social insurance system. 
After success in the areas of workmen's compensation and industrial safety laws, the AALL focused on 
promoting unemployment insurance and other measures to help the jobless.32 In 1912 AALL co-founder John 
Andrews stated that unemployment" ... is not only the most difficult but the most important problem with which 
we will have to deal in the coming years. "33 At the organization's Second National Conference on Unemployment 
in December 1914, Andrews and John Commons34 suggested that if employers could "regularize" industry, they 
could "prevent" unemployment. The AALL's blueprint, "A Practical Program for the Prevention of Unemployment 
in America," was based on the belief that unemployment could be controlled and stabilized by industry. In what 
became known as the "American approach to unemployment insurance,"35 the AALL am·anced the theory that 
businesses would enact reforms to improve working conditions if given economic incentives, such as a reduction in 
taxes based on record of employment, to do so.36 Richard Ely emphasized that the AALL wanted to "make the state 
a safe place for enterprise and industry [and at the same time improve] labor conditions ... to help the weaker classes 
of the community." Members of the AALL encouraged change within the existing capitalist system, "by means of 
agreement among capital, labor and public-minded reformers and officials. "37 Edwin Witte, a student of Commons' 
at the University of Wisconsin, brought these ideas to Washington as Executive Director of the CES, saying, "I owe 
to Commons my entire outlook on life and a great many of my ideas. "38 
The Fraternal Order of Eagles centered their efforts on promoting a "systematic provision for old-age 
security other than enforced institutional care."39 In 1922 Frank Hering, chairman of the Fraternal Order of Eagles' 
National Commission on Old Age Pensions, united with Andrews and the AALL to sponsor a single uniform bill 
on old age insurance. This "standard bill" proposed a money grant for persons over the age of seventy with no other 
means of support, but did not include provisions for workers' contributions. Thecefore, it was seen as another form 
of poor relief, administered by the state instead of through private organizations.40 As a result of the Eagles' 
campaign for old age insurance, by 1928 six state legislatures had enacted old age insurance laws, but state 
governments did not appropriate funds to administer them.41 Hence, security for the elderly through old age pension 
laws, a critic noted, was "more apparent than real."42 
Unhappy with the lack of success and direction of the old age insurance movement, Epstein founded the 
AAOAS in 1927 to ... promote adequate protection for the dependent aged through either state old age pensions or 
contributory government insurance plans."43 The organization also promoted pension plans as a way to alleviate 
unemployment by removing the elderly from competition for existing jobs, thereby reducing the labor supply. In 
addition, the AAOAS advanced the theory that "the money distributed through pensions would ... increase purchasing 
power and thereby help to create many new jobs."44 In order to provide " ... leg!slators and executives with 
carefully prepared facts and figures and an arsenal of arguments favoring old age pensions," Epstein undertook 
comprehensive studies of existing old-age pension laws in the United States, and European and South American 
social insurance plans.45 
As a result of his studies, Epstein was convinced that any viable social insurance program ". . .aiming at 
stability and adequacy ... [must] divide the costs equitably among employers, employees and the government." 
Employers should contribute because the provision for workers' security was "a legitimate charge upon 
production."46 Epstein was especially adamant that the government participate in funding both old age am 
unemployment insurance: ''The obligation of the government to contribute to the cost of social insurance cannot be 
questioned. It has ever been the duty of the state to protect and promote the welfare of its citizens."47 Sensitive to 
the lack of widespread support for a national social insurance program, Epstein worked to". . . secure the passage of 
old age legislation in key states" in the belief that it would persuade" ... election conscious Congressmen [to] take 
some action to institute a nation-wide system of protection for the aged."48 To secure workable state old age 
3 
insurance laws, Epstein and the AAOAS announced their old age security bill in 1928. Unlike the previous standard 
bill, the AAOAS bill included arrangements for state administration and funding, and did not penalii.e beneficiaries 
for any personal savings or o~er income they rcceived.49 Although many states perceived the plan to be too costly 
to finance and administer,50 Epstein proudly noted," ... while at the end of 1928 only one out of the six pension 
states provided for state contributions, to-day [ 1933] twelve out of twenty-four have adopted the state-aid plan. "51 
Despite its moderate success, Epstein and AAOAS maintained that a contributory national old age pension 
plan was required because all states did not legislate "a system of compulsory contributory old age insurance" which 
was essential if the United States was to enact "the most adequate long-range program. "52 Although Epstein, 
Andrews and other social insurance advocates testified before the House Committee on Labor that". . . some kind of 
federal legislation looking toward decreasing the economic insecurity of the aged was urgently needed," none of the 
federal bills introduced between 1927 - 1930 was ever reported out of committee.53 According to Epstein, "the first 
progress in federal legislation was made in 1932," when Senator Clarence Dill(Dem) and Representative William P. 
Connery, Jr.(Dem) introduced a bill authored by the AAOAS.54 Eventually known as the Dill-Connery old age bill, 
the measure was favorably reported to the floor of the House and Senate and debated, but lacking White House 
support, did not pass.55 
Realizing that the country was becoming more preoccupied with unemployment than with old age 
security, in 1933 Epstein renamed his organization the American Association for Social Security (AASS) and took 
up the fight for unemployment insurance.56 Epstein and the AASS championed an unemployment system based on 
the British model, that emphasii.ed contributions from employers, employees and the public treasury, in order to 
establish" ... an effective system of guaranteed benefits."57 1be AASS supported the fundamental precept of the 
Ohio plan Rubinow helped develop: "unemployment insurance, being social insurance, has a specific social purpose, 
to relieve distress." The organization emphasii.ed that an unemployment plan should not be" ... called upon to 
express any opinion whether unemployment is preventable, and if so, how."58 Rejection of the Wisconsin 
prevention and stabilization approach to unemployment insurance caused Epstein and the AASS to publicly break 
with the AALL and its promotion of the American Plan. Epstein charged that the Wisconsin plan" . . . is not 
workable.. it is essentially contrary to all social insurance ideas. "59 1be AASS insisted that any worthwhile 
unemployment plan would have to include employee and government contributions, fearing that "noncontributory 
unemployment insurance is bound to degenerate into some sort of dole."60 Epstein and the AASS fought to 
incorporate provisions of the Ohio plan and European experiences into state laws. They were most successful in 
New York, Massachusetts and Ohio where unemployment insurance laws were passed, although only the New York 
and Massachusetts laws went into effect before the Social Security Act of 1935 mandated compulsory contributions 
from employers.61 
The AALL, the Fraternal Order of Eagles and the AAOAS/AASS were instrumental in keeping the issues 
of old age and unemployment insurance as prominent discussion topics prior to the Social Security Act of 1935. 
"More than any other one man," one author wrote, "Epstein was responsible for the fact that, by decade's end, social 
insurance was again a live idea in America ... "62 And, although they battled for different unemployment plans, the 
AALL and AASS both played a vital role in pressing the states and the federal government to enact legislation in 
this area. Individual states' old age pension and unemployment laws, secuml by these refonn movements prior to 
1934, served as models for the Social Security Act of 1935. 
Although most progress in state old age pension legislation occurred between 1931 and 1934, the preceding 
thirty years had witnessed some state government discussion on the topic. Initially, states set up commissions to" .. 
. investigate conditions of [the] aged and to propose improved methods of caring for them."63 By 1928 state 
legislatures had considered three hundred bills dealing with this question. Nearly all of the proposed bills were for 
poor relief; benefits were limited according to a person's income, property ownership and savings, and most were 
non-contributory plans. As one 1928 investigation revealed," ... the movement in the United States toward payment 
of old age pensions by state ... governments has barely got underway."64 
By 1932 seventeen states had some type of old age pension law in effect; seven were optional laws and ten 
were mandatory.65 A 1932 study by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics found that "the weakness of the optional 
laws [was in] putting the whole cost upon the individual counties."66 The comments of the Delaware old age 
commission reflect the problems that all states experienced: "it is utterly impossible ... to meet the whole needs of 
the aged people of our State with the appropriation given." As the Depression worsened, "unprecedented demands on 
relief funds in all the counties," increased, and pensions were paid only "at intervals when funds [were] available." 
Prior to passage of the Social Security Act, all of the state legislation that h&a been enacted was intended to 
provide for old age assistance through relief payments, and not to establish old age insurance plans. 1be CES found 
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the "lack of precedents or convictions for any particular form of old-age insurance in this country . . . a marlced 
advantage," when designing the federal old age insurance program. Without state laws to conflict with their proposed 
legislation, the CES felt free to recommend a purely national plan, rather than a joint state-federal plan. The failure 
of state pension plans to provide guaranteed benefit payments to their elderly populations contributed to the CES' 
decision that an old age pension plan must be funded in a way other than by state means, and must be compulsory, 
not optional or voluntary .67 
State governments were no more successful in enacting unemployment compensation laws than they ha:l 
been in legislating old age pension bills. The failure of most states in this endeavor can be attributed to a fear that 
states without unemployment compensation laws would enjoy an "unfair competitive advantage" over those states 
that provided unemployment insurance to their wage earners.68 The two leading states in the unemployment 
insurance movement, Wisconsin and Ohio, provided the CES with the foundation for recommendations regarding a 
national unemployment plan.69 
The Groves Bill, written by Elizabeth Brandeis and Paul Rauschenbush, was introduced into the Wisconsin 
legislature in 1930. This bill was based on the AALL American Plan, and provided for a reserve system of employer 
contributions pooled into an employer-controlled state unemployment fund, ". . . to which all payments of benefits 
to ... employees were to be 'charged. "70 Employer contributions varied according to the company's past record of 
employment. This "merit rating" was supposed to provide incentive for businesses to keep unemployment rates 
down by" ... giving the competitive advantage to the business concern that manages to provide steady employment 
for its workers."71 However the bill, as passed in 1932, provided for segregated unemployment reserves distinct for 
each business unit (not pooled funds), and was "essentially a stabilization rather than a relief measure."72 The law 
did not go into effect until 1934 due to "the slowness with which employers in Wisconsin moved to set up 
[unemployment reserves] ... under the state law."73 Nevertheless, the Wisconsin unemployment law" ... was the 
only concrete result of all the numerous endorsements of unemployment compensation and the years of effort for the 
enactment of state legislation."74 
President Roosevelt "was thoroughly familiar not only with the progressive legislation for which 
Wisconsin was famous, but also with the philosophy underlying its development and enactment. "75 As a result of 
their successful experience with state unemployment legislation, President Roosevelt selected Wisconsin-educated 
reformers to comprise the CES. Witte and Arthur Altmeyer drew upon their backgrounds in Wisconsin law when 
drafting the Social Security Act. Several authors have noted that "the admirers of.. . the Wisconsin Plan were 
important in the deliberations leading to the unemployment provisions in the national level Social Security Act of 
1935."76 
The state of Ohio also sponsored a detailed unemployment compensation plan. In contrast to the Wisconsin 
Plan's goal of unemployment prevention, the Ohio Plan adopted the European social insurance tradition of 
unemployment relief, which was a social responsibility and a necessity," ... regardless of the incidence of the cost 
upon particular industries."77 Drafted in 1932, the Ohio Plan was a compulsory plan that proposed" ... the cost of 
insurance, the premfom, be shared by capital and labor," and placed into a publicly controlled single pooled fund, to 
broadly distribute the risk and "spread the costs of unemployment benefits among industries."78 In this way, 
national income would be more equitably distributed as a result of capital's contribution to the unemployment fund. 
Unlike the Wisconsin philosophy, the Ohio Plan did not countenance the belief that a merit rating would encourage 
industry to reduce unemployment because, the authors stated, it was beyond the power of individual businesses to 
control the incidence of unemployment. The plan stressed that the purpose of unemployment insurance was to 
guarantee security and relief for workers, not to stabilize the economy. 79 
The significant influence of the Wisconsin group on the CES helped ideas such as the merit rating and 
segregated funds to be included in the Social Security Act of 1935. However, "the application of the principles of the 
Ohio plan to a unified national scheme" was also partially realized, as the Social Security Act provided a 
compulsory, obligatory unemployment compensation plan.SO In its attempt to reconcile the aims of the Wisconsin 
and Ohio Plans, the CES endeavored to write the Social Security Act in a way that would " ... make it possible for 
the states to pass unemployment compensation laws and to induce them to do so. "81 By recommending a 
compulsory law that would require" ... industries in all States ... [to] make uniform payroll contributions," the" .. 
. unfair competitive advantage [of] employers operating in states which have failed to adopt a compensation system" 
would be eliminated.82 
The Social Security Act of 1935 represented the culmination of years of unsuccessful attempts to provide 
security for Americans through public and private charity, trade union and industrial pension plans, and state 
legislation. Before the introduction of the Social Security Act, events conclusively demonstrated that old age and 
5 
unemployment insurance, necessary for the security of Americans, was ineffectual without federal aid, legislation, 
and some form of federal administration. It is clear that the basis for this federal plan came from the conception, 
discussion, examination and publication of the ideas and proposals of social reformers, state legislators, industry and 
labor. The Social Security Act of 1935 was not a result of the federal government following an unmarked, 
revolutionary path. Rather, it was the logical outcome of the lessons learned from the preceding one hundred years of 
American and European social insurance investigation and experimentation. 
Endnotes 
1. United States Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Economic Security Act: Hearings, 74th 
Congress, 1st session, 1935, p.463. 
2. J. Douglas Brown, '"The Development of the Old-Age Insurance Provisions of the Social Security Act," Law and 
Contemporary Problems (April 1936): 187. 
3. Most historians agree that the Depression was the impetus for initiating federal legislation. However, Arthur 
Altmeyer, chairman of the Technical Board of the Economic Security Committee, expressed doubts that the 
Depression "caused" the government to enact a long-range social program for the purpose of preventing as well as 
alleviating economic hazards. Arthur J. Altmeyer, 'The Formative Years of Social Security (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1966), p.9. 
4. Margaret Weir, Ann Shol!l Orloff and Theda Skocpol, eds., 'The Politics of Social Policy in the United States 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.46. 
5. Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, p.128. Veterans were no longer re.quired to show that their disability 
originated in injuries actually incurred during the Civil War. 
6. By the tum of the century, approximately one million elderly Americans received benefits (one-half of all elderly, 
native-born men in the North). Weir, Orloff and Skocpol, Politics of Social Policy, p.38. 
7. Social Insurance. with Special Reference to American Conditions, 1913, quoted in Skoepol, Protecting Soldiers 
and Mothers, p. l 02. 
8. Social Insurance. with Special Reference to American Conditions, 1913, quoted in Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers 
and Mothers, p.135. 
9. Ann Shola Orloff, The Politics of Pensions (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), p.237. 
10. Weir, Orloff and Skocpol, Politics of Social Policy, p.11. 
11. Ibid., pp.515-516. 
12. Report of the New York State Commission on Old Age Security, pp.395-396, quoted in Epstein, Insecurity, 
pp.508-509. 
13. Poor Relief in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Department of Welfare, p.59, quoted in Epstein, Insecurity, p.513. 
14. New York Times, February 21, 1932, as quoted in Epstein, Insecurity, p.162. 
6 
15. Epstein, Ins. 
16. Roy Lubove 
17. Under the o 
labor and insura 
Social Security , 
18. Abraham EJ 
1928), p.211. 
19. Murray W. 
Latimer provide 
20. Members cc 
Aged, p.197. 
21. Epstein, Ch 
22. Epstein, Cl 
way for the em1 
"guarantee" of 
Capitalism and 
23.Lubove,Sb 
24. Quadagno, 
25. Barbara G. 
of 1935." Mid-. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Brown, "OJ 
28. Ibid., pp. 1 
29. Epstein, Cl 
30. Ibid., p.20 
31. Louis Leot 
32. Weir, Orio 
33. Daniel Nel 
34. John Com 
students. Co11 
while Andrcwi 
35. Nelson, t 
emphasized th! 
aid, legislation, 
the conception, 
•rs, industry 800 
: an unmarked, 
illndred years of 
Hearings, 74th 
Act," Law 800 
owever, Arthur 
loubts that the 
1ting as well as 
1: University of 
: United States 
their disability 
' of all elderly, 
:<:ting Soldiers 
icting Soldiers 
n, Insecurity, 
rity, p.513. 
15. Epstein, Insecurity, pp.163-164. 
16. Roy Lubove, The Struggle for Social Security. 1900-1935 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.2. 
17. Under the contributory plan workers would "be receiving not charity, but the natural profits of their years of 
labor and insurance." Franklin Roosevelt as quoted in Mark H. Leff, ''Taxing the 'Forgotten Man': The Politics of 
Social Security Finance in the New Deal," Journal of American History 70 (September 1983): 373. 
18. Abraham Epstein, The Challenge of the Aged, with a Forward by Jane Addams (New York: Vanguard Press, 
1928), p.211. 
19. Murray W. Latimer, "Old Age Pensions in America," American Labor Legislation Review 19 (1929): 64-65. 
Latimer provides a list of the chief provisions of the majority of trade union pension schemes. 
20. Members contributed three-fourths of one percent of their earnings to the pension fund. Epstein, Challenge of the 
Aged, p.197. 
21. Epstein, Challenge of the Aged, p.205. 
22. Epstein, Challenge of the Aged. p. 163. Jill Quadagno asserts that the continuous service stipulations were a 
way for the employers to prevent workers from striking, and make workers accept a lower wage in exchange for the 
"guarantee" of a pension benefit if all requirements were satisfactorily fulfilled. Jill S. Quadagno, ''Welfare 
Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935," American Sociological Review 49 (October 1984): 637. 
23. Lubove, Struggle for Social Security, p.129; Quadagno, "Welfare Capitalism," p.637. 
24. Quadagno, "Welfare Capitalism," p.638. 
25. Barbara G. Brents, "Capitalism, Corporate Liberalism and Social Policy: The Origins of the Social Security Act 
of 1935." Mid-American Review of Sociology 9 (1984): 29. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Brown, "Old-Age Insurance Provisions," p.190. 
28. Ibid., pp. 197-198. 
29. Epstein, Challenge of the Aged, p. viii. 
30. Ibid., p.207. 
31. Louis Leotta, "Abraham Epstein and the Movement for Old Age Sccurity,"Labor History (Summer 1975): 359. 
32. Weir, Orloff and Skocpol, Politics of Social Policy, p.58. 
33. Daniel Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p.14. 
34. John Commons was on the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, and Andrews was one of his graduate 
students. Commons served as an administrator of the Wisconsin workmen's compensation act from 1911-1913, 
while Andrews was executive secretary of the AALL. 
35. Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, pp. 16-17. Witte pointed out that unemployment insurance champions 
emphasized the word "American" to distinguish the plan from the British system which was in "low repute" in the 
7 
United States in the 1920s. Many Americans called the British system a "dole," that mistakenly exercised "coddling 
of the unemployed." Witte, "Unemployment Compensation," pp. 24-25. 
36. One author emphasized that " ... widespread consideration of his [Commons'] proposal flowed from the business 
optimism that characteri7.ed the twenties," before unemployment rates skyrocketed during the depression. Harry 
Malisoff, "The Emergence of Unemployment Compensation I," Political Science Ouarterlv 54 (June 1939): 243. 
37. Theron F. Schlabach, Edwin E. Witte: Cautious Reformer, with a Forward by Wilbur J. Cohen (Madison: State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1969), p.81. 
38. Schlabach, Edwin E. Witte, p.19. 
39. Barbara N. Armstrong, "Old-Age Security Abroad: The Background of Titles Il and vm of the Social Security 
Act," Law and Contemporary Problems (April 1936): 185. 
40. The bill also stipulated a home residency requirement of fifteen years and personal property value of less than 
three thousand dollars. The benefit provided was not to exceed one dollar pee day. Ibid., p.363. 
41. The six states that authorized old age pensions under state law were Colorado, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, 
Nevada, Wisconsin, and the territory of Alaska. Latimer, "Old Age Pensions," p.57. 
42. Leotta, "Epstein and Old Age Security," p.363. 
43. Epstein, Challenge of the Aged, p.291. 
44. Epstein, Insecurity, pp.270-271. 
45. Leotta, "Epstein and Old Age Security," p.367. 
46. Abraham Epstein, "Security for Americans I: Social Insurance Comes to the Fore," New Republic, 21 
November 1934, p.38. 
47. Epstein, Insecurity, p.42. 
48. Leotta, "Epstein and Old Age Security," p.375. 
49. Fifty percent of the funding was to come from the state, and fifty percent from the county. Ibid., p.368. 
50. The states that pMSed some fonn of the AAOAS bill were New York, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania inl 
Missouri. Ibid., pp.368, 370. 
51. Epstein, Insecurity, p.537. 
52. Ibid., p.547. 
53. Ibid., pp.373-374. 
54. Epstein, Insecurity, p.533. 
55. Epstein wrote, "Had President Roosevelt said one word in its [Dill-Connery bill] favor, it would have been 
enacted into law ... " Epstein, "Social Insurance Comes to the Fore," p.39. Leotta brought up the point that 
ironically, it was because of Epstein's success in bringing the idea of old age pensions to the attention of the 
country, that Roosevelt dccidcd not to back the Dill-Connery bill, and instead called for an investigation into a 
comprehensive social insurance program. 
8 
56. Most authors 
association. Kem 
states that "Epste 
Social Security, 1 
51. Nelson, Uner 
way to increase ti 
58. Schlabach, E 
59. Nelson, Une1 
60. Ibid., p.196. 
61. Ibid., p.187. 
62. Davis, ''The 
pension movemt 
on Roosevelt ca 
benefits to be pa 
1937 Roosevelt 
basis. It means 1 
63. Epstein, Chi 
Insurance and 0 
various types o. 
expensive way tr 
of each state's pi 
64. Latimer, "O 
65. These seve, 
contained appro 
discretion of in 
funding to the c 
Monthly Labor 
66. Ibid., p.252. 
five percent of 
states with man 
67. Brown, "Ol 
68. Witte, "Un 
York, Connect 
legislation. lbic 
from 1921 unti 
compensation . 
Compensation, 
69. Lubove, St 
70. Witte, "Un 
xercised "coddling 
from the business 
epression. Hany 
IC 1939): 243. 
1 (Madison: State 
e Social Security 
,aJue of less than 
ryland, Montana, 
w Republic, 21 
p.368. 
ennsylvania m:I 
ould have been 
the point that 
1ttention of the 
tigation into a 
56. Most authors agree that Roosevelt adopted the phrase "social security" from Epstein's use of the term for his new 
association. Kenneth Davis, "The Birth of Social Security," American Heritage 30 (April/May 1979): 44. Altmeyer 
states that "Epstein was the person most responsible for introducing the term [social security]." Formative Years of 
Social Security, p.4. 
57. Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, p. 195. The AASS primarily pushed to include employee contributions as a 
way to increase the dollar amount of benefit payments. 
58. Schlabach, Edwin E. Witte, p.90. 
59. Nelson, Unemployment Insurance, p.195. 
,60. Ibid., p.196. 
61. Ibid., p.187. 
62. Davis, "The Birth of Social Security," p.43. Lubove also wrote, "Epstein contributed more to the old-age 
pension movement than any single individual." Struggle for Social Security, p.143. The influence of Epstein's ideas 
on Roosevelt can be seen in FDR's address to the conference of governors in 1930 when he called for "old-age 
benefits to be paid out of joint contributions by employers, employees, and government." To Epstein's dismay, by 
1937 Roosevelt remarked, ". . . I prefer it [Social Security financing] to be contributed . . . on a sound actuarial 
basis. It means no money out of the Treasury." Davis, "The Birth of Social Security," pp.43, 48. 
63. Epstein, Challenge of the Aged, p.263. The Wisconsin Industrial Commission, Ohio Commission on Health 
Insurance and Old Pensions and commissions in Pennsylvania, Indiana, Montana, Virginia and Arizona all proposed 
various types of old age pension schemes from 1900 to 1921, after concluding that pensions would be a less 
expensive way to provide relief for the elderly than charitable grants and almshouses. Epstein reports the provisions 
of each state's proposed plan in Ibid., pp.264-274. 
64. Latimer, "Old Age Pensions in America," pp.57-58. 
65. These seventeen states (KY, MD, MN, MT, NV, WV, WI, CA, CO, DE, ID, MA, NH, NJ, NY, UT, WY) 
contained approximately thirty-four percent of the total United States population in 1932. Optional plans were at the 
discretion of individual counties for ·funding and administration. Mandatory plans usually provided some state 
funding to the counties. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Experience Under State Old-Age Pension Laws in 1932," 
Monthly Labor Review 37 (August 1933): 251,257. 
66. Ibid., p.252. The study concluded that in those states with voluntary or optional old age pension laws, twenty-
five percent of the population received benefits, whereas ninety-one percent of the population received benefits in 
states with mandatory old age pension laws. 
67. Brown, "Old-Age lnsW'8JlCC Provisions," p.191. 
68. Witte, "Unemployment Insurance," pp. 162-163. In the 1920s, several states including Massachusetts, New 
York, Connecticut, Minnesota and Wisconsin unsuccessfully attempted to enact some type of unemployment 
legislation. Ibid., p.157. Wisconsin introduced the Huber Bill, drafted by Commons, into state legislative sessions 
from 1921 until 1931. This bill "marked the first legislative step in the direction of compulsory unemployment 
compensation ... and served to further discussion throughout the country." Malisoff, "Emergence of Unemployment 
Compensation," p.244. 
69. Lubove, Struggle for Social Security, p.174. 
70. Witte, "Unemployment Compensation," p.25. 
9 
71. Elizabeth Brandeis, "Security for Americans ill: Wisconsin's Start on Job Insurance," New Republic, 5 December 
1934, p.94. 
72. Ibid., p.95; Walter A. Morton, ''lbc Aims of Unemployment Insurance with Especial Reference to the 
Wisconsin Act," The American Economic Review 23 (September 1933): 395. 
73. Malisoff, "Emergence of Unemployment Compensation," p.247. 
74. Witte, "Unemployment ,Insurance," p.158. The law excluded some categories of workers such as agricultural 
laborers, limited benefit collection to ten weeks, and stipulated that contributions be made solely by the employer. 
Brandeis provides a detailed look at the Wisconsin law, "Wisconsin's Start on Job Insurance," pp.94-97. 
75. Arthur J. Altmeyer, "The Wisconsin Idea and Social Security," Wisconsin Magazine of History 42 (1958): 21. 
76. William Domhoff, "Corporate-Liberal Theory and the Social Security Act: A Chapter in the Sociology of 
Knowledge," Politics and Society 15 (1986-87): 310; Brents, "Corporate Liberalism," p.31; Davis, ''The Birth of 
Social Security," p.44. A good example of the Wisconsin group's influence on the recommendations of the CES can 
be seen in the Report of the Advisory Council of the CES that echoes the Wisconsin Plan's prevention aim by 
stating: "the [unemployment compensation plan] should serve as an incentive to employers to provide steady work 
anc to prevent unemployment." Witte, "Unemployment Insurance," p.163. 
77. Morton, "Unemployment Insurance and Wisconsin Act," p.396. 
78. Isaac M. Rubinow, "Security for Americans II: The Ohio Plan of Unemployment Insurance," New Republic, 28 
November 1934, p.65; Quadagno, "Welfare Capitalism," p.636. 
79. Rubinow, "Ohio Plan of Unemployment Insurance," p.65. Other provisions of the Ohio Plan included a Sixteen 
week benefit period at approximately half-pay. 
80. Ibid., p.66. 
81. Witte, "Unemployment Insurance," p. 167. 
82. Ibid., pp.163, 165. 
10 
TheGrci 
United States. Ui 
federal assistance 
enacted a series c 
stimulate an eco11 
with the immedia 
Social S 
for the act's ove, 
groups with seen 
members of both 
Although none o 
support for this 
most popular am1 
was also popula 
humanitarian, po 
The mo 
broad-based pop1 
social reformers 
union leaders, sc 
American Assoc 
Perkins, got inv 
debated social sc 
laws. Though t 
indicates broad s 
Not on 
across party line 
pension progran: 
state matching o 
for a federal soci 
SupJ 
responsibility, 1 
People who supJ 
helped maintain 
regular earning : 
consumption of 
unemployment 1 
further drop in p 
Humai 
this ilk recogni2J 
Representatives 
evidenced in hut 
blic, 5 December 
~fercnce to the 
ti as agricultural 
1y the employer. 
97. 
~2 (1958): 21. 
1e Sociology of 
;, "The Birth of 
of the CES can 
:vention aim by 
ride steady work 
:w Republic, 28 
luded a Sixteen 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT: 
WHO SUPPORTED IT, AND WHY 
Julia Sloan 
The Great Depression created widespread economic upheaval of a magnitude never before experienced in the 
United States. Unemployment reached staggering proportions, and the number of Americans in need of some type of 
federal assistance rose dramatically. The federal government. under the leadership of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
enacted a series of sweeping social and economic reforms to provide for the needs of the American people and to 
stimulate an economic recovery. One such piece oflegislation was the Social Security Act of 1935, designed to deal 
with the immediate economic crisis and to create a permanent system for government relief. 
Social Security's dual purpose of providing humanitarian aid, while promoting fiscal pragmatism, accounts 
for the act's overwhelming nationwide popularity. This duality made Social Security appealing to many diverse 
groups with seemingly contradictory interests. Among such groups were the New Deal Coalition, organized labor, 
members of both the Democratic and Republican parties, religious organizations and clergy, and business interests. 
Although none of these interest groups were completely homogeneous in their composition or unanimous in their 
support for this legislation, one can generali:ze about interest group and class-based support. Social Security was 
most popular among the middle and lower classes of American society, who stood to benefit the most from it. It 
was also popular among upper class liberals and politicians, who supported the legislation for a variety of 
humanitarian, political, and economic reasons. 
The movement for some form of social security legislation pre-dated the Depression and enjoyed fairly 
broad-based popular support before Roosevelt brought the idea to Congress in 1934. Professional social workers and 
social reformers had brought these issues into the political arena long before Roosevelt's action. I In 1906, labor 
union leaders, social workers, and academic social scientists in favor of social insurance, had united to found the 
American Association for Labor Lcgislation.2 By the time New Deal reformers, like Secretary of Labor, Frances 
Perkins, got involved, her predecessors had accomplished a good deal. By the time the House of Representatives 
debated social security in 1935, twenty-nine states, plus the territories of Alaska and Hawaii, had old age pension 
laws. Though these laws were poorly organized and inadequately funded. the fact that they existed prior to 1935 
indicates broad support nationwide for at least the old age pension portion of the Social Security Act.3 
Not only were old age pension programs well supported on the state level in the early 1930s, they also cut 
across party lines on the national level in popularity. In 1932 the Democratic national platform supported an old age 
pension program. More significantly, by mid 1934 the Republicans supported a similar program, calling for federnl-
state matching old age insurance.4 Thus, many Americans, regardless of their party affiliation, recognized the need 
for a federal social welfare program. 
Support for this legislation was based on a variety of ideas about the economy, governmental 
responsibility, and population statistics underscored by the recognition of human suffering around the country. 
People who supported social security for economic reasons argued that such measures were beneficial because they 
helped maintain purchasing power. These supporters maintained that stability in a modem economy depended upon 
regular earning and spending habits. Economists and politicians during the 1930s believed that without regular 
consumption of goods, full production was not possible.5 Their line of thinking asserted the nation would face high 
unemployment unless it maintained high levels of production. In tum, this high unemployment would lead to a 
further drop in purchasing power, thereby creating a vicious circle not easily broken. 
Humanitarian concerns provided the basis for a second argument in favor of Social Security. Proponents of 
this ilk recognized the suffering created by the Depression and sought to help those in need. According to a House of 
Representatives report, the need for social security was threefold and "on every hand the lack of such security is 
evidenced in human suffering, weakened morale, and increased public expenditures. "6 Congress thus recognized the 
11 
need to develop a system to deal with economic insecurity in the future. Consequently, there seems to have been a 
real desire on the part of congressmen and social reformers to guard against the reoccurrence of such tragedies. 
One final pre-legislation argument for social security came from a rather unlikely source, business 
interests. The Social Security Act has been considered: "the logical culmination of a quarter-centwy battle over the 
scope and costs of industrial welfare and a direct descendant of the anticompetitive business strategies of the 1930s." 
Business leaders argued that a federal social security law would aid commercial interests because it would coordinate 
and equalize industry's social responsibilities across the country. Prior to the passage of federal legislation, 
businesses in states with social welfare programs were, according to one Wisconsin manufacturer, "at [such] a 
distinct disadvantage with our competitors in other states" where no such programs existed.? Obviously, operating 
costs for industries in states with social welfare programs were much higher than for those with no such regulations 
concerning pensions and unemployment insurance. 
The standardization of these costs under a federal law became an important goal of business leaders in the 
early 1930s. The Congressional delegations of several northern industrial states including Ohio, New York, New 
Jersey, Massachusetts, and Michigan led the charge for a national law. Thus, business interests supported social 
security not for humanitarian reasons, but because in was financially prudent to do so. One historian discussing this 
so called welfare capitalism said: "U.S. welfare policy has been, in large part, a business measure in progressive 
clothing. "8 · 
When the social security legislation debate reached Congress, its widespread popularity became quite 
apparent. During the Congressional debates there was virtually no opposition to the ideological premise of the 
legislation. By far the most heated disagreements concerned the scope and administration of these programs aoo 
stt.mmed from differences in the reformist zeal of Congressional leaders. As Representative Doughton of the House 
of Representatives Ways and Means Committee stated, criticisms of social security at the committee level "were 
directed to particular features of it rather than to its fundamental purposes. "9 
Congressional leaders had a variety of reasons for supporting or opposing each title of the Social 
Security Act. For example, with regard to the old-age portion of the Social Security legislation, the major argument 
concerned population. Aside from the political expediency of humanitarian efforts, many congressmen genuinely 
believed the United States was on the verge of a population crisis. Social scientists concurred on this point aoo 
employed statistical data as evidence of the changing dynamics of the American population. Studies conducted in the 
early 1930s indicated that the elderly were beginning to constitute a larger percentage of the population. IO This 
realization led to several rather ominous predictions for future American economic prosperity and caused some 
congressmen, though not all, to desire very strict limits on old-age compensation. 
In another area. that of possible unemployment relief, the rather disturbing statistics here led many 
congressmen to believe that social legislation needed to include a program for unemployment insurance. According 
to a House of Representatives report, unemployment was a serious threat for industrial workers. Congressmen were 
quick to point out the correlation between unemployment and relief, noting that of all urban families on relief, over 
four-fifths were there because of unemployment. I I The benefits of such a program would be twofold: 
(!)unemployment insurance would help families remain financially independent, and (2)it would help reduce public 
expenditures for relief. Statistics showed that if an unemployment compensation tax had been enacted in 1922 at a 
rate of three percent, the government would have had two billion five hundred million dollars available in 1929 to 
subsidize the unemployed.12 The severity and duration of the Depression might have been greatly reduced by such 
an influx of money into the economy and the maintenance of working class purchasing power. 
A final argument in favor of the Social Security Bill as a whole had more to do with national pride aoo 
prestige in the international arena than with the needs of the American people. Several social scientists am 
politicians argued for enacting social legislation because other countries already had such programs. While the 
foundations of this argument were weaker than those of the arguments previously discussed. the importance of pride 
in the United States' role as a world leader cannot be underestimated. Representative Ellenbogen said that social 
reforms of this type were "nothing new in almost evei.y country in the world except the United States." His 
colleague in the House of Representatives, Mr. Doughton concurred, stating that social insurance programs exist in 
"practically every other progressive country in the world."13 When the final vote on the Social Security Bill 
occurred in August of 1935, such sentiments helped it win a landslide victory with all but six senators and all but 
thirty-three members of the House of Representatives voting in favor.14 As one member of the Senate said, "It is 
worthy of notice that the social-security measure aroused no important opposition in any quarter." 15 
The extreme popularity of the bill in Congress l1lllTOl'Cd its popularity in the constituencies across the 
nation as the following discussion of labor and religious groups demonstrates. 
1
Among the segments of the 
12 
population that resp 
support force. Acee 
bread-and-butter pro; 
The many social " 
"president was on th 
Indeed, sin( 
federal social welfai 
insurance with fede1 
Social Security Act 
Security, and in 1 
organizations, contii 
Another segment o 
America's churches. 
represented all level 
religious people we1 
Thus, some religio1 
reasons rooted in Ju 
Further, in 
congregations as 
organizations advoc 
Catholic Welfare Cl 
agreed upon this p 
because the idea of 1 
American churches 
temporary shelters. 
Act. 
A study c 
solicited by F.D.R. 
the Social Securit) 
discovered that the 
government policy. 
responses were nin 
Security "had brou: 
single dissenting n1 
Not only 
Security Act, they 
demonstrated by Bl 
These surveys and 
ninety percent.21 I 
Catholics in Bost, 
supported the act b 
morally because it I 
In summa 
pull the nation ou 
future. Inherent it 
recovery by stimul 
made overwhelmir 
Americans on som 
industry could app' 
difference social sc 
be seen as an effi 
responded accordin 
1s to have been a 
tragedies. 
source, business 
ry battle over the 
es of the 1930s." 
would coordinate 
deral legislation, 
1rcr, "at [such] a 
iously, operating 
such regulations 
ess leaders in the 
New York, New 
supported social 
n discussing this 
re in progressive 
rity became quite 
1 premise of the 
sc programs 300 
'On of the House 
ittcc level "were 
le of the Social 
major argument 
;smcn genuinely 
1 this point 300 
conducted in the 
Jlation.10 This 
nd caused some 
; here led many 
LIICc. According 
,ngressmen were 
on relief, over 
1ld be twofold: 
Ip reduce public 
cd in 1922 at a 
able in 1929 to 
reduced by such 
tional pride 300 
scientists am 
ns. While the 
>rtance of pride 
laid that social 
I States." His 
,grams exist in 
I Security Bill 
ors and all but 
aate said, "It is 
:ies across the 
gmcnts of the 
population that responded favorably to the passage of the Social Security Act, organiud labor stands out as a major 
support force. According to Bruce Nelson, a historian of the New Deal, the Social Security Bill was "part of the 
bread-and-butter programme that cemented the link between organised labour and the Democratic administration." 16 
The many social welfare programs enacted by the Roosevelt administration convinced working Americans the 
"president was on their side."17 
Indeed, since the early 1930s, organi7.Cd labor had been actively involved in the movement for state 300 
federal social welfare programs. The American Federation of Labor, which had supported state unemployment 
insurance with federal assistance since 1932, later strongly endorsed the health and disability insurance articles of the 
Social Security Act. The president of the A.F.L., William Green, sat on the Advisory Council on Economic 
Security, and in 1935 endorsed fcdmll unemployment insurance. The A.F.L., later joined by other labor 
organizations, continued to lobby for further expansions in federal social insurance well into the 1940s.18 
Another segment of the population highly supportive of the Social Security Act was the clergy and laity of 
America's churches. Motivated to a greater degree by humanitarian beliefs than other groups, religious people 
represented all levels of American society. Because religious affiliation cut across socio-economic boundaries, some 
religious people were in dire need of government assistance while others escaped the Depression virtually unscathed. 
Thus, some religious Americans supported the act for self-serving or pragmatic reasons, while others did so for 
reasons rooted in Judeo-Christian values. 
Further, in addition to the anecdotal obvious above, it is possible to use the sentiment of clergy and their 
congregations as a representative sample of American public opinion. As early as 1932, national religious 
organizations advocated old age pensions and unemployment insurance. The Department of Social Action of the 
Catholic Welfare Conference and the Social Justice Commission of the Central Conference of American Rabbis both 
agreed upon this point. ~ of Jewish social agencies, including Abraham Epstein, favored social security 
because the idea of everyone providing for the needs of the entire community had deep roots in the Jewish faith.19 
American churches actively fought hunger and homelessness throughout the Depression with soup kitchens 300 
temporary shelters. Religious organizations, not suprisingly, were enthusiastically supportive of the Social Security 
Act. 
A study conducted by historians Monroe Billlington and Cal Clark, and 'based on thousands of letters 
solicited by F.D.R. from clergymen across the country in September 1935, illustrates the tremendous popularity of 
the Social Security Act with religious Americans. Using a representative sample of states, the two historians 
discovered that the clergy cited Social Security more often in their letters that any other New Deal program or 
government policy. Among the clergy as a whole, nearly eighty-five percent supported the act. Catholic and Jewish 
responses were ninety percent and one-hundred percent favorable respectively. One Texas clergyman said Social 
Security "had brought a 'sil vcrlining' of hope to many a clouded mind." A priest from Alabama said: "I heard not a 
single dissenting note. "20 
Not only did the preachers, ministers, priests, and rabbis of the nation themselves support the Social 
Security Act, they also believed it enjoyed favor among their congregations. That their belief was accurate was 
demonstrated by Billington and Qark through the use of Gallup polls and surveys conducted between 1935 and 1940. 
These surveys and polls showed the approval rating for Social Security among lay people as between eighty-nine 300 
ninety percent.21 Lay support, as earlier indicated, stemmed from both humanitarian and pragmatic reasons. Poor 
Catholics in Boston supported the act because they stood to gain from it, while wealthy Jews in New York 
supported the act because it facilitated an economic recovery. Moreover, social security also appealed to both groups 
morally because it fed and clothed suffering Americans. 
In summary, the Social Security Act represented the efforts of the Roosevelt administration and Congress to 
pull the nation out of the worst depression in its history and to create a system for avoiding such a crisis in the 
future. Inherent in both objectives was a practical and a humanitarian agenda, namely, to provide for national 
recovery by stimulating millions of personal recoveries in households across the country. This duality of purpose 
made overwhelming support possible because it enabled the legislation to transcend class divisions and appeal to all 
Americans on some level. Social activists could find favor with the act's humanitarian reforms, while captains of 
industry could applaud its fiscal practicality. At the same time, lower and middle income Americans could see the 
difference social security made in their daily lives. Consequently, the basic purpose of the Social Security Act can 
be seen as an effort to effect the greatest positive change for the majority of Americans. And, that majority 
responded accordingly. 
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What to do with the Submerged Tenth?: The Social 
Question of Poverty in Late 19th Century England 
Veronica Bruce 
Rapid industrialization and urbanization in England in the early nineteenth century aeated problems of 
poverty, homelessness, unemployment, and demoralization. While Charles Dickens brought the misfortunes of the 
poor vividly to life in his novels and Benjamin Disraeli spoke of the "two nations" of rich and poor, the government 
did little to ameliorate these problems. In the era of laissez faire capitalism, individuals who felt a duty to help the 
poor were encouraged to participate in benevolent charitable efforts or voluntary associations. 
Electoral reform, increased class conflict, and escalated governmental intervention during the mid-Victorian 
age disturbed the traditional balance of British society. Political leaders followed Thomas Macaulay's advice to 
"reform so that you may conserve" to fight off changes to the social equipoise. Conservative reform measures could 
noi stop the transformation in intellectual and cultural thought spurred by the 1859 publication of Charles Darwin's 
Oti&iD of Specjes. Darwin challenged the ideaJ>f eternal stability by provoking a debate which questioned man's 
place in nature and the established order of society. 
The clash between natural science and religious faith continued to rage into the late nineteenth century. 
Philosophers such as Herbert Spencer likened Darwin's belief in the natural struggle to survive to the idea of 
Progress in the social world. The "laws of evolution prescribed a policy of Individualism" where the person either 
adapted to the environment without any state intervention or failed to do so and perished. I 
In the late Victorian era Social Darwinism created fear that chronic urban poverty hampered the 
opportunities of the respectable classes and threatened national efficiency through racial degeneration. The propertied 
classes in the late 1880s trembled at the notion that unemployed workers (especially in London) would join forces 
with the residuum underclass in mass riots and class conflict directed by socialists.2 So pervasive Wet"C these ideas 
that the issues of the 'deserving' versus the 'undeserving' poor and the endemic problem of the 'submerged tenth' or 
the 'social residuum'-usually identified as loafers, part-time casual laborers, and the indigent- caused a resurgent 
interest in the poor amongst professional and amateur social investigators.3 
In between the proponents of individual charitable enterprise and the efforts of the Fabian socialists, other 
theorists advocated programs which sought to better the conditions of those groups not enjoying the general 
improvement in the standard of living. Reformers studied poverty like a disease-detailing its causes, processes, 
development and consequences. They concluded this disease was curable if its nature was understood and the proper 
treatment applied. One of the first social survey's of the poor, Henry Mayhew's London Labour and London Poor 
(1861), was characteristic of the upper-middle class "exploration" of the London underworld with a lot of concern for 
the "good of society" but few tools of scientific analysis. The trend towards a definition and standardization of 
poverty and the 'poverty line' appeared in the 1880s and 1890s as many reformers grew discontented with the laissez 
faire approach and believed in greater state intervention.4 Andrew Mearn's Bitter Czy gf Outcast London (1883) and, 
most especially the first volume of Charles Booth's Life and Labour of the People of London (1889) ( original title 
Labour and Life of the People London) reflect these changing attitudes. 
The reform programs of "General" William Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, Helen Bosanquet, 
member of the Charity Organisation Society (COS), and B. Seebohm Rowntree, York businessman and social 
investigator, represent three diverse philosophies ranging from moralistic regeneration and collectivist cooperation to 
strict empirical research and observation. They searched for reasons why certain individuals hindeced or rejected 
progressive advancement 
Recent scholarship on the changing social policies of Victorian reformers indicates that strict differentiation 
between collectivist and individualist philosophies cannot work. As Jose Harris pointed out in her 1992 article in 
Past and Present, "ideas about 'social welfare' can migrate unexpectedly across the political spectrum. "5 Indeed many 
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late Victorian era reformers opposed paternalistic, state intervention, but did insist the government remove obstacles 
to private forms of intervention and maintain basic sanitary and educational standards. 
Booth, Bosanquet, and Rowntree addressed the social question of what to do about poverty in books arxl 
pamphlets. Through their publications, the reformers engaged in a dialogue among themselves and, with others, 
acted as a guide to the different intellectual and cultural currents of their own time. Their strong defense of particular 
programs or social policy against criticism emphasizes the idea of 'doing things' for the poor instead of relying on 
state or charity or waiting for the working class to do it themselves. Unlike the Social Darwinist belief in the 
inferiority of certain groups, these reformers believed that improvements in the lifestyle and character of individuals 
were not only possible but vital to the reconstruction of the social structure of Britain. 
In 1890 Methodist minister William Booth wrote In Darkest England and the Way Out (imitating Herny 
Stanley's account of Darkest Africa) to bring attention to problems at home. The •book seemed to advertise his 
Salvation Army organization as the means to save humanity from the depths of despair. The poor of England, 
Booth wrote, were "sodden with drink, steeped in vice, eaten up by every social and physical malady."6 Booth's 
information about the 'submerged tenth' came from Salvation Army officers' reports and studies from sections of 
London. The problem, according to Booth, was not insoluble if "manfully faced" in a "scientific" manner- not in 
traditional philanthropic remedies which usually only helped those whose circumstances were not so dire. The poor 
must develop religious beliefs, discipline, and moral strength in order to regenerate and win the struggle for survival 
for "the weakest will go to the wall. "7 Only the regenerative powers of Christ would permanently "deliver mankind 
from misery." Booth promoted various practical and quixotic programs-slum crusades, traveling hospitals, open air 
meetings, waste collectors, household salvation brigades, and children refuge centers. 
The General remarked that his proposed three colony program represented "regimental co-operation" whereby 
all members voluntarily agreed to obey strict rules of discipline and morality. The General envisioned these self-
helping cooperative communities organized along the lines of the Salvation Army. The city colony incorporated the 
functions of giving the basic necessities to the destitute while they underwent "rousing salvation meetings" arxl 
encouraged prayer and individual testimonies of their regeneration. The poor would be moved to cooperative fann 
colonies where, given intelligent direction, they would plant and grow enough for their subsistence. Those who 
volunteered for the overseas colonies participated in the final step in the rehabilitation of character through hard work 
and repayment for transport. Booth believed the eventual creation of self-sustaining settlements in British colonies 
was the only true remedy for the submerged tenth. Just as Henry Stanley rescued the Emin Pasha, Booth's scheme 
would allow the "forlorn denizens [to] escape into the light and freedom of a new life."8 
The Salvation Army plan met with criticism from two fronts. "Darwin's Bulldog," scientist Thomas 
Huxley, sank his teeth into the colony/salvation scheme when he wrote 12 letters to the London ~9 critical of 
Booth's authoritarian structi.Jre. Secondly Booth's colony program struck the Charity Organisation Society as a short 
term solution with no long term impact. Huxley incorporated the ~ letters with a prefatory essay into his 
volume EyoJutjon and Ethjcs.10 In the preface, Huxley opposed Booth's idea that the struggle for survival embodied 
a constant movement towards progress and perfection.11 Quite the contrary, Huxley believed that nature was 
"neither moral nor immoral but non-moral" and it is an "error to imagine that evolution signifies a constant tendency 
to increased perfection." Huxley's amoralism led him to conclude that any a priori doctrine or speculation on the 
'social question' was vicious and only led people to take matters into their own hands by creating a despotic system 
of control and vigilance against perceived wickedness.12 
While Booth conceived his scheme as a cooperative venture, Huxley.observed that Booth's Anny embodied 
a type of autocracy hidden behind a facade of religious devotion and honest intention. Huxley detested any type of 
regimentation that required blind devotion to one leader. He questioned the indoctrination techniques to change the 
"motives of the individual man" to thrift and industry. In order for anyone to be 'saved,' according to Booth's plan, 
individuals would have to conform to the "narrow theological fold" and be docile as sheep. Anyone in need of some 
physical help would first have to take a place as a sinner in Booth's estimation.IS Booth declared himself 
prosecutor.jury, and judge in cases where the Salvation Anny went aftcl" those accused of wrongdoing and extorted 
heavy fines as payment for keeping silent.16 
In a somewhat frantic tone, Huxley wrote that Booth's "corybantic Christianity" of revivals, songs, arxl 
tambourines hid a worldwide centraliud military organization which demanded blind devotion to the General. While 
he did not want to come acro$s as if he questioned the need for assistance, or that any solution that worked should be 
utilized, Huxley disliked Booth's attempt to use devoted and self-sacrificing enthusiasts for his own purposes.17 He 
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compared the Salvation Anny to the Franciscans and Jesuits who used the same methods and were soon taken over 
by worldly pursuits and internal corruption.18 
Huxley coined the term "Boothism" to describe the General's use of individuals as instruments for his own 
pet projects.19 He expanded his critique of Booth when he received information on the financial arrangements of the 
Salvation Anny by former members of the organization. These individuals asserted that Booth and his family took a 
large share of the proceeds for personal needs while forcing employees to pay a percentage of the donations to the 
central office and to pay for rent, heating, cleaning, repairs, and salaries.20 By 1891 Huxley grew frustrated with his 
campaign. He wrote "What an ass a man is to try to prevent his fellow creatures from being humbugged. Surely I 
am old enough to know better."21 Huxley left the fight to stop the "ill-regulated enthusiasm" of Booth's Salvation 
Anny to men like C.S. Loch of the Charity Organisation Socicty.22 The COS sponsored programs to restore the 
self-respect of the poor through hard work and service to society .23 
The General had already criticized the COS for only caring about the "deserving poor" and the "fit" instead 
of taking the undeserving and making them fit.24 Prominent members of the COS responded with pamphlets 
published in 1891 as Critjcjsms on "General" Booth's Socjal Scheme. In it the idealist philosopher Bernard 
Bosanquet and his wife Helen Bosanquet agreed with Booth that the "submerged residuum" needed help but pointed 
out that his scheme was in principle just the "revival of institutional bencvolencc."25 Bernard Bosanquet's article 
"In Darkest England, On the Wrong Track" pointed out that General Booth's scheme of sending the needy out to the 
colonies would not only be dictatorial, it would simply change the circumstances without altering the central 
problem of developing the character of the individual. Ultimately, it would only condemn more people to the depths 
of poverty. 
Bernard Bosanquet also disagreed with Booth's assumption that the residuum was enormous in quantity 300 
permanent in character. Society, according to Bosanquct, could only be improved by modifying the individual 
character and will of the desperately poor and encouraging self-discipline through socijil pressurc.26 These types of 
recommendations form part of the Idealist philosophical school of thought. Proponents of Idealism (related to 
British Hegelianism) believed in a "corporate identity of society and the state." The social context cannot be separated 
from individuality, for society was a "spiritual personality with a moral will."17 Although Bosanquet penned some 
articles on poverty, his writings, for the most part, reflected his interests in aesthetics, metaphysics, and logic. His 
wife, Helen Dendy Bosanquet, devoted her life's work to the social aspects of poverty. 
Helen Bosanquet, graduate of Newnham College, Cambridge in Political Economy and Moral Science, 
published over 6 books, numerous pamphlets and articles. She was later appointed as a member of the Royal 
Commission of the Poor Laws.28 As a member of the COS she did not oppose bureaucratic legislation or state 
intervention at an institutional level to promote good social relations. She believed the best method to do so was to 
establish close cooperation between an individual (case) worker and one family. 
Helen, the daughter of a Unitarian minister and a follower of her husband's Idealist philosophy, postulated 
that society existed as an organic whole and that once the attitude and will of the individual were improved, then the 
conditions causing improvidence would change and all classes would live in a brotherhood of harmony.29 People 
were in need of constructive training and purpose that ultimately would result in a better, more progressive society 
for all. 
In order to gather material for her book, Rich and Poor, Bosanquct lived among the poor of East London-
population 122,000. Although in the introduction she remarked that she had "purposely avoided overloading" her 
book "with technical dctails,'~Bosanquct claimed to have an "intimate knowledge of the conditions under which our 
poorer neighbors live." In the description of the housing of the poor, she pointed out the positive influence of 
individual landlords or tenants who helped to brighten an otherwise gloomy set of block dwellings. Institutions 300 
endowments which were supposed to help the poor performed inadequately. Instead of frittering away on doles of 
money, bread. and clothing the parish should be responsible for improving water, sanitation, streets, schools, ax! 
lighting. Bosanquct approved of pieces of legislation desi~ncd to "check the downward course" of the poor, especially 
children.30 The schools represented another institution that needed improvement. In order to reclaim the 
"submerged class" there needed to be an end to child pauperism and criminal activity. The Industrial Schools Act 
would force these children to attend school and "check their downward course." As a result, they would emerge as 
useful citizens instead of the residuum of the futurc.31 
The people of East London, as reported by Helen Bosanquct, included workers and a "class of parasites." 
The latter--those who "won't work" and "those who only work by fits and starts"- represented the largest share of 
poverty in the London district. Bosanquct, however, was much more concerned with saving those with adequate 
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incomes but whose slovenly habits committed them to the ranks of the submerged poor. Artisans, costermongers, 
unskilled or odd job laborers, and chandlers made up the bulk of the parish. Women and children participated in non-
skilled tasks such as polishing or selling wares. The artisan family wage was adequate to pay for rent, food, clothing, 
doctors, and some entertainment. Women with children, according to Bosanquet, should not do home work for it 
would only result in "dirt, disorder, and badly cared for children." Women should be taught adequate housekeeping 
and bookkeeping skills as well as practical childcare. The family must learn to be thrifty and wise in money 
purchases or else risk joining the submerged poor. Bosanquet concluded that each' member of society must get 
involved on a daily basis in the lives of the poor in order to develop virtues of thriftiness, honesty, sobriety, am 
efficiency .32 
Helen Bosanquet's work provides an example of the practical application of Idealism-not mere laissez-faire, 
but of "social collectivism. "33 Reformers needed to know individual families personally to be of any real service. 
Admittedly some of Bosanquet's observations and solutions demonstrated her lack of understanding about the struggle 
for daily existence among the poor. But even if the philosophy proved to be ephemt;ral, Helen Bosanquet's method 
would prove to be popular and became an integral part of the social workers training. ff the notion of intervention 
by the "comfortable" classes into the lives of the poor proved impossible to sustain, the hope that community 
involvement would result in a better society is prevalent today in community activist programs. 
Another social activist, Seebohm Rowntree, was a member of a successful cocoa and chocolate 
manufacturing family. He believed in practical and fair-minded business tactics based on his Quaker beliefs. 
Rowntree spoke before the Quaker church meeting of York stating that the members could not "rest while so 
much ... sorrow and injustice and misery remain[ed] in our midst. "34 A prolific author of books, pamphlets am 
articles on poverty, Rowntree's work bridged the gap between nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In 1902 he 
published Poverty· A Study jn Town Llfc. The second survey of York, Poyeny and Progress appeared in 1941 am 
the 1951 Poverty and the Welfare State finished his third and final survey of York. In order to understand the 
conditions governing lives of the wage-earning classes and the cyclical nature of poverty, Rowntree investigated the 
city of York from 1897-1898 in an empirical manner utilizing a house to house investigation of 46,754 people (of a 
total population of 75,8120).35 Rowntree wanted to expand upon Charles Booth's study of the London poor by 
examining poverty in provincial towns. His goal was to formulate a "true measure of poverty" and its causes. He 
dispassionately defined poverty as the condition in which purely physical efficiency was impossible.36 
Rowntree developed a classification system based on his statistical survey of York. He divided the poor 
into seven categories, level 'A' being the poorest. Consisting of the unemployed, semi-employed, loafers, and lowest 
wage earners, this section of the work force earned 18s per capita and comprised 2.6% of the total British population. 
Rowntree created a detailed analysis of household wage earnings, weekly expenditures, housing costs and ·conditions, 
health standards, and diet of entire families. To determine the relationship of poverty to health, Rowntree prepared 
notebooks to give to 35 housewives. They were to record their income, to keep account of all money spent and to 
maintain a menu of meals provided during the week. He concluded those families maltjng less than 26s weekly were 
"seriously underfed."37 Based on these findings, England could not hope to compete on a commercial level with 
Europe and America without an adequately nourished and physically efficient work force. 
Rowntree developed a working division between (economic) primary and (preventable) secondary poverty 
[7,230 people in primary and 13,072 in secondary]. The 'poverty line' indicated the minimum resources necessary 
for the maintenance of physical health. Unlike Booth and the Bosanquets, Rowntree concluded that adverse economic 
conditions caused drinking, gambling, ignorance and careless housekeeping not vice versa. He disagreed with 
Bosanquet's philosophy of individual responsibility. Instead of blaming the poor for their condition, Rowntree called 
attention to the fact that of those in class 'A,' two-thirds suffered from poverty because of old age, disabilities, 
illness, desertion or death of wage earners, poor dietary health, or simply lack of sufficient family wages.38 
The tragedy of poverty for Rowntree was its cyclical nature as children "perpetuated the race of the unfit" 
because of dietary and educational deficiency .39 Rowntree did not dispute the fact that his categories of poverty 
included those carelessly spending earnings on drink and gambling or ignorant of housekeeping responsibilities. He 
noted, however, that it was the monotony of the work, physical exhaustion, and squalid living conditions that led 
individuals to fall prey to vices. These living conditions, not their personal character, caused "limited horizons. "40 
Rowntree agI?Cd with many of the ideas of Helen Bosanquet They both believed that alcoholism was a 
definite problem and that too many alcoholics could find solace in drink in an abun<Jant number of public houses. 
Out-relief needed to be improved by appointing a Superintendent Relieving Officer to end waste and abuse in the 
system. Children in the wo~ses needed to be kept outside with Poor Law Guardians or in boarding homes. The 
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workhouses needed structural improvements and useful occupations, although Rowntree preferred the elimination of 
such institutions. Friendly Societies, cooperatives, and trade unions offered progressive reform for people.41 
While they concurred on the potential for positive change in society, Rowntree and Helen Bosanquet 
approached the problem of poverty from completely different angles. Each wrote a detailed critique of the other's 
method and philosophy in The Poverty Linc by Mrs. Bosanquet and The Poverty Ljnc· A Response by Mr. 
Rowntree.42 In an exchange of letters in the~ on the issue of poverty in provincial towns, Rowntree disclosed 
his disaffection with preconceived opinions and explanations. Helen meanwhile observed the idealist doctrine that 
"facts were meaningless without an explanatory framework derived from subjective experience and a priori 
reasoning. "43 
Helen Bosanquet wrote letters to the London Iimcs. on September 16, 1902 and October 4, 1902. In 
addition she wrote an article for Contemporary Rcyjcw in 1904 which set down her criticisms of Charles Booth's 
Ljfe and Labour and Rowntree's Poverty· A Study jn Town Life. In both she dismissed the figure of one-third of 
Britons in poverty as "simple sensationalism."44 She claimed the statistics were skewed to include those with 
sufficient income (but insufficient character) to keep them above the poverty line.45 Bosanquet was very interested in 
finding out exact figures of seasonal-out-of-work labor and if they happened to be employed at the time of 
Rowntree's survey. If so, that fact would also skew his results to give a temporary lower number to the members of 
secondary poverty .46 
Helen also questioned the use of York as a "typical provincial town." In her "large experience amongst the 
very poor" she found York to be burdened with endowed charities and an unworkable Poor Law administration, both 
tending to produce (or attract) thriftless and inefficient people.47 For someone who consistently gave no "technical 
dc:.tails" in her own studies, Bosanquet was particularly critical of Rowntree's method of finding out exact numbers of 
family income.48 She was appalled to find no entry for earnings or income in his investigators' schedules. Rowntree 
had estimated wages from knowing the occupations of family members.49 
As Helen Bosanquet defined it, Rowntree's secondary poverty included those suffering not from lack of 
money but to some other cause-self-indulgence, negligence, drunkenness, and/or carelessness. Bosanquet was not 
convinced that the British race was physically deteriorating as a result of chronic poverty. Instead she believed that in 
any effort to combat primary physical inefficiency care and advice must be given on a direct individual basis.SO 
Where were Rowntree's remedies she asked?5 l All poverty for Bosanquet was "preventable," despite opinions to the 
contrary. 
Rowntree's response to critics also appeared in letters to the London~- In January 1902, he supported 
his position that even those whose conditions were in part "due to wasteful and ignorant expenditure" should be 
counted under the poverty line because they lived in "obvious want and squalor."52 In September 1902 Rowntree 
reminded Bosanquet that he divided poverty between 'economic' and 'preventable' poverty and that attention should be 
placed on those that have an insufficient income to maintain physical efficiency. Bosanquet's suggestion that 
families fell into "primary" poverty when the chief wage earner was out of work did not consider the possibility that 
families also succumbed to illness, old age, or work related injuries.53 Could Mrs. Bosanquet provide alternative 
facts to prove her conclusions?54 
In response to Helen Bosanquet's criticism of his dietary estimates for physical efficiency, Rowntree pointed 
out that she admitted to being "incompetent to criticiu." Rowntree wrote that he found it necessary to create a 
standard to represent average requirements after consulting with many types of food experts to figure out dietary 
requirements for moderate working males. Rowntree found the criticism of his method particularly irritating. He 
believed Bosanquet's suggestion of direct inquiry on wage earnings of the family would be "utterly unreliable 
information." Rowntree defended his study as more accurate for he bMcd it upon careful estimates from extensive 
knowledge of the occupation and wage scale.55 Rowntree maintained York was typical of many provincial towns 
with similar economic conditions and social problems. He concluded "statistics are the sole and necessary counters 
of a large social investigation as coins are of trade." Rowntree believed statistics should not provoke criticism but a 
determined effort by sober and responsible people to improve the prospects for Englan~'s poor.56 
What emerged from the Victorian debates on poverty was the particular world view of the social reformers. 
They represented tolerant, liberal minded, middle class members of society. The reformers were not merely 1ady 
bountiful's' or 'do-gooders' soothing their conscience through giving money but were engaged in hands-on activities 
and programs. Concerned about 'doing something' for the poor, these reformers attempted to instill in all citizens 
the importance of those virtues and good qualities which would benefit not only the poor but, more importantly, the 
whole of British society. 
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The social refonners of the 1890s represented a turning point into a new phase of the examination of 
poverty. Each elicited different social salvation schemes with gradations of state intervention and the use of new 
scientific techniques of investigation. William Booth was the least interested in the numbers, detailed descriptions, 
understanding, analysis, or careful district study. The debate among Booth, Huxley, and Bernard Bosanquet was 
largely on the theoretical aspects or the administrative detailing of the social problem of poverty. Helen Bosanquet 
and Seebohm Rowntree brought to their studies increasing degrees of professionalism and expertise. They debated 
the numbers and results--questioned findings-refuted figures. The idea that analysis must precede refonn became the 
mark of a progressive interest in creating standards and scientific methods. 
The ideas of the social refonners were proffered. But the late Victorian govetnments of Lord Salisbury aoo 
Arthur Balfour were disinclined to adjust their priorities, and social refonn was left a local responsibility with limited 
funds. While these investigators had limited national appeal and little power in the late Victorian era, the Liberal 
governments in the early twentieth century included many young reformers as MPs or civil servants who had read 
Bosanquet or Rowntree and included their suggestions in national schemes of social welfare. 
The question of "who won"--moralists or empiricists--cannot be answered categorically for in spite of 
progressive development of the social sciences that disregard the pursuit of man's perfectibility, older moralistic 
approaches continue to surface today. The late twentieth century is not the beneficiary of a century of effort at 
fighting poverty. Indeed the Victorian concern for examining the nature and circumstances of chronic poverty sounds 
familiar. Then, as now, people were more inclined to select their own choices than follow someone else's interfering 
ideas on improvement. Yet although it was not the continuous progression of success as the Victorians had hoped, 
Booth, Bosanquet, and Rowntree represented the increased awareness of the connection between a well-ordered society 
and alleviating social inequity. 
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in the Dixiecrat Movement, 1948-1950" 
Kari Frederickson 
Bastard sons and unwanted daughters. Illicit liaisons, jilted lovers, and broken marriages. Insult and betrayal, 
kidnapping and murder. Easily mistaken for the seedy and twisted plot lines of a television drama, these were instead 
the tenns and scenarios chosen by white Southerners to describe and interpret political change and resistance to 
change in the tumultuous years following World War II. In response to federal civil rights initiatives and local 
activism, Southern whites experimented with a variety of vehicles, both political and non-partisan, designed to 
thwart racial progress and political change. Historians are familiar with the political narrative of the Second 
Reconstruction and Massive Resistance, but few have examined the cultural dimensions of political resistance aoo 
change during this tumultuous period.
1 
In the struggle to defend segregation, Southern whites sought shelter behind 
a familiar barricade of states' rights. From there they created an oppositional culture that drew upon Southern 
history. cherished regional icons, symbols, and cultural practices to explain political change and to justify their 
resistance. 
This essay explores the larger dimensions of states' rights by examining the political culture of the States' 
Rights, or Dixiecrat, movement of 1948.2 Subsequently overshadowed by the fury of white response to the 1954 
Brown v Board of Education . decision, the Dixiecrat revolt was the first serious, organized effort by white 
Southerners in the post-war era to defend segregation from northern intervention.3 In these early years of civil rights 
opposition Southern politicians fashioned a language of resistance that drew heavily on gender and family imagery. 
White Southerners' employed familial metaphors and gendered scenarios to explain and justify their relationship to 
politics and to the national Democratic Party. These metaphors and scenarios reveal the close interplay of race aoo 
gender in Southern society and illustrate how the potential loss of political power in the public sphere was linked to 
fears of disruption in the private sphere. 
Language is a point of entry. The Dixiecrat campaign and its aftermath is a lens through which may be 
explored larger questions of political identity and power. The use of gendered metaphors to explain political 
resistance triggered by federal civil rights initiatives also reflected general concerns regarding changes in actual gender 
and family relations. In post-war South Carolina, white Southerners' concerns about civil rights and loss of 
political power coincided with a movement to legalize marital divorce. Evidence suggests the relationship between 
the two events was as much symbiotic as coincidental: Southern whites' concern over the disruption of their 
political home was influenced by distress regarding the decline of the family and the conjugal unit. 
South Carolinians' overlapping anguish over unstable racial and gendec hierarchies is exemplified by the 
reprobation of federal judge J. Waties Waring of Charleston. A civil rights advocate and divorced man, Judge Waring 
personified States' Righters' worst fears. The abuse heaped upon the judge and his second wife in the late 1940s aoo 
early 1950s, in particular his detractors' melding of his divorced status and his voting rights decisions, reveals the 
degree to which South Carolinians found it impossible to separate gender and racial concerns. 
South Carolina provides an excellent laboratory in which to examine the cultural dimensions of states' 
rights ideology. South Carolina was pivotal to the States' Rights movement and along with Mississippi aoo 
Alabama gave the Dixiecrats their most impressive victory in the 1948 presidential election. South Carolina also 
contributed to the movement its leader and presidential candidate, governor J. Strom Thurmond. Therefore, South 
Carolina is where one should naturally look first when examining the movement. While South Carolina is the main 
study, it should be noted that gender operated as a key metaphor in states' rights rhetoric throughout the South, aoo 
that furor over Waring's decision and personal life transcended state boundaries. 
By redefining what is "political," gender analysis has transformed the way historians conceptualize the state 
and "high politics." It has revealed as fallacious the notion that political, women's, and African-American history 
can be treated as distinct entities. Politics never has existed exclusively in the public realm, nor was it influenced 
solely by activities there. The political language of white resistance links the private household space and the larger 
25 
public, political sphere in the mid-twentieth-century South.' 
The evidence presented in this essay underlines the need for a more expansive understanding of states' rights 
as it was applied n the mid-century South. By adopting a feminist perspective, historians should consider the 
implications of the states' rights doctrine for women as well as for African-Americans. Feminist scholars have 
demonstrated how an expansive federal state has provided the means by which women and racial minorities have 
acquired guaranteed protection of their rights. Conversely, support for states' rights and criticism of an activist 
federal government may be interpreted as an attempt to frustrate the claims of women and African-Americans for 
equality. The idea of the family as a private, patriarchal domain is an integral component in the doctrine of states' 
rights.5 We should not, then, be surprised to find white Southerners using gencb'ed and familial metaphors to 
express their advocacy of states' rights, nor should we view their concurrent efforts to bring divorce under state 
control as mere chance. 
Finally, we cannot examine the cultural complexities of the States' Rights movement apart from the 
general disruptions brought on by World War II and the anxieties produced by the Cold War. The influx of women 
into the workforce (and into formerly male-dominated positions) during and after the war raised serious questions 
regarding the survival of traditional gender roles, while the tense international situation in the post-war era induced 
widespread anxiety among Americans and precipitated a search for security at home. In their search for security in 
the late- l 940s and early-l 950s, Americans embraced traditional gender roles and retreated into what one historian has 
called "domestic containment." As practiced in foreign policy, the containment theory dictated that the United States 
employ an effective counterforce to "contain" the spread of Communism into the free world. 
"Domestic containment" held that the family and the home provided the best protection against moral aro 
social decay.6 It is significant that the States' Rights movement arose during this nationwide retreat into domesticity 
and presents an opportunity to investigate the role of race in "domestic containment" within the staunchly anti-
Communist South. Within this larger milieu, white Southerners' defense and linkage of traditional gender and racial 
hierarchies illustrate the general belief that a stable, patriarchal home was the best protection against social 
disintegration. Only when we begin to explore the complex meanings behind states' rights advocates' support for 
local control over domestic affairs can we hope to understand the full significance of massive resistance to the Second 
Reconstruction. 
From Reconstruction until the mid-twentieth century, the South operated virtually under a one-party 
system. Rebuilt upon the ashes of Radical Republican governments, the Democratic party became the instrument 
through which elite white Southerners could safeguard the region from federal intervention, persuade poor whites to 
sustain the governing class, and keep blacks economically prostrate, socially inferior, and politically disfranchised. 
As the region's only viable political force, Southern Democrats constituted an influential minority within the 
national party. 
Local and national developments in the 1930s and 1940s threatened the South's ideal of states' rights aro 
limited federal intervention, and laid the groundwork for the 1948 states' rights defection. While Southern 
congressmen gladly supported the New Deal's various agricultural price support and early relief programs, Southern 
leaders became increasingly skeptical of the intrusive and paternalistic nature of the latter reforms and their potential 
capacity to upset Southern race relations. Southern Democrats were especially critical of New Deal relief policies, 
which undermined white paternalism and threatened the ready availability of cheap labor by encouraging Southern 
blacks to look to the federal government for assistance.
7 
Another factor contributing to the South's bolt from the national Democratic Party was the region's decline 
in national political prestige and power. In 1936, the Democratic National Convention abolished the two-thirds rule 
in nominating conventions. The Solid Southern Democratic bloc had exploited this rule in previous nominating 
conventions as leverage for acquiring a pro-Southern presidential or vice-presidential candidate. With only a simple 
majority required, approval of the South was less crucial. 
The prominence of African-Americans and organized labor in the New Deal cpalition by 1936 amplified the 
South's insecurity and defensiveness within a party that was growing increasingly northern and urban. While 
President Franklin D. Rooscyelt did not intend to use his position to further the cause of civil rights, neither could 
he ignore African-American voters. Roosevelt received 75 per cent of the black vote in 1936, an amazing turnabout 
from the 1928 election, when the Democratic candidate had received no more than 25 percent.
1 
Between 1941 aro 
1944 more than I million Southern blacks had migrated to northern cities such as Chicago, Detroit, and Oeveland, 
thereby increasing the political influence of northern blacks." 1be party's new composition and Southerners' 
diminishing relative strength threatened the region's "peculiarities." 
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Despite the fears of Southern Democrats, it should be noted Lltat Roosevelt's record on civil rights was 
unexceptional. African-American leaders criticized Roosevelt for his lack of support for civil rights legislation (no 
single piece of civil rights legislation was passed during Roosevelt's twelve years in the White House), and for the 
deleterious effect some New Deal legislation had on black farm laborers. On the other hand, New Deal relief 
10 
programs had mitigated some harsher aspects of racial discrimination. Roosevelt's one contribution in the area of 
ci vii rights came in 1941. In response to pressure from black leaders, Roosevelt issued an executive order which 
forbade discrimination in defense industries and established the Committee on Fair Employment Practices (FEPC). 
Although the FEPC had no power to enforce its directives, it still roused the ire of Southern congressmen like 
Mississippi's John Rankin, who equated the creation of the committee with the beginnings of a communist 
dictatorship. 11 
As the national Democratic party became increasingly liberal in the 1930s and 1940s, the South and its 
leaders were faced with a dilemma. The institution that for 70 years had served as the bulwark against social reform 
was now tampering with the "Southern way of life. The catalyst to the 1948 Southern defection was President Harry 
Truman's commitment to civil rights. Alarmed by racial violence sweeping across the South , much of it directed 
against returning black veterans, and cognizant of the political power of African-American voters in key northern 
states, Truman took unprecedented action. In December 1946, Truman created the President's Committee on Civil 
Rights by executive order. Charged to devise a means to strengthen and improve the federal, state, and local 
governments' safeguards of civil rights, the committee presented its findings to the president in the fall of 1947. In 
its published report, To Secure These Rjghts, the committee documented a wide range of civil rights abuses, mostly 
in the Southern states, and recommended a broad program of civil rights initiatives. In particular, the report 
emphasized the need for the federal government to assume much greater responsibility as the guardian and protector 
of civil rights. 12 Although he did not adopt the committee's entire program, Truman presented to the nation his own 
civil rights proposals for congressional consideration. For the first time since Reconstruction, the status of African-
Americans had become a political issue of national importance.
13 
Truman presented his civil rights recommendations 
to Congress in early February 1948. His proposals represented a bold departure from the relative inaction of his 
predecessor. Truman advocated federal protection against lynching, anti-poll tax legislation, the establishment of a 
permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission, and the prohibition of segregation in interstate transportation. 
14 
Reaction from the white South was immediate and angry. Many white Southerners feared these measures signaled 
the beginning of a general assault on segregation. 15 
White Southerners' reaction to Truman's initiatives makes sense only when coupled with an understanding 
of local electoral and political developments. The unease white Southerners felt toward this spate of federal civil 
rights legislation was compounded by tlrieir knowledge of significant increases in voter registration and political 
activism among Southern blacks. This increase was due primarily to tlrie demise of the Democratic party's white 
primary system throughout the South. In 1944, in the Texas case of Smjth y AHwright, the Supreme Court rule.cl 
that the Texas white primary law violated the Fifteenth Amendment and was therefore unconstitutional. The states 
of the upper South acquiesce.cl in tlrie decision. Lower South states such as Sou~ Carolina, Mississippi, and 
Alabama took measures to circumvent tlrie court's decision and to preserve the white primary. In South Carolina, for 
example, Governor Olin D. Johnston convened a special session of the state legislature, during which all references 
to the Democratic primary were removed from tlrie statute books. Such a measure ostensibly relegate.cl the 
Democratic party to the status of a private club. Federal district courts soon found this and other measures to be 
unconstitutional.
16 
Black voter registration was impressive. In the wake of a 1946 fe.deral district court decision which opene.d 
the Georgia Democratic primary to black voters, approximately one hundred thousand black Georgians registered to 
vote.17 South Carolina's Democratic primary was opened to black voters in 1947; Blacks began enrolling in record 
numbers for the 1948 election. Registration figures doubled from 1944 to 1948, and by 1950 civil rights activists 
could claim 75,000 registered black voters. South Carolina was also home to arguably tlrie most dynamic black 
political organization in the South at that time -- the Progressive Democrats. Organized in 1944 and fiercely loyal 
to the National Democratic party, tlrie Progressive Democrats organiz.ed voter education schools and voter 
registration drives and could justifiably claim responsibility for tlrie increase in black voter registration. 
Foreshadowing the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's attempt to be seated at the national convention in 1964, 
tlrie Progressive Democrats organized a group of delegates to attend the 1944 and 1948 national conventions to 
challenge the seating of the all-white delegation. 11 
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To stem this progressive tide from above and below, and desperate to recover its former preeminent position 
within the national party ranks, a group of disgruntled Southerners formed the States' Rights Democratic Party in 
1948. Running on a segregationist platform, the States' Rights Democrats, or Dixiecrats, with their 
presidential candidate, J. Strom Thurmond, of South Carolina, attempted to upset the election of Hany Truman by 
capturing the electoral votes of the Democratically solid South. This would then prevent either major party candidate 
from winning a majority and throw the election into the House of Representatives. In the House Dixiecrats 
believed they could extract concessions favorable to the South. 
From July until the election in November, 1948, Dixiecrats forced Southerners to re-evaluate their long-
standing allegiance to the national party. Given the Democratic party's traditional role in maintaining white 
supremacy and its long-standing hegemony in the South, to break this alliance would not be easy. White 
Southerners' attachment to the party was tenacious, personal, and potentially explosive. Faced with a national 
Democratic party that was aggressively courting the votes of labor and African-Americans, the Dixiecrats waged a 
campaign designed to co-opt the allegiance of white Southerners.19 
On the hustings and in private, Dixiecrats explained and understood their role within the Democratic party, 
including the present conflict, in familial terms. They envisioned the national party, with all its various 
constituencies, as a family, in which Southern Democrats were the dominant, masculine member. Clearly this 
configuration reflected the actual patriarchal organization of Southern society. Within the greater family of the 
national party, different interest groups such as organized labor assumed the subordinate family roles. White 
Southerners expected African Americans to remain outside the political as well as the actual white family . Because 
the South was the senior partner in the Democratic party relationship, some Southern whites were not convinced that 
their best interests were served by leaving, or bolting, the party. According to United States Congressman Joseph R. 
Bryson of Greenville, South Carolina intraparty disagreement over civil rights was alcin to a domestic dispute mi 
should be handled as such. "It's like having an undesirable guest in your house," he claimed. "If you don't like him, 
it doesn't mean you'll pack up and leave your own home."20 
Given the familial nature of the relationship between the South and the national Democratic party, it was 
only proper that the Dixiecrat bolt was likened to a severing of the bonds of matrimony. William Workman, veteran 
South Carolina newsman, made the most obvious connection when he refernd to the Dixiecrat insurgency as "the 
States' Rights motion for diyorce in the South's long marriage with the national Democratic party." Arkansas 
Governor and fellow Dixiecrat Ben Laney exclaimed that the national party' civil rights advocacy was more painful 
because it came from "our own people -- our own family .... " 
21 
The creation of a new political vehicle, whether a 
distinct party or a protest faction within the larger party, was a birthing process and the Dixiecrats' failure to capture 
the votes of the solid South was likened to infant mortality.22 Writing to Thurmond upon the failure of the 
Dixiecrats, W. H. Howard of Alabama speculated that "there can be no doubt that the Dixiecrat movement as a party 
is dead. It died in swaddling clothes and the dead infant must be buried."23 
Just as in a real marriage or relationship, the South expected certain things from the national party. Above 
all, white Southerners demanded fidelity. When the South was spumed by national party leaders for the attentions of 
African-Americans, Southern whites were dismayed by this sudden loss of prestige and influence. They chafed at their 
new-found position of dependency. Emasculated and relegated to a perceived position of powerlessness, Southerners 
likened their situation to those who possessed little or no power in society. Their masculinity imperiled, Dixiecrat 
leaders equated their status to that of women. Senator James Eastland of Mississippi warned that Truman's proposals 
threatened Southern whites with political feminization and impotcncy.24 Speaking before the States' Rights 
convention in Jackson, Mississippi, in May 1948, Strom Thurmond conter.ded that Truman's drive against the 
South was predicated on the belief that the South was "weak," "foolish," and "meck."25 
Some white Southerners compared their status to that of children. J. Knox Huff, vice-chairman of the 
Mississippi State Democratic Executive Committee, declared that the Truman Democrats had "reduced the South .. 
.to the status of illegitimate children at a family reunion. "
26 
William Workman, among others, commented that the 
South had been treated as "the red-haired stepchild in national Democratic party affairs ... 27 Most significantly, 
these white Southerners compared themselves not just to children, but to step- and illegitimate children. This 
markedly inferior status was the product of an undesirable, shameful, or illicit liaison, namely, the new relationship 
consummated between the n~tional party and African-Americans. Perhaps the allusion to bastard and step-children 
referred to whites' obsession with, and fears of, racial intermingling and diminishing racial purity. Given that white 
Southerners frequently expressed fears that desegregation would ultimately require them to entertain African 
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Americans in their actual homes, it is not surprising that an African-American presence in their political home 
would yield such a dishonorable, albeit imagined and rhetorical, result. This fear was clearly expressed by Harry C. 
Brown of Charleston. Writing to Thurmond, Brown asked, "Would you like to see the negroes be admitted into our 
inner sanctum .... ? If you gentlemen are looking for the ncgro votes which I know you gentlemen from the South 
aren't[,] [p]lease ask Mr. [Thomas] Dewey if he would· like to have those people ... to live in his home:-28 
Politics was personal, and within this elaborate family drama, the South became personified. Hence, the 
national Democratic party's appeal to African-American voters was not only an insult and a betrayal, but a physical 
attack on the embodied South. Dixiecrats employed graphic and violent imagery to illustrate their point and spoke 
frequently of being slapped, gagged, choked, kidnapped, hogtied, flogged, lynched, and stabbed by national party 
leaders.29 Dixiecrat campaign literature often featured a picture of a stabbing victim as representative of the South's 
position or dilemma. Frequently, the descriptions bordered on the grotesque, as when Mississippi congressman John 
Bell Williams declared that Truman "has seen fit to run a political dagger into our backs, and now he is trying to 
drink our blood.":,-0 
Having described their betrayal in violent terms, Dixiecrats spoke of their redress in terms of personal 
vengeance. Here the Dixiecrats borrowed from a masculinist canon of the Southern code of honor, with its tenets of 
fidelity, reciprocity, the capacity for betrayal and retaliatory violence.
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For Dixiecrats, resistance to civil rights and 
encroachment by the federal government became nothing less than a test of manhood. Northerners expected the 
South to "crawl on its belly, submit and beg," but white Southerners would not take this insult "lying down." 
"[W]e must be men," one Southerner claimed, "and not weaklings." Supporting the civil rights policies of the 
national party was unthinkable for "any red-blooded man in South Carolina," and failure to act on this betrayal would 
brand them as "less than men ... " Ultimately, it was important that the South respond in some way. "Southerners 
respect a fighter, be his cause right or wrong," wrote William Workman. "By the same token, they loathe the faint-
hearted." The Dixiecrat alternative was seen as an act performed "in self defense," with "[t]he Electoral College [as] 
their ... weapon." 32 
These examples illustrate the connection between gender and race relations, particularly, how the subversion 
of one hierarchy led to the disruption of the other. It is possible the gender inversion underway in political discourse 
mirrored changes in relations between actual married persons. At almost the same time they were deciding whether 
to grant the Dixiecrat's divorce from the Democratic party, South Carolinians were contemplating whether to 
abolish the state's 52-year ban on marital divorce. The state's constitution, written in 1895, prohibited divorce, and 
by 1947, South Carolina was the only state in the union that did not permit couples to sever by law the bonds of 
matrimony. Attempts to repeal the prohibition had been made in 1916, 1937, 1944, and 1945, but to no avail. 33 
From January through M~h. 1947, the General Assembly debated a resolution that would permit South Carolinians 
to vote in a statewide referendum to amend the constitution to permit divorce. Many of the resolution's supporters 
viewed the measure as a means to strengthen the family. Although South Carolina did not grant divorces, there was 
no shortage of divorced persons residing within her borders. Those seeking a divorce simply slipped across state 
lines and established a false residency claim in neighboring North Carolina or Georgia where divorces were legal. 
However, in South Carolina, divorced persons who remarried were consideced adulterers and any subsequent children 
that may have resulted from such a bond were considered illegitimate. Also, since the second marriage was 
considered adulterous, problems frequently arose with regard to property transmission upon the death of one of the 
partners.
35 
By legalizing divorce, lawmakers sought to bring the practice, and by extension marriage and the family, 
under state control. According to Representative John McMaster of Richland County, 
a co-author of the resolution, nothing less than "the sanctity of marriage, the legitimacy of children, and the 
possession of property" hung in the balance.
36 
The resolution originally provided only for submission of the question of eliminating the ban; however, to 
win conservative support for the measure, lawmakers specified four sole grounds for divorce: adultery, desertion, 
habitual drunkenness, and physical cruelty. Most agreed that divorce should be authorized only under the most rigid 
restrictions. The last thing lawmakers wanted was for South Carolina to become another Reno, Nevada. Despite 
strong support, the resolution encountered vocal minority opposition. Perhaps more than one opponent shared the 
sentiments of Representative Roger Scott, of Dillon, who saw little need for a divorce provision. "What we need is 
men," he preached. "Some people have got up in society and they won't take the old fashioned method of slapping a 
woman down occasionally." "[Our wives back home] are bad enough now," he claimed, "and we had better not be 
giving them any ideas about divorce." In his opinion divorce was primarily a recourse for women. That opinion 
29 
primarily a recourse for women. That opinion was at least partially confirmed. Even before the bill was signed into 
law, four divorce suits were filed in Richland County, Orangeburg, and Walhalla. All were filed by women. 
37 
The joint session of the General Assembly approved the resolution in late March 1947. In the 1948 
election voters approved the referendum, effectively lifting the ban on divorce and authorizing the general assembly 
to establish a divorce procedure, which was ratified and signed by Governor Thurmond in April of 1949. Thurmond 
never expressed an opinion regarding the divorce law, although at the time he personally did not believe in divorce. 
Upon signing the document, Thurmond expressed gratitude over the law's emphasis that every effort be made to 
reconcile the parties before the divorce is granted. "The home is the bedrock of our civilization," he stated, "and it 
behooves us to preserve, by every possible safeguard, the sanctity of the family." Concurrent with their debate over 
divorce, legislators also considered ways to ensure more secure and stable marriages. In January 1949 legislation was 
introduced to require a three-day waiting period and a sanity and venereal disease test for couples wanting to marry. 
The present law required only a 24-hour waiting period.39 Representative Nathaniel Cabell of Charleston 
claimed that such a bill would prevent "hasty marriages" and would "stabilize romance." Representative Joseph Wise 
stated that "[I]t is time ... to think of the moral and social standards of the state. Since it seems apparent that we will 
have a divorce measure it is all the more important to have stricter marriage laws."
40 
Opponents declared that the 
legislation would actually prevent marriages. Testifying before the Senate Medical Affairs committee, one probate 
judge claimed that such a law would discourage pregnant girls from getting married. "The bill is an indictment 
against our young womanhood," he claimed. "It presupposes an incorrect life." Despite the best efforts of the 
bill's supporters, the marriage code remained unchanged throughout the 1950s.41 
Evidence suggests that white Southern men recognized the linkages between the subordination of African 
Americans and women, thus, the disturbance of one -- race relations -- was explained in terms of the other -- gender 
relations. Simultaneous discussions and crises concerning civil rights, divorce, and the fate of the family likely 
underscore the connection between gender and race in their minds and heightened their support for states' rights. The 
most obvious and celebrated example of the convergence of racial, gender, and political concerns involved the case of 
federal Judge J. Waties Waring of Charleston. In the 1947 and 1948 cases Elmore y Rice and Brown v Baskin, 
Judge Waring had declared South Carolina's white primary unconstitutional, thus opening the state's Democratic 
primary to black voters. Significantly, Judge Waring also was a divorced man. In 1945, the Judge's first wife, a 
Charleston blueblood, obtained a divorce in Aorida at his request. Shortly thereafter, Waring married Elizabeth 
Avery, a Northern-born divorcee fifteen years his junior. Subsequently, the Warings became estranged from 
Charleston society. 
A difference of opinion exists between the Warings and other contemporary observers whether the Warings 
shunned official society or whether they were ostracized. What is generally agreed, though, is that the Warings 
became convenient targets of abuse; for, compounding South Carolinians' fury over the judge's unpopular voting 
rights decisions was Elizabeth Waring's public civil rights advocacy. On January 16, 1950, in an address to the 
Negro YWCA in Charleston, Elizabeth Waring condemned what she saw as the collective social psychosis of white 
Southerners. She referred to them as "sick, confused and decadent people ... full of pride and complacency, 
introverted, morally weak and low," while she complimented black Southerners, who were "building arrl 
creating. "'42 Mrs. Waring's comments set off a torrent of protest, both within official political circles and from the 
grassroots. Thus from 1947 until they finally left Charleston and the South altogether in 1952, the Warings suffered 
official political harassment and actual physical violence. In 1948, in the wake of Waring's voting rights decisions, 
United States Congressmen William Jennings Bryan Dorn of Greenwood and L. Mendel Rivers of Charleston 
launched an investigation and impeachment proceedings against the judge in the House of Representatives.43 Calls 
for impeachment intensified following Elizabeth Waring's 1950 YWCA speech. Back home in Charleston, the 
Judge and Mrs. Waring regularly received hate mail, harassing phone calls, and attacks on their Meeting Street home. 
While the treatment meted out to the Warings was reprehensible, the implications behind the 
retaliations are intriguing. In their public and private pronouncements against Judge and Mrs. Waring, South 
Carolinians conflated the Warings' divorce and remarried status with his voting rights decisions and her public 
advocacy for civil rights. White citizens' rage over one often was wedded to disgust over the other. To many 
Southern whites, the Warings' challenge to the racial status quo was directly linked to the couple's willingness to 
subvert traditional gender relations.
44 
In their reproach of the Judge and his wife, contemporary observers merged the 
racial and gender elements in two ways. Some claimed Judge Waring's voting rights decisions were a vengeful 
response to the social ostracism he suffered following his divorce and remarriage. They interpreted the judge's 
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vendetta by toppling another sacred institution. Natw:alb:'., a divorced man would not be accepted into polite society, 
and llfil!!mfu. he would take revenge by upsetting race relations. The second rationalization by South 
Carolinians was that the judge's willingness to divorce his first wife indicated a propensity toward subversive 
behavior, a predilection subsequently confirmed by his willingness to overturn the racial status quo. This line of 
reasoning surfaced frequently in the hate mail written to the judge and his wife. One writer characterized Waring's 
treatment of his first wife as sinful, claiming "Now his sins has [sic] a grip on him and he can't shake it off."45 
Another irate writer asked: "Why did you wait until you took on this second wife before you suddenly became mad at 
all white people. Did not this course of action occur to you while married previously? Of course it didn't... ."
46 
In 
either configuration, there exists an idea of a social compact with interconnecting racial and gender components. 47 
Although Waring's voting rights decisions prompted the impeachment proceedings, South Carolina 
legislators used the judge's Florida divorce as grounds for dismissal. They hoped to demonstrate the illegality of his 
divorce and to prove Waring unfit to serve on the bench. Yet legislators condemned Waring as much for mjstreatiof,? 
his first wife as for procuring an out-of-state divorce. They spoke as frequently of his "distorted personal life" 300 
his "ungentlemanly" conduct toward his first wife as they did of his alleged illegalities.48 Congressman Dom 
blended these two elements when he stated that "a man who disposes of a woman to whom he had been married for 
33 years, against her will, and takes another man's wife, whom he sent to Reno, Nevada[,] to obtain a divorce in 
order that he might marry her himself, ... and then returns to that State and sits on the bench and passes sentence on 
49 
people, ... is morally unfit to serve as a Judge." Politicians' interest in the Waring's private life bordered on the 
prurient. It was a rare public official whose papers did not include a file on the judge and his wife, complete with 
doggerels and off-color jokes. 
The Warings also were harassed by private citizens. Hate mail received by the couple reveals that the 
authors believed that Elizabeth Waring's civil rights advocacy cast both her and the judge outside the confines of 
traditional masculine and feminine gender roles. Mrs. Waring became a sexually-dissatisfied homewrecker 
unhappy with the domestic role of the conventional wife. Irate letter writers wondered why she would not "stay at 
home where [she) belong[s]." Furthermore, most letter writers considered her marriage to the judge illegal. More 
than one writer accused Mrs. Waring of having "stole" the judge "from his legal wife." One even referred to this 
alleged marital thievery as "a nigger trick."50 The judge, on the other hand, was a cuckold. Unable to control his 
outspoken wife, he became a pitiful symbol of imperiled masculinity. One woman wrote to the judge "to extend to 
you my profound sympathy in this hour of your humiliation. "
51 
Another writer contributed a poem written in black 
dialect that implied the judge was not "man" enough for Elizabeth Waring: "Dont let dat ol judge man keep you 
down too long. Comon up noth honey we'll show you plenty good times"
52 
Yet another writer, a woman, admitted 
that while it was "very sweet" for a wife to mirror her husband's ideas, the opposite was unthinkable. To this female 
correspondent, the judge's support of his wife's civil rights advocacy was "revolting;" she disapproved the judge's 
stay in the background while his wife took to a public stage to advocate civil rights for African Americans.
53 
Petitions calling for the judge's impeachment echoed this woman writer's sentiments.54 The wording of 
these petitions is particularly interesting because the major charge against the judge was not his judicial decisions 
but his willingness to allow his wife to speak for him. It states that "J. Waties Waring, has, openly, through his 
wife, advocated both dissension and revolution on the part of the negro citizens against the white citizens of South 
Carolina, thereby most certainly disqualifying himself as a fit Judge for the Honorable Federal Courts .... " 1be 
petitioners not only found her views reprehensible; undoubtedly the unwillingness of the judge to refute his 
wife's statements was as objectionable.55 As these examples graphically illustrate, white Southerners' worst fears 
regarding increased federal intervention and the dissolution of states' rights were dramatically revealed through their 
condemnation of the Warings. 
The gendered discourse of the States' Rights movement of the late-I940s ~ early-19505 was not only an 
attempt to restore the South to a position of power in the Democratic Party family but also an effort to shore up 
domestic patriarchy generally. Furthermore, while not officially part of the Dixiecrat platform, clearly the 
movement to legalize divorce was pursued not as a progressive measure but as a means by which to bring what was 
already a reality -- a plethora of illegally divorced citizens under state control. Because divorce was seen primarily as 
a recourse for women, strict control of the legal machinery allowed lawmakers to regulate the behavior of women and 
protect the family in the process. 
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The Israelites of Columbia, South Carolina: The Development of an Antebellum 
Jewish Community 
BelindaF. ~l 
When Columbia became South Carolina's new state capital in 1786, Jews had lived in Carolina for almost 
a century. They arrived in Charleston in the late 1600s and soon became part of the city's recorded history. Drawn to 
the colony, where John Locke's "Fundamental Constitutions" promised freedom of religion to "Jews, Heathens, and 
Other Dissenters," Jews established themselves in the port city, won the right to citizenship and voting privileges, 
flourished in business and professional fields, and in 1749 organized a synagogue known as Kahal Kadosh Beth 
Elohim, the Holy Congregation of the House of God. 1 
By the early decades of the nineteenth century, Charleston was the unofficial "Jewish capital of America," 
with what one scholar has described as "the largest, most prosperous, and probably most cultivated and intellectually 
sophisticated Jewish community in the New World." Throughout this early period, Jews left the city to settle in 
Georgetown, Beaufort, Camden, Sumter, and Columbia. By the 1830s Jews had a significant presence in 
Columbia, and the state's capital city served as an important second center of Jewish life in South Carolina.2 
It is impossible to determine just when the first Jewish settler arrived in the Columbia area. In the 1730s 
colonial authorities offered an attractive promotional package to encourage settlement vf the interior. Each settler 
received fifty acres to move inland, with an additional fifty acres for each person taken with him. This package must 
have been especially attractive to Jews whose tradition with land ownership in Europe had been severely limited by 
governmental action. Further, the bargain prices on land led speculators like Jewish merchant Joseph Salvador of 
London to purchase a hundred thousand acres in 1755 in the Ninety Six District, an area northwest of what would 
later become Richland County. Referred to as the "Jews Land," this vast area was the home of Francis Salvador, 
whose election to South Carolina's First Provincial Congress in 1774 made him the first Jew in the modern world to 
serve in elective office.3 
New economic possibilities most certainly attracted Jews when Columbia became the state's new capital in 
I 786. Settlers found a warm welcome in the frontier-like environment of the new state capital, especially settlers 
who brought important skills in business, trade, and the professions. Columbia's early Jews brought these skills 
and others as they opened dry goods stores, grocery stores, saloons, and auction•· houses. They also brought 
important business connections to Charleston and other cities as well that any new town, especially a young state 
capital, would find desirable. 
Judah and Jacob Barrett moved up from Charleston and were among the earliest Jewish merchants to locate 
in Columbia. Judah Barrett arrived in the early 1800s and moved around the communities of Columbia, Camden, and 
Winnsboro. His brother Jacob opened a dry goods store in Columbia known as "Barrett's" in the 18 lOs. The store 
carried a little bit of everything: "Dry goods, groceries, provisions, liquors, hanlware, crockery, shoes, hats, and 
saddles." Together with brother Isaac in Charleston, the brothers formed a prosperous enterprise, moving goods back 
and forth from Charleston to Columbia.4 
The Barrett brothers speculated in real estate and engaged in other business activities as well. By the mid-
1820s Judah Barrett assumed a prominent role in the community. He became a founding member of the Columbia 
Hebrew Benevolent Society in 1826, and a year later was Columbia's first Jew elected to public office. Judah Barrett 
was elected to the Town Council and served two terms as town warden or city council member.5 
Isaac Lyons, a German Jew who first settled in Philadelphia and later moved to Charleston, arrived in 
Columbia in the 1820s and opened a successful ~ocery store with his sons, Henry and Jacob Cohen Lyons. Married 
to the daughter of the hazan (prayer leader) of Philadelphia's Mikveh Israel Synagogue, Lyons and his family brought 
important ties to Philadelphia and Charleston. Lyons' son, Jacob Cohen Lyons, married the daughter of Abraham 
Hart, one of Philadelphia's leading book publishers and the preeminent Jewish book publisher of his day. Lyons' 
daughter, Isabelle, married M.C. Mordecai, one of Charleston's leading shippers and importers and a popular state 
senator. The Lyons family actively participated in the civic life of Columbia. Jacob Cohen Lyons was a board 
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member of Columbia's Exchange Bank, the Columbia Board of Health, and the Columbia Athenaeum, while Henry 
Lyons served numerous terms on Town Council and as Columbia's second Jewish intendant in 1850.6 
Charleston residents Humphrey and Frances Marks relocated in Columbia in the 1820s to open Marks 
Porter and Relish House. This establishment, was an upscale bar supplied with the "best wines and Liquors." In 
their advertisements, the Marks noted the care and attention that had been given to the "fitting up of the 
establishment." The Marks provided a rt'.ading room with newspapers "to which gentlemen from the country ard 
also members of the legislature" could have "free and uninterrupted access."7 
Columbia represented a second chance for some Jewish merchants who had run into business difficulties ard 
other problems in Charleston. Levi Pollock, convicted of larceny but pardoned "if he left the state," opened an 
auction business in Columbia with Phineas Solomon. This business !rCW rapidly, and the men enjoyed a 
considerable measure of financial success. They became founding members of the Columbia Hebrew Benevolent 
Society, with Solomon serving as the organization's first recorded president.' 
Surveyor Robert Mills noted in the 1820s that a number of Charleston merchants had opened businesses in 
Columbia and observed that the state capital now "en~ssed much of the trade which King Street... formerly 
enjoyed." This trend reflected Charleston's declining economy and undoubtedly resulted in the decision of several 
Jewish merchants to relocate in Columbia. All of the eleven "founding members" of the Columbia Hebrew 
Benevolent Society in 1826 had previously lived in Charleston, and ten of the eleven founders were involved in 
business and trade.9 
It was in the professions, however, that Columbia's Jews exerted influence that far surpassed their limited 
numbers. Augmenting the young city's small professional class, they served among Columbia's first attorneys, 
educators, and physicians and assumed important positions in the professional elite. 
Chapman Levy, born in Camden on July 4, 1787, and admitted to the Bar in 1806, was one of the earliest 
Jews to practice law in the state and the first Jewish lawyer to settle in Columbia. Well respected for his War of 
1812 service and his service in both houses of the South Carolina legislature from Kershaw County, Levy lived in 
Columbia in the 1820s and built a solid legal reputation. In his pioneering study of the South Carolina Bar, Judge 
John Belton O'Neall noted Levy's "eminent success" and described him as "one of the shrewdest advocates" in the 
Bar. Levy gained notoriety for his murder prosecution of the brother of Governor John Taylor, which later led to a 
duel between Levy and the Governor's son. Indeed, Levy's reputation as a master duelist was well known in the area 
One well respected upcountry physician recalled that Levy was consulted "in every duel that ... [was] fought in the 
upper part of South Carolina .... "10 
Levy owned considerable land in Columbia and operated a brickyard near the Columbia Canal. Records 
indicate that with thirty-one slaves, Levy was the largest Jewish slave-owner in the United States in 1820. He also 
functioned as a type of one man banking operation in this era before banks were organized in Columbia, with a 
pattern of loans to various residents. Levy undoubtedly took a leading role in the organization of the Hebrew Burial 
Society in 1822 as the earliest surviving marker in the cemetery is that of his wife Flora. He served as "Worshipful 
Master," the key leadership position, of Columbia's only Masonic organization at the time of Columbia's Masonic 
Hall dedication in the early 1820s. Levy returned to Camden in the latter part of the decade, served several terms in 
the legislature, and took an active role as a state senator in the Nullification Crisis of the 1830s. A delegate to the 
Nullification Convention, he vigorously opposed the Ordinance of Nullification.11 
Physician Elias Marks arrived in Columbia before 1820 and soon redirected his considerable talents ard 
energies from medicine to the cause of women's education. Within a few short years, he virtually dominated 
antebellum discussions of appropriate higher education for women in South Carolina. Born in Charleston in 1790, 
Marks was an 1815 graduate of New York City's College of Physicians and Surgeons. While in New York, he 
married Jane Barham, a former teacher, and the couple moved to Columbia where Marks' parents operated the Porter 
and Relish House. They began an active involvement with the recently opened Columbia Female Academy, ard 
Marks became the school's principal. 12 
Marks soon sensed the need for more advanced study for young women beyond the scope of the Academy's 
basic curriculum. In 1826 he appealed to the South Carolina General Assembly to support an institution for th(' 
higher education of women. When the legislature refused to take action, the couple made plans to open their own 
school. Marks named the property he purchased for the school "Barhamville," in honor of his wife who died shortly 
before the school opened as the South Carolina Female Institute in 1828. Marks directed the school for the next 
three decades. 13 
Popularly known as the "Barhamville Academy," the school provided an adva.'!Ced four year curriculum ard 
drew its students from the daughters of wealthy, prominent citizens throughout the state and the South. It became 
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South Carolina's premier school for women. Leg~.~dary surgeon Dr. J. Marion Sims, ~ho visited th~ school wh.~le a 
student at South Carolina College, recalled that 1t was the. first and only school of.its character m th~ state. By 
1855 Marks claimed to have educated over 4,000 students. His more fa.'llous graduates included Anna Mana Calhoun, 
the daughter of Vice President and United States Senator John C. Calhoun; Ann Pamela Cunningham, who Jed the 
efforts to preserve George Washington's home, Mount Vernon; and Martha Bulloch Roosevelt, the mother of 
President Theodore Roosevelt. 14 
Another early Jewish physician with a strong commitment to public service was Dr. Mordecai Hendricks 
DeLeon, who combined his interests in medicine and politics to become one of Columbia's leading antebellum 
physicians and public servants. Born in South Carolina in 1791, he was the son of Jacob DeLeon, a Sephardic Jew 
who had emigrated to Charleston from Jamaica before the Revolution. Mordecai DeLeon built an impressive medical 
practice in Columbia; his patients included Dr. Thomas Cooper, the celebrated President of South Carolina College, 
and Mary Boykin Chesnut, the Civil War diarist. In 1833, Del.eon was elected Columbia's intendant, or mayor, for 
the first of three successive terms. '5 
Mordecai DeLeon settled in Columbia at a time of intense political activity that centered around proposed 
tariff increases. South Carolina College President Thomas Cooper sparked the debate at an anti-tariff meeting in July 
1827 predicting that, "We shall, before long, be compelled to calculate the value of the Union .... " DeLeon became 
an active admirer and supporter of Cooper's and embraced his "Nullification" philosophy. The two men developed a 
close, personal friendship, with the seventy year old Cooper likely serving as a mentor to the much younger 
DeLeon. Cooper designated DeLeon as executor of his estate, while DeLeon named his youngest son after the 
college president. Cooper no doubt introduced DeLeon to prominent politicians, including Columbia resident ard 
United States Senator William C. Preston, who became a close DeLeon associate. While information on DeLeon's 
1833 race for intendant is sparse, it is probable that he was viewed as Cooper's choice in the election and in 1834 and 
J 835 as well. 16 
The DeLeon family became a leading, antebellum Columbia family. Mordecai DeLeon served as Chairman 
of Columbia's Board of Health in the 1840s and Regent for the State Hospital. Rebecca Lopez DeLeon headed up 
Columbia·s Ladies Benevolent Society, whose members constituted the wives and daughters of Columbia's social 
elite. Their eldest son, Dr. David Camden DeLeon, was the first surgeon general of the Confederacy. Second son, 
Edwin DeLeon, also a graduate of South Carolina College, was an attorney and a newspaper publisher. He was 
appointed counsel general to Egypt by President Franklin Pierce and was Jefferson Davis' personal representative to 
France during the Civil War. The Del.eon's third son, Thomas Cooper DeLeon, was a prolific writer and chronicler 
of southern society. 17 
It did not take long for Columbia's early Jews to organize for Jewish communal life. They formed a burial 
society in 1822 and established the Columbia Hebrew Benevolent Society four years later. Formal religious 
organization began in the 1840s when the community grew to over a hundred and twenty-five residents. This 
important next step was initiated by Philadelphia resident Boanna Wolff, who visited Columbia in 1843 to see her 
sister, Elizabeth Wolff Lyons, the wife of Columbia city council member Henry Lyons. 18 
Boanna Wolff's Philadelphia connection afforded her an opportunity to observe firsthand the work of 
religious educator Rebecca Gratz and Rabbi Isaac Leeser, the pre-eminent leader of traditional Judaism in the United 
States. Gratz and Leeser had recently pioneered a successful Sunday School program for Philadelphia's young Jews, 
the first such religious progam for Jewish youth in the country. Other leaders in the Philadelphia Jewish Sunday 
School program included Louisa Hart, the aunt of Columbia resident Louisa Hart Lyo~s (the sister-in law of Boanna 
Wolff's sister). Boanna Wolff no doubt sensed a need for a similar program in Columbia as well as likely support 
and volunteered her talents and services to the etfort. 19 
Wolff received the support of Jewish community leaders, with a member of the Columbia Hebrew 
Benevolent Society providing space to house the Sunday School program, and other members soliciting donations 
for books, fuel, and furniture. The Columbia Israelite Sunday School opened on October 15, 1843, with some thirty 
students and became one of only seven Jewish Sunday School programs in the country during the 1840s. Public 
examinations, held six months later before an overflow audience at Carolina Hall, were so well received that the 
community immediately launched a fundraising drive to further the aims of the school. With contributions from 
Christian friends as well, the community erected the Hebrew Benevolent Society Building in 1846. Columbia 
Hebrew Benevolent Society leaders then organiz.ed Columbia's Sheritt Israel Conwegation and established a 
synagogue on the upstairs floor of the building. Benevolent Society president. Jacob Levin, served as the 
congregation's president. The conwegation soon employed a part-time Rabbi, who served as acting hazan (prayer 
leader) and taught Hebrew.:zo 
39 
These activities propelled Columbia's small Jewish community into the larger arena of Jewish life around 
the country. The Columbia Israelite Sunday School and the new congregation received considerable attention in the 
nation's only Jewish newspaper, Rabbi Leeser's monthly publication, The Occident. Addresses and remarks by 
community leaders Jacob Levin and Henry S. Cohen were reprinted with positive editorial comments, arrl 
community events were reported on a regular basis. Leeser served as a conduit for financial contributions to the 
Columbia congregation and encouraged its progress. His personal ties to the Columbia Jewish community were 
strong, having officiated at the marriages of several members. Leeser visited Columbia on three occasions--in 1852, 
1855, and 1867-- before his death in 1868. During his visit in 1852, he made note of the "zeal" of the 
congregation's members.21 
Columbia's early Jews found a warm reception in their new town. Many Jews, including city councilman 
Judah Barrett, attorney and state senator Chapman Levy, educator Dr. Elias Marks, and intendants Dr. Mordecai 
DeLeon and Henry Lyons, were viewed by their neighbors as important people with powerful connections. 
Columbia newspapers boasted that Jacob and Lipman Levin's brother in Philadelphia had been elected to Congress. 
Others in the Jewish community, including Isaac S. Cohen and Isaac D. Mordecai, became bank officers and held 
important positions in organizations ranging from the militia to the Masons to the Franklin Debating Club.22 
In large part the tremendous acceptance Jews felt in Columbia was due to the fact that they were so much 
like their neighbors. Race, not religion, was the overriding factor in southern society, and Jews were white. They 
shared the views of their Christian neighbors on most of the important issues of the day. On the critical issue of 
slavery, they were supporters with the majority of Jewish families owning slaves, and community leaders like Jacob 
Levin even trading in slaves.23 
There was, however, one recorded instance where Columbia's Jews differed with their neighbors. A distinct 
Jewish view existed on the matter of Sunday Sabbath laws, and it collided with an effort by town leaders to limit the 
congregating of slaves in the city on Sundays. Columbia was undergoing a periodic fit of hysteria over the security 
of the white minority and focused on unsupervised slaves congregating on Sundays to engage in limited trade arrl 
bartering. Much of this trade was with Jewish merchants, who closed their shops on the Jewish Sabbath and opened 
for business on Sundays. Ironically, Mordecai DeLeon had just assumed his first term as intendant in 1833. 
Columbia's town council adopted an ordinance that prohibited the opening of any business on Sundays, or 
trade on that day with any person of color. The ordinance set off a storm of protest in the press, with DeLeon 
denounced for supporting a measure that discriminated against Jews. The conflict escalated when three businessmen, 
two of whom were Jewish, were prosecuted for violating the ordinance. Although no official record of DeLeon's 
vote remains, all existing accounts of the proceeding indicate that the vote to convict was unanimous.24 
One of those convicted, Alexander Marks, the brother of Dr. Elias Marks, appealed his conviction, 
challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance on the ground that it violated Article 8 of the South Carolina 
Constitution, which provided for" ... free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without 
discrimination or preference." The ordinance was upheld in the courts upon the dubious finding that the prohibition 
of all labor on Sunday was unrelated to the Christian Sabbath.25 
The Sunday Sabbath prosecutions reverberated through the city's next municipal election, with a competing 
slate offered that included tw~ Jewish businessmen for the town's six warden positions. Notably, the opposing slate 
did not challenge Intendant DeLeon, presumably recognizing certain limits to their disagreement with him. One of 
these opposition candidates, Henry Lyons, captured his council seat and served on Council until his election as 
intendant in 1850.26 
In sum, while there were episodes of religious intolerance and insensitivity, Columbia's Israelites viewed 
their adopted hometown as a place of opportunity and openness. One leader, H~nry S. Cohen, described the Jewish 
community's strong feelings for Columbia at a community address in May 1849: 
.. .In contemplating, as Israelites, our position in this land, to us truly a "land of 
milk and honey," we may justly exclaim, with Israel of old, "the Lord hath 
brought us forth out of Egypt with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm, 
He hath brought us into this place, and hath given us this land."27 
Columbia's first Jewish community with its active Benevolent Society, Sunday School, synagogue, arrl 
tradition of community involvement came to a close following the upheaval of the Civil War. The fire 
accompanying Sherman's capture of the city on the Sabbath Eve of February 17th, 1865, destroyed the Benevolent 
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Society Building and the synagogue and devastated Jewish homes and businesses. Young Eleanor Cohen, whose 
family lost everything in the fire confided to her diary that in one night her family was brought from comparative 
wealth and luxury to abject poverty."21 
In the aftermath of the fire, which gutted much of the city's business district, a number of the established 
Jewish merchants and their families left Columbia to seek more promising opportunities elsewhere. Commenting 
years later on the Jewish families no longer liv!n.g in the :irea, Columbia newspaper ~itor Julian Selby observed that 
··move on" had been the motto of Columb1as Israelites. Those few who remained, along with new Jewish 
immigrants who settled in the city during the turbulent war and reconstruction era, lacked the numbers and financial 
resources to maintain a viable synagogue or Sunday school, and Jewish life in the postwar era was disorganized 800 
sporadic. 29 
As a measure of prosperity returned in the 1890s, the new residents, with very limited ties to the earlier 
generation of Columbia Jewry, comprised the city's second Jewish community. This new community launched 
efforts to reestablish Jewish communal life that culminated in the organiz.ation of a new congregation in 1896 and 
the establishment of a new synagogue in 1905.30 Its foundation, in the rich antebellum experience of earlier Jewish 
life in the state's capital city, was solid and steadfast. 
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The Circle Large and Small: 
Courtship, Marriage and Childrearing 
on a Lowcountry Plantation 
Judith Lee Hunt 
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese described family as the "central metaphor for southern society" that was the basis 
for personal and social relations through which individuals defined their identities and understood" themselves. In the 
antebellum South, both the black and the white family was molded by the plantation system, and the centrality of 
the southern family to larger southern society has inspired a rich historiography.1 
The marriage, the household structure, and the plantation system of Susan Smith Middleton and Williams 
Middleton, members of two of South Carolina's oldest and most prestigious planter families, demonstrate the 
relationship between the private family and the lowcountry plantocracy. Although family history covers an array of 
topics and is entangled in numerous historiographical issues, this work pays particular attention to three major sets 
of questions in southern historiography. First, what was the nature of power structures within the nuclear 
household? Secondly, how did planter elites form their households in the nineteenth-cent\Jry and why? Finally, 
what was the basis for kinship interaction? How did relationships with extended kin affect the nuclear household? 
The examination of such questions places the Middleton family in the larger body of scholarship. 
The plantation was originally laid out by John Williams who in 1705 received a royal grant to 1600 acres 
along the Ashley River. From his profits in rice and indigo, he constructed a handsome three-story mansion. 
Situated upon an unusually high bluff on the Ashley River, it provided generations of Middletons a commanding 
view of their domain. The plantation came into the Middleton family in 1741 when Mary Williams, the sole heir to 
her father's estate, manied Henry Middleton, a wealthy planter with interests in the lowcountry, Barbados, aro 
England. Naming the plantation Middleton Place, Mary and Henry busily went to work making the plantation as 
prestigious as the family name. 
In 1755 they added two flanker buildings on each side of the mansion and hired English landscape architects 
to lay out beautiful terraces and formal gardens, reputedly the earliest landscaped gardens in America. Architecture 
and English gardens reflected not only great wealth but also a more self-conscious sense of identity on the part of the 
colonial elite. These out-buildings of "superior elegance" were far more ornamental than the original house, am 
represented the proprietors' desires to display their elite status through architecture.2 ,The wing to the right of the 
house, closest to the slave quarters and stables, had "the laundry and extra bedrooms above." The other wing was a 
"library, beneath which was a conservatory."3 In 1784, Arthur Middleton, Henry's eldest son and a signer of the 
Declaration oflndependence,'inherited the plantation. During the three short years of his proprietorship, he expanded 
rice cultivation, created two large rice fields, and constructed a rice mill. The property then passed to his son, 
another Henry. 
Henry, Williams' father, surpassed all his forbearers' efforts to improve the plantation. When Henry became 
proprietor, the gardens were in place, but as one traveler noted, both the house and gardens were "badly kept." 
Middleton Place was "quite a pet place" with Henry and his wife, Mary Hering Middleton, and under their ownership 
it was improved and enlarged.' Fifty slaves labored for over ten years to construct new gardens and terraces. These 
slaves, under the direction of their master, "laid out the garden and grounds in a style of great beauty and elegance, 
with terraces, hot-houses, serpentine walks, campus, ponds and fish reserves, flowers native and exotic, flower trees 
and forest trees." Between 1800 and 1838, gardeners experimented with over two hundred varieties of plants.5 
The expansive gardens reflected the Middletons' refined taste and acquisitiveness: "forty acres in the grounds 
... were filled with rare plants and shrubs from all parts of the world. The camellias and azaleas were first brought 
to this country from Japan before Perry opened its gates." The gardens provided pleasant walkways, delighted the 
senses and enhanced the setting of the house and other structures. As one family member described the scene, "From 
the semicircular portico and steps on the front of the house a very broad walk, twenty or thirty feet wide, runs 
straight to the terraces with numerous flower beds on either side. Diverging from this, in front of the house, are 
walks somewhat less broad. One, after a short distance, turns abruptly and skirting the great lawn in the rear of the 
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house, passes borders of azaleas, rhooodendrons and other blossoming shrubs, then a group of laurels and fine forest 
trees, which fonn a secluded enclosure for the tomb where generations of Middletons sleep their last sleep."6 
Curiosities, both animal and vegetable, abounded: 
Farther on the walk, on the lotus pond, the famed flower of the Nile finds a friendly atmosphere 
and lifts its golden bloom a foot in diameter to a height of three feet or more above the water. Still 
farther on a heavy wire fence divides off a portion of the wide expanse of lawn where the curious 
Turkish water cattle grazed and reveled in still another pond, standing so deep in it that only their 
noses were visible on the surface. In shap(': they were much like buffaloes, but without the heavy 
growth of hair about the neck and shoulders.' 
The gardens at Middleton Place were famous and even grander than the plantation house. Although not 
Williams' creation, the constant improvement and expansion of the gardens were extremely important to him. Like 
his father, Williams expanded the garden in the formal English tradition going "beyond his immediate progenitor in 
improving and decorating the family homestead, or ancestral family seat. "1 He "reclaimed a vast body of marsh land," 
expanded rice cultivation, and raised cattle, sheep, and rare cashmere goats. He also built a com and cotton mill, a 
practical asset for himself and his neighbors.9 
His plans diverged from tl1e contemporary British fashion of laying out gardens in a very infonnal, natural 
rr;mner; Williams desired to dominate nature and to create the image of formality once associated with the European 
aristocracy. The landscape, including the gardens, the artificial butterfly lakes, and the scaled terraces leading from the 
river to the main house, all certainly gave the aesthetic effects of power, prestige, and control. 10 Their livelihood 
came from utilizing the soil and water necessary for rice cultivation; their need for an elaborate and complex 
hydraulic system required them to control the rivers, reshape the land, and maintain a large, skilled labor force. 
Without control over land and labor the plantation system would have collapsed. 
Williams Middleton was born in July 1809. The sixth son of Mary Hering Middleton, Williams was named 
after his great-grandmother, Mary Williams. Like his father and his grandfather, Williams and his siblings grew up 
surrounded by the lowcounu;y plantocracy. He spent most of his life before his marriage in the company of his 
family at Middleton Place, at his father's estate in Newport, Rhode Island, or abroad. When Williams was a youth of 
eleven, his father was appointed American Minister to Russia. Governor Henry Middleton moved his wife an1 
children to St. Petersburg, where they spent ten years living in the lavish luxury of the Royal Court of Czar 
Nicholas I.U 
While abroad, Williams attended Brook Green, a boarding school in London, and a Paris boarding school. 
His education complete, he served as an attach6 at the American Legation while his father remained in Russia. 
Williams was surrounded by and emersed in the high culture of Europe and United States and developed a love arrl 
appreciation of art and literature that he retained throughout his life. Returning to the lowcountry in 1830, he quickly 
assumed his position in lowcountry society and enjoyed life as a country planter. 12 
In 1848 Williams began his courtship of Susan Pringle Smith, the twenty-six year old daughter of Robert 
and Elizabeth Mary Pringle Smith, and granddaughter of Robert Smith, the first Episcopal Bishop of South 
Carolina. Like Williams, Susan grew up as a member the Jowcountry planter elite. Her family owned plantations on 
the Ashepoo and Combahee Rivers, so that she too enjoyed a privileged life, traveling abroad and summering in 
Newport, "enjoying all the gayeties [sic] and pleasures of this world which wealth and social position could offer." 
Susan was considered quite a beauty, and her elegant trousseau added to her refinement. After summering in 
Newport, Susan and her siblings frequently traveled to New York, where they bought clothes in the latest fashions, 
and, on their return to Charleston, "with their stately mother made a marked appearance in the quiet of the old 
town." 13 At twenty-six, Susan, found the forty year old Williams a desirable suitor. All the attributes that made him 
popular in society attracted Susan to him. 14 Susan and Williams were old acquaintances; Williams' cousin, Elizabeth 
Middleton, had married Susan's brother, William Mason Smith. Moreover their families held neighboring 
plantations in Prince Williams Parish and certainly mingled in the same social group in Charleston and Newport .. 15 
Susan and Williams embarked on a courtship motivated by social and economic interests as well as the 
pursuit of individual happiness and romantic love. Their courtship was neither coldly formal nor frivolously gay. 
They spent the months prior to their wedding visiting, corresponding, and contemplating their joint future in a 
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Susan, some weeks before their wedding, wrote to her fiancee; "I trust in after . .. years we shall look back to '49 
not as the happiest year of our lives but only as the beginning of our happiness." 16 
Williams, almost forty and anxious to marry, wanted a short courtship, and the longer Susan delayed setting 
a date, the more he expressed concern and questioned her desire to marry him. Such insecurities might have been 
reinforced by a previous courtship that had gone awry while his eagerness was perhaps encouraged by the fact that all 
his siblings had already married. 17 Susan, however, reassured him; "My dearest do you not know that my engaging 
myself to you was my engagement thoughtlessly or lightly but soberly & after much reflection[.]" Her willingness 
to express her own opinions so confidently depicts a young woman unlikely to be easily dominated by her husband 
and suggests that holding her suitor's desires at bay was a coy way of keeping his attention. Susan enjoyed Williams' 
attention and in one instance was angry when he went to visit his "favorite nieces" in Edisto, rather than spending 
time with her. Regardless of these minor disagreements, their courtship correspondence indicates not only that the 
decision to marry was one of individual choice, but also one both parties had seriously contemplated.18 Throughout 
the courtship Susan clearly expressed her desires and needs. Rather than writing love letters filled with courtship 
rhetoric of female devotion and submission, she expressed her desire to create a loving household based on equality. 
Her ability to express herself and willingness to pursue her own destiny certainly ooded to a more equal 
relationship. 19 
Susan's financial security furthered equality within the marriage. Since her father had died a year before her 
engagement, her mother and brother negotiated the marriage settlement on her behalf. Susan was given $10,000 and 
thirty-one slaves along with their interest and issue; this was a large settlement, even by elite standards. Moreover 
this personal property was put in trust during Williams' lifetime for "her own sole and separate use independently and 
exclusively of the debts, contracts and engagements of the said Williams Middleton." Should she wish to sell or 
make other use of her property, Susan was required to make a written request to her trustees, signed in the "presence 
of two (2) or more credible witnesses." She was empowered to make a will that would "direct, limit or appoint the 
property embraced and included within the terms and conditions and for such estate or estates as to her the said 
proper." During their joint lives, this settlement was intended to protect Susan's assets from any personal interests of 
her husband and to thwart any attempt by him or his creditors to appropriate them. But, even more revealing of its 
intent, was the provision that should Williams die before Susan, the property should be "discharged and exonerated 
from all the trusts, powers and limitations herein contained and expressed."20 The fact that Susan would receive her 
remaining assets, devoid of any restrictive trust stipulations, indicated that the settlement was created in a manner 
which would provide Susan the greatest control and protection. 
Settlements like tt:e one between Williams and Susan were becoming more common among the wealthy in 
the North and South by the 1830s. An "active trust" was the surest way of protecting a married woman's assets from 
her husband and/or his creditors. Although she was dependent on the trustees' approval while Williams was alive, 
she, unlike many women, retained the control and use of the property after his death and was able to will her assets 
as she chose. Despite the involvement of trustees in the handling of her assets, Susan had considerable financial 
independence. The arrangement of the marriage settlement was "inextricably connected to the allocation of power" 
within the nuclear household. Economic power was essential to the well-being of the Middleton household and to the 
social status of the family. Economic control in the household translated, to some degree, into authority for Susan in 
the family. 21 
Their engagement represented a consolidation of power and prestige for Williams and Susan as a couple and 
as members of a larger kinship network. The thirty slaves Susan brought to their marriage substantially increased 
Williams's slave holdings.22 By the mid-fifties and perhaps even earlier, Williams was either cash poor or hoo 
difficulty liquefying assets. Susan's $10,000, then, was especially significant. ~ very fact that Susan was a 
member of a family equal to her husband's in tenns of power and prestige also helped mitigate gender inequalities. 
Indeed, her status led Williams' Aunt Septima Sexta Middleton Rutledge to consider her one of society's "highest 
prizes."23 In addition to assets that afforded Susan an identity and worth separate from Williams, she was considerably 
older at age twenty-seven than the average women at her first marriage. Susan was more likely to have a strong sense 
of self and more likely than a younger woman to realize the equalizing effects her material and personal assets 
brought to her union. 2" 
Her many assets encouraged Middleton family members to welcome Susan into the fold. On October 7, 
1848, Septima Rutledge offered Williams her congratulations on his recent engagement. Similarly, William's 
sister, Eliza Middleton Fisher of Philadelphia, sent Williams a table and asked that it be presented to his future bride 
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"as a token of Sisterly affection." When family members approved of a marriage, all efforts were made to bring 
spouses into the larger circle of kin. 25 
While individual emotions and pursuit of personal happiness became increasingly significant in determining 
marriage choice by the early part of the nineteenth century, marriage patterns among the Middletons and Smiths 
indicate that these choices were not outside the sphere of influence of both the nuclear and extended family members. 
While affection was important, clearly family status and wealth mattered in elite partnerships.26 Both Susan's aoo 
Williams' siblings all made marriage choices intended to consolidate family power and prestige. If they did not marry 
members of lowcountry planter elite, they married the offspring of Northern commercial civic elites who had both 
capital and political influence or foreigners with claim to royal lineage. Like Williams and Susan, their choices 
imply that marriage had an effect not only upon the principals, but also on the members of their larger circles.27 
On January 11, 1849, in the company of friends and family, Williams and Susan were married in 
Charleston's St. Philip's Church by Bishop Christopher Edwards Gadsden. After the wedding, Williams took his 
new bride to Middleton Place Plantation, the hub of the extended Middleton family circle.28 As newlyweds, 
WiJliams and Susan enjoyed the isolation of Middleton Place. They relied on one another for entertainment aoo 
adjusted weJI to a quiet married life. Williams described their "Darby and Joan" existence to his mother, a lifestyle 
which suited them because, by his estimation, they were both "quiet people" and were establishing comfortable 
patterns and habits as husband and wife. Williams expressed no regret at his new life and appeared sympathetic to the 
stresses their marriage caused his bride. He explained that when he left for long periods, he would "persuade my wife 
to remain in town with her mother so that she could on my arrival there return with less reluctance."29 
For the first time, Susan resided as mistress of her own household without the company of her mother aoo 
sii..lings. During their courtship Susan had explained to her future husband that although she did not have regrets or 
misgivings about their marriage, she had "a little pardonable regret at having to leave the kindest most [exemplary] 
of Mothers." Yet she remained in close proximity to her kin, alleviating much of the kind of isolation that women 
on the southern frontier felt; Like Susan, Williams had spent the majority of his adulthood surrounded by his 
extended family. He balanced his satisfaction with his "little circle" against his responsibilities as ·a trustee of his 
father's estate, husband, and planter~30 Williams hoped that his wife would adjust to other demands on his time aoo 
soon begin to enjoy their new life; "By Little & little I think I shall be able to make her take interest in my 
occupations; relieving the tedium of some of them & doubling the pleasure of others.: Here, Williams expressed his 
desire that Susan actively participate in his life rather than enter a household of separate and unconnected spheres.31 
Feelings of detachment and separation between Susan and Willams waned as they became integrated into the 
interlocking network of the Middletons and Smiths. Susan maintained her relationships with her own kin and forged 
new relationships with her spouse's kin which, in tum, provided her further emotional support during this period of 
transition. In a March 1849 Jetter, Williams' mother, who resided in Philadelphia and Newport after the death of her 
husband, wrote her son to express her "great pleasure" in his recent marriage and her jubilation at having the 
opportunity to rekindle the friendship she had enjoyed in her youth with Susan's mother: "Pray give my love to her 
& tell her I hope to meet her this summer at Newport, we used to be very intimate formerly & it will give me great 
pleasure to see her every day. She will I suppose go to Newport with you, & I shall be obliged to go there in June." 
The formation or reformation of relationships between Middleton and Smith kin tied the nuclear household of 
Williams and Susan further into a larger family structure.32 
Within four months of their marriage, Susan was pregnant with their first child. The early months of her 
pregnancy were relatively trouble free. She still enjoyed the company of friends and family and exercised as frequently 
as possible. The only discomfort she noted was "stooping over my desk," which, she explained to her husband, was 
the reason she did not write to him every day. She expressed her fears concerning childbirth to Williams as she 
related the sad news of their friend Mrs. Bennett who "was after an illness of a few short hours summoned with her 
infant from here into etemity."33 Episodes like Mrs. Bennett's were not uncommon, and both Williams and Susan 
had family members and frie11ds who had died during childbirth or who had lost their child during the delivery .J.1 
Susan's anxieties concerning her pregnancy were probably exacerl>ated by her husband's long absence. In 
June 1849, family members called on Williams to come immediately to New York to alert his brother Edward, a 
naval officer, to a family crisis. But because &lward's ship had departed from the Mediterranean much later than 
expected, Williams was kept away from his wife for several weeks. Susan frequently wrote to him expressing the 
sorrow she felt because of his Jong absence, and there were sometimes hints of resentment towards the demands his 
kin placed upon him: "I think Mr. Fisher must have forgotten that you were married when he so coolly advised you 
to 'go at once'. "35 
Susan spent the almost seven weeks of Williams's absence with her family in Charleston. Like many 
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women, she desired the company of her female kin, especially her mother, during her pregnancy. Mrs. Smith was a 
great source of support, and Susan found comfort in being around women who had successfully endured the 
experience of childbirth. However, Susan confessed that she "long[ed], most ardently, most earnestly" for her 
husband. Williams tried to support his wife through this anxious period by writing at least every other day until he 
was able to return to Charleston. "36 
Williams returned to Charleston to find Susan too sick to escape from the summer epidemics of cholera 300 
yellow fever. Williams, risking his own health and deferring his response to the family crisis at hand, stayed at his 
wife's side until she gave birth to their first child, Elizabeth Smith Middleton, on November 7, 1849.37 Although 
very ill before and after the birth, Susan and her child survived the ordeal.31 The event brought great joy not only to 
Susan and Williams but to the larger circle of kin as well. As soon as Susan was able to travel, Williams brought 
his wife and daughter back to the tranquillity of Middleton Place to recover. Although Williams returned to his work 
managing the plantations, he stayed close to his wife's side for over three months for she was "recovering her 
strength very slowly & still suffering very much from her bosom." Susan's mother, busy caring for her other 
daughter who had fared far worse in childbirth than Susan, was unable to assist Williams. In her stead, a childhocxl 
friend of Susan's came to Middleton Place, "nursing & attending her with the utmost tenderness .... "39 
Despite an infection in her breast, Susan, like so many planter women, breast-fed Elizabeth.40 To nurse her 
own children was a maternal responsibility she expected to fulfill and one from which she derived great emotional 
pleasure. Weaning was emotionally difficult for Susan. Williams wrote when the "weaning process bids fair to be a 
severe trial on all sides."41 Susan's health probably added to the difficulties she faced in weaning her first born. After 
seven months, Susan continued to have serious bouts of illness. In early May, Williams was required "make up a 
bed in the carriage" to move his "poor wife" into town. Unable to stay with Susan, Williams placed her under the 
care of her mother. Suffering from a "another rise of the bosom," Susan's health became worse. Despite his desire to 
go at once to Philadelphia to be by the side of his dying mother, Williams went to Charleston to be with his wife.42 
By the late spring of 1850, Susan's health had improved significantly, and their baby remained healthy.43 As 
the long period of anxiety for Susan ended, the new addition to the family became the center of attention. Williams 
and Susan took great interest in their infant who became "quite a pet with all our friends" and family. And while 
both Susan and Williams were again "very busy ... with various objects of interest," Elizabeth's development was a 
source of pride and joy. Williams kept kin up to date with his daughter's latest accomplishments such as her first 
words and her first steps.44 
Susan became pregnant again within a year of Elizabeth's birth, and on May 12, 1851, gave birth to their 
second child, Henry. Weeks before his birth, Williams moved his wife and daughter to her mother's house in 
Charleston. The confinement must have been extremely stressful for Susan, as her mother's house became "a 
complete hospital for some time with doctors chairs continually at the door .... " Susan's brother, who had been 
sick for several months, died within twenty-four hours of Susan giving birth. Williams, trusting his wife's strength, 
decided it would be better "for her to learn the news of her brother's sad fate before than after her confinement & 
therefore broke it to her, almost at once after it occmred; gradua1ly preparing her, however, for it, as much as the 
time would permit." The pattern of her confinement, marked by physical discomforts and the threat of death for 
mother and child, was similar to her first experience in childbirth. Williams remained ,sympathetic and concerned for 
his wife. Williams expressed respect and admiration for Susan's strength and "great fortitude", when, despite the news 
of her beloved brother's death, she successfully gave birth to a "well & hearty" son, Henry .45 
After Susan sufficie~tly recovered and the infant's health stabilized, the family returned to Middleton Place. 
Williams and Susan were blessed with a "very manageable" child, who seemed to suffer little from "infantine 
afflictions." But Susan, who was weak after her long confinement, again suffered from an infection in her breast, aoo 
this time was unable to provide, as her husband put it, "proper nourishment" for their son.46 After attempts to taxi 
their son with a bottle failed, Susan and Williams sought the assistance of a wet nurse. The woman, the mother of 
"a twelve month old" proved disastrous, and her milk almost brought their "poor little treasure ... near death." This 
unfortunate experience made their search for a wet nurse even more urgent as Williams grew increasingly concerned 
about his wife's and daughter's health. Believing they were "both very much in want of a thorough change in 
climate," he wanted to take them to Europe. The problem was solved when their son finally accepted a bottle. 
Pleased at last to see him "thrive," they "did not trouble themselves much about it .... " Williams' efforts aoo 
concerns provide evidence of his active involvement in the rearing of his infants. He not only attempted to remedy 
the nursing problems, but also tried to improve his wife's and daughter's health by moving them to a healthier 
climate. Efforts such as these demonstrate ~at Susan and Williams shared domestic responsibilities and that 
Williams was actively, not passively, involved in parenting and in the sphere of domcsticity."7 
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Despite the fact that Hal was an easy child, Susan suffered from severe depression for several months after 
his birth. Although initially she accepted the news of her brother's death "with great fortitude," the reality of her loss 
and her weak health took their toll. In the isolation of Middleton Place, she became increasingly withdrawn aoo 
refused to receive any visitors except her mother. Although Williams was apparently sympathetic, his wife's 
unsociable behavior seemed to annoy him somewhat, and he commented that "our house is not likely to be looked 
again for ... parties for some time to come. "48 
The difficulty Susan experienced before and after childbirth and Williams' anxiety for her health may explain 
why they had only two children. Susan could have had at least two more children, twenty to twenty-four months 
apart, before she turned thirty-five. There is no evidence, however, that they attempted to have any more children or 
that Susan suffered any miscarriages, stillbirths or children who died during infancy. It seems likely that the potential 
health threat to Susan outweighed Williams' desire for more children. The small size of their family suggests that 
rather than being merely a "reproductive unit" Susan had control over reproduction, another equalizer within the 
household.49 
Like many Southerners of their class, Williams and Susan assigned slave women primary responsibility for 
the material care of their infants. These responsibilities created a bond, no matter how unequal, between domestic 
slave women and Elizabeth and Hal. Shortly after Hal's birth, both children became ill, as did Elizabeth's nurse, Jane. 
Describing his daughter's reaction to the absence of her nurse, Williams affectionately reported that "my poor little 
girl would not, in her absence, leave my arms to go to any one." The presence of slaves freed Williams and Susan 
from much of the drudgery of child rearing and created a distinct pattern of domesticity in plantation households.50 
Williams moved his family to different climates in an effort to improve their health. Sometimes the trip would be to 
nearby Sullivan's Island; sometimes as far away as Europe. But more often Williams took his family to the 
Northeast for extended periods when the summer heat and humidity brought malaria, yellow fever, and cholera to the 
Iowcountry. While Williams seemed to suffer little from the heat, he recognized the ill effect the climate had on 
"Poor Sue" and his "poor little treasures" and their need for "a thorough change of climate."51 Unlike many planters, 
Williams usually postponed plantation business to accompany his wife and children on such moves, and when one 
location did not have much effect, he sought another.52 Besides looking for solutions through a change in climate, 
Williams sought assistance from the "two best physicians" in the Charleston area and closely monitored the effects 
of their treatments. Once, when his daughter suffered from a persistent cough, the doctors gave Williams a recipe for 
a cough remedy of "brandy & water with a little sugar." The father administered it to his daughter and closely 
monitored her improvement. When Williams found the remedy had "very remarkable" effects for his Lilly, he 
recommended that J. Francis Fisher try it with his child.53 Such close supervision of his family's health demonstrates 
that he not only helped in household duties and cared for his ailing children, but that his family's private needs took 
precedence over his public role.54 
Williams and Susan also shared the more pleasurable aspects of childrearing. In the company of friends and 
family, the children grew up in a fashion similar to their parents, enjoying the leisurely days of youth as members of 
the South's wealthy elite.55 As very young children, Elizabeth and Hal seem to have enjoyed the same types of 
activities and friends as their parents had, developing an early passion for riding and "treasured fancy horses. "56 
Williams and Susan cultivated their children's riding abilities. As Williams saw to plantation affairs, he would take 
the children on rides, or they would go riding with their mother at Middleton Place or at their grandmother's 
plantation on the Ashepoo. · Frequently, Lilly and Hal, both at Middleton Place and in Charleston, enjoyed the 
company of their young cousins. Alicia Hopton Middleton and her brother Nathaniel Russell Middleton, Jr. 
recollected such winter days passed at the family estate as the source of their "chief knowledge of plantation life under 
the old regime. "57 
As the children grew older, their activities became more gender specific. Hal.~ook an interest in drawing and 
model building. Later on, he was attracted to the latest Charleston "mania" of yachting, which Williams, in the 
hopes of building his son's strength, encouraged.58 Lilly enjoyed riding, had a passion for the piano, and enjoyed 
reading and embroidering. Williams appreciated his daughter's pleasant and peaceful nature. Inde.cd, Lilly's interests 
and achievements m her music and lessons pleased her father so much that he considered her a "great blessing. "59 
Neither Lilly nor Hal attended school in the years before the Civil War. Williams did not want his children 
to be educated by a tutor, so he and Susan shared the responsibilities of educating their children. By 1860, however, 
Williams became increasingly concerned about their "proper" education.M In his opinion, Susan had not the "health 
& strength," nor did he have the time to give them regular lessons. Although the parents were more concerned with 
Hal's formal education than with Lilly's, they decided that despite his educational needs, they were "unwilling to be 
separated from him.''61 
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As their children grew, both Susan and Williams took an active role in improving their material well-being 
and maintaining the family's status. Their interest in the acquisition and display of material wealth reveals their 
values, habits, and attitudes. Luxury goods were of paramount imporumce in their lives as they were for most elite 
planters. Besides improving the plantation landscape, Susan and Williams enhanced the interior of the big house. For 
generations, Middleton Place had been a popular site among family and friends for entertainment. Guests arriving by 
road approached the house through an avenue of enormous and noble oak trees, while those arriving by the Ashley 
River ascended numerous terraces decorated with fine statuary. Once they entered the house, the elegant display 
impressed visitors; it was "adorned with the richest productions of the painter's and sculptor's arts, with galleries of 
fine family portraits, by artists of high fame, and by many rare curiosities from Russia and elsewhere"62 The walls 
were "literally covered" with some of the most "exquisite and very rare" art work in the world. Williams and Susan 
proudly displayed their Claude L. Lorraine, at that time the only one in the United States.63 Accompanying the 
Lorraine were family portraits by Thomas Sully, by the 1820s the most famous portrait artist in America,. as well 
as his famous "picture of Washingt0n crossing the Delaware." Along with the patriotic symbol of Washington was 
the portrait of Arthur Middleton, signer of the Declaration of Independence, with his wife and child. Two paintings 
given to John Izard Middleton, son of Arthur, by Madame de Stael and Madame Recamer, represented the social 
status of the Middleton clan in the courts of Europe.64 Paintings of Diana surrounded by her nymphs, monks under a 
grape arbor, and a moonlight scene with nuns and a view of Vesuvius, displayed their culture and cosmopolitanism.65 
The dinner parties hosted by Williams and Susan must have made quite an impression on even their 
wealthiest and most sophisticated guests. Susan would have to decide which set of china to use: the Russian set 
given to the family by Czar Nicholas I, the French Bourbon Spring porcelain, the Bone China, or the Wedgewood. 
The Middleton slaves would carefully pour the wine or champagne from the decorative crystal decanters into the 
appropriate stemmed glassware, as the guests ate with silver marked with the family crest. After dinner, guests 
adjourned into one of the drawing rooms or perhaps the library for conversation or to perform or listen to a concert 
on the piano or violin. Regardless of the actual activities, it seems unlikely that many guests would leave Middleton 
Place unimpressed by its splendor.66 
Williams, however, was apparently not satisfied with the house, and by the 1850s he planned extensive 
changes. He employed Charleston architect Frederick J. Smith to design new floor plans for a massive expansion. 
The original house was three stories tall with four rooms on each floor. Of Smith's two plans, the one more favored 
by Susan and Williams called for the inclusion of more public space. In addition, the preferred plan provided eight 
bedrooms, large drawing rooms, parlors, a study, and a breakfast room, along with a library and museum. The new 
library and museum area of the house was enormous, 79 x 25 feet, with a ceiling that went to the top of the second 
floor. The design would have at least doubled the size of the mansion, in which only Susan, Williams, and their two 
children lived, and would have provided ample space for the display of their treasures and the entertainment of their 
friends and family. Along with the expansion of public space, the plan called for the addition of ostentatious 
Italianate ornamentation to the rather plain exterior of the house. Williams wanted the elevated terraces leading to the 
front of the house elaborated, so he sketched Greek Revival piazzas sunnounted with statuary. Although the 
Middletons envisioned the large-scale, elaborate expansion as a display of their s~tus, these grand designs were 
sketched while the family was in the midst of economic decline. So, although the plans seemed to accentuate the 
planter concept of dominance and paternalism, it is at least arguable that the desire to maintain appearances was his 
major concern.67 
Williams was never able to realize his grand vision for Middleton Place because his limited resources dil 
not match his dream. Nonetheless, in 1855 he and Susan acquired one of the most elegant homes in Charleston, a 
purchase made possible by his wife's sizable assets. The four-story mansion, located at the foot of Meeting Street 
overlooking the White Point Gardens, provided Susan and Williams proximity to family and friends, but with 
accommodations far beyond their needs.61 The house, with elements of both Italianate and Greek Revival design, 
represented a grand display of wealth and social prestige.69 Family and friends could watch the happenings in the 
town from one of the three grand piazzas that ran the full length of the house. Inside, the arched Italianate marble 
mantels, elaborate ceiling medallions, and detailed cornices and baseboards surely made an impression on their 
guests.70 
The purchase caused a stir. Some family members chastised them for such an extravagant purchase, but 
Williams and Susan justified their actions as enabling them "to pass most [of] our summers [in Charleston], arrl 
thus save the money which we have spent wandering about." Williams further assured his kin that they had made a 
wise purchase; although "far too large for us ... we should have been obliged to pay almost as much for a house in 
every respect inferior. 71 Despite family criticism, Susan and Williams were elated with their new home. As 
51 
Williams wrote his sister; "The situation is even more than we had hoped. The view is delicious and every thing else 
as good as reasonable people could desire. I think nothing short of fever can give us an excuse for leaving home. 72 
Williams was true to his word, and from 1855 until the Civil War their summer months were usually spent in 
Charleston. 
The fashion in which Susan and Williams lived reveals much about their values. The acquisition of luxury 
goods was a central activity for them both. Through the display of their purchases, Williams and Susan enhanced 
society's perception of the family . Their material possessions were part and parcel of their individual and family 
identity. The competitiveness associated with the planter elite, the desire to out-pace one's neighbor, manifested itself 
in many ways. While sports such as horse racing were more obvious forms of competition among southern elite, the 
manner of dress, travel, and living were also emblems of "wealth and status and a proud extension" of the 
individual.73 Their clothes, their horses and carriages, their houses and the contents within, and the family names 
worked together with their more personal attributes to set them apart from their inferiors and further "their quest for 
honor and distinction" in the public sphere.74 This maintenance of social prestige was a joint venture. The well-being 
of Williams' and Susan's household was inextricably linked to a complex web of kin and to the vagaries of the 
plantation economy. Thus, individual identity and status was bound, to a large degree, by the behavior of all the 
members of the larger circle of kin. 
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The Polish Home Army: Partisans or Organized Army? 
James Dixon 
Throughout the second World War, German military and occupation authorities in Poland were constantly 
plagued by partisan resistance and sabotage. The underground movement in Poland grew into an extensive national 
resistance movement, which disrupted the German war effort in a central location, providing a rallying point for the 
Polish people against the occupation of their country and the indignities experienced at the hands of the Germans. 
Among the Poles, their partisan fighters were known as the Home Anny (Annia Krajowa), but the Germans did not 
consider their Polish adversaries as soldiers, only bandits.1 Although the Home Anny was an underground force 
which employed unconventional tactics, it did possess the primary compor.ents of traditional military organizations. 
In order to determine whether the Polish Home Anny was indeed an army, a specific set of crite1ia, common to all 
military organizations, must be used by which one can measure the Home Anny. The criteria can be divided into 
three categories: the nature of the overall command and control structure, the level of discipline, and the 
organization's combat performance base.don the first two criteria.
2 
The Home Anny was proclaimed on 14 February 1942 by decree of the Polish Government in exile. 
However, the Home Anny cannot be considered as a viable military force until the initiation of the Tempest (Bun.a) 
Operation in Spring-Summer of 1944 when the military effectiveness of the Home Anny was displayed for the first 
time on the field of battle. The period between the September 1939 defeat and the 1942 announcement of the Home 
Army is of crucial importance because the essential groundwork was laid which enabled the Home Anny to exist as a 
competent military force by the summer of 1944. 
The creation of a force to combat the Germans presented the Poles with several major difficulties in the 
months after the September defeat. The first such obstacle was the absence of trained leaders in Poland. Most of the 
prewar military commanders who had survived the German invasion were either in German prison camps or had fled 
Poland to join the free Polish units which were being formed in France. Those free officers unable to flee the country 
began to assemble under the command of General Michal Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz in Warsaw. The le.aders all agreed 
that allegiance to the government in exile and the supreme command of General Sikorski was of the utmost 
importance, because without unity the Poles would be divided, retarding any hopes for success. All of the military 
leaders agreed on the need to create a force that would eventually become the center •of the general uprising for the 
entire Polish nation. The name given to the fledgling resistance movement was the Union for Armed Struggle 
(Zwiqzek Waiki ZbrojneJ).3 
The command of the resistance was divided between the German and Soviet controlled halves of the country. 
General Tokarzewski was charged with the consolidation of the underground forces in eastern Poland under Soviet 
occupation, and General Stefan Rowecki was charged with consolidation of western regions under German 
occupation. The consolidation process and the establishment of a chain of command would operate along the 
following lines: commanders would form a group of five subordinates, who, in turn, would create subordinate groups 
of five. Secrecy would be maintained by each member only knowing his immediate compatriots. In this way the 
pyramid of command would grow while security was maintained. Additional security was enhanced by the use of 
aliases by all members. No one would know the true identities of the other members in case of capture by the 
4 
Germans. 
The Germans knew that underground resistance was forming and began to seek out the Polish leaders. In the 
course of the German action, Polish civilians were threatened with execution if the resistance leaders did not 
surrender. 1be underground was faced with a major decision. If they surrendered, lives would be saved but the same 
tactic would probably be repeated against their successors; if they refused to surrender, innocent civilians would 
continue to die. The Poles elected to fight. 
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After creating a senior-level chain of command, the Polish leadership consolidated various resistance units which 
had sprung up independently and those which had been formed around the political parties of prewar Poland. 
Underground leaders believed that this task would be difficult owing to the fact that most of the extant units were 
loyal to political parties at odds with the exiled government, and the authority of the Poles in London was moral at 
best. This task proved easier than expected. Resistance forces were interested primarily in the most effective method 
of fighting the Germans and maintaining Polish dignity. The proposal of unity proved to be an effective method of 
attracting the various factions into the emerging Home Army. Any means to fight the Germans was acceptable to 
the vast majority of Poles. The attraction of being a part of a larger resistance network provided the Poles with a 
sense of national unity and even provided a sense of security (albeit limited) through ooded numbers.6 The early 
stages of resistance consisted mostly of limited acts of sabotage against the German supply lines coming out of 
Poland. To fight to the Germans as quickly as possible and to involve the fewest number of troops, the preferred 
tactic became railroad sabotage. The use of Polish workers by the Germans, combined with the general willingness 
to cooperate on the part of the Polish population, meant that the underground was able to infiltrate easily critical 
areas designated for sabotage. A preferred target was the rail line that ran from Przemsyl through Krakow to Breslau, 
which brought supplies and raw materials out of Polish Silesia and ran through one of the major areas of 
underground activity. The underground developed and perfected methods which could not be traced directly to any 
specific point in the resistance, making the sabotage appear to be accidental or of non-Polish origin.
7 
Another target 
critical to the German war effort was the communication network (telephone and telegraph lines). Damage was easily 
inflicted on these targets owing to the extended nature of their construction and the difficulties associated with the 
ddense of such targets: 
German war planners utilized the Polish industrial and agricultural base for the support of the German war 
machine. Poles employed in the factories were used to conduct "petty sabotage" against the German war effort. 
Examples of such efforts included the destruction of machinery through neglect, disruption of production by 
intentionally ignoring operating procedures and misrepresenting production statistics. Each method served to disrupt 
the German efforts to coordinate the Polish economy for their war machine. Activities on the part of the agricultural 
workers consisted of the concealment and redistribution of foodstuffs and the delivery of a lower quality of goods to 
German suppliers. The sabotage and training for such sabotage actions conducted in the rural areas came under the 
jurisdiction of the Peasant Battalions (rural units of the Home Army).9 
German ieaders became increasingly concerned about the "criminal activities" in the General Government. 10 
Although they did not consider the activities serious enough to warrant full scale iptervention by anti-partisan 
Waffen-SS units, Governor Hans Frank ordered the Security Police to increase 'counter-insurgency measures. The 
primary areas of concentration for the Germans in countering the resistance were the major urban centers of Warsaw, 
Krakow and Lublin!
1 
The German leadership was aware of the existence of the Union for Armed Struggle and that it 
was under the direct command of the exiled Polish Government. Although resistance activities were limited, the core 
of an underground force was recognized by the Germans, especially the nucleus of a military organization and a well-
organized propaganda machine. If counter-insurgency actions succeeded, the ZWZ would be severely restricted in its 
preparations for a general uprising. 
12 
When the ZWZ became the Home Army in February 1942, its command structure and internal organization 
were well established. Resis.tance operations were divided into three operational regions: Bialystok, Lwow and the 
western region. Operational regions were subdivided into districts roughly conforming to prewar administrative 
boundaries and each district was further subdivided into sectors that roughly corresponded to the Polish voivoids 
(counties) from the prewar governmental administration. 13 Combat units of the Home Army were organized along 
roughly the same lines as in most traditional annies. The standard unit of the Home Army was the platoon, 
comprised of three squads of approximately ten soldiers each. On occasion, several platoons would consolidate to 
form a company, this being a rare occurrence until the Tempest Operation in 1944.
14 
The Home Army's mission was to prepare and lead the nation in a general uprising against the Germans, 
but its ability to do so was quite limited. lberefore the Home Army's most active component was the intelligence:: 
branch. Intelligence gathering and the distribution of information are critical components for any army and the Poles 
were able to constructed a vast, effective network of operatives for this purpose. One of the greatest assets possessed 
by the Home Army intelligence section was its ability to draw from all walks of Polish society for its members. 
This aspect allowed the Poles to conduct their resistance activities while simultaneously carrying out their daily 
lives. To collect intelligence was not difficult in occupied Poland,15 but to distribute it was difficult and dangerous. 
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Possession of radio equipment by Poles carried the penalty cf death, but underground radio communication was 
maintained at a minimal level throughout the country and with London.
16 
Therefore, the foremost task presented to 
the Home Anny was distribution of information at the local level. Without daily communication between elements 
which were attempting to coordinate their activities, failure would ensue. 'There was one group of Home Anny 
soldiers assigned throughout the Home Anny in combat and non-combatant units, who enabled the intelligence aro 
communication network to succeed at all levels. These soldiers were known as the Liaison Couriers (Lacmiczki). 
What made these couriers different from the average member of the Home Anny was their training and the conditions 
in which they had to operate. 17 Whereas the majority of the Home Anny soldiers were part of a team and operated as 
a collective unit (as in most traditional military organizations), the Lacmiczki were required to function 
independently, while in possession of classified material, contraband as well as information. 11 
Intelligence sections were also responsible for counter-intelligence. The clandestine nature of the Home 
Anny impeded knowledge of the arrest of Home Anny members. This kind of infonnation came from Home Anny 
infiltration of the Pawiak Prison in Warsaw, the central detention facility for non-criminals. The Home Army 
intelligence network was successful in placing its operatives inside the prison because the Germans allowed Poles to 
be lower-level wardens and administrators. Polish wardens kept records of who was a prisoner, and communicated 
with prisoners after the Germans had interrogated them. In this way the Intelligence section could find out what 
information, if any, had been divulged. If a prisoner died during interrogation or was executed, the Home Anny 
intelligence command concluded that the Germans had filed to obtain infonnation. Counterintelligence activities of 
the Home Anny also involved the murder of collaborators and Gestapo agents. Additionally, the protection of Home 
Army operatives who appeared to be collaborators factored into this role of the intelligence sections. 19 
The Home Anny also operated an underground press. Not only did it publish illegal pamphlets aro 
newspapers, but also false Gennan periodicals. The most successful Home Anny propaganda was known as Action 
N (Akcji N). The underground press generated convincing periodicals directed at the German soldiers aro 
Volksdeutsche in Poland, complete with authentication stamps which were entitled Der Frontkaempfer, Der Soldat, 
Bilder fuer die Truppen, Der Hammer and Der Durchbruch.'10 These publications provided distorted information to 
demoralize German troops and civilians in Poland. Many Gennans were caught off guard by these publications anl 
the manner in which the distorted information was presented which made these journals appear genuine.21 
Other branches of the Home Anny can be loosely compared with similar branches in traditional armies. One 
was the Quartermaster which not only procured supplies, but also manufactured weapons and ammunition. The 
Quartermaster initially obtained arms and ammunition from a variety of sources: , hidden prewar caches, Allied 
airdrops, the disarming of enemy soldiers and raids conducted against Gcnnan supply depots. These sources did not 
provide adequate amounts of arms to equip the Home Army effectively. Poles in the German-controlled factories 
diverted deliveries and reported transport routes to the Home Anny so that shipments could be hijacked.22 
The Quartermaster made up shortcomings by the manufacture of weapons of their own device. Clandestine 
manufacturing sites were established precisely for this purpose. The most common, and effective, was thefilipinki, a 
grenade with more explosive power than the standard grenade. Another of their inventions was the sidol, which was a 
small grenade deriving its name from the Sidol shoe polish cans in which they were constructed. The Quartermaster 
section also manufactured its own pistols, rifles, general-purpose mines and flame throwers. Other makeshift 
weapons included mortars constructed out of drain pipes and catapults for petrol bomb.23 
The Germans gave the Home Anny its first opportunity to demonstrate its combat effectiveness in the 
Zamosc region in southeastern Poland. The Zmaosc Action began on 26 November 1942 and continued until March 
1943. The German objective was to remove Poles and resettle ethnic Germans from other regions of eastern Europe. 
The operation targeted the major towns in the Zamosc voivoid: Hrubieszow, Tomaszow, Bilgoraj and Zamosc.24 
The first major engagement between the Home Anny and the German Wehrmacht occurred in February 1943 aro 
lasted for ten days. The Home Anny's mission was to help remove Poles to the forests, to bum as much property as 
possible and to kill Gennans. Peasant Battalions were assigned to the operation with~ force totaling approximately 
850 troops. During the campaign, the Home Anny was able to conduct a running battle extending over fifty 
kilometers with major engagements occurring at Wojda, 2.aboreczne and Roza. Over 5000 Polish civilians were 
rescued from the German roundups and taken to the forests where secured villages were established under Home Anny 
control.
15 
The Germans did not consider the actions of the Home Anny during the Zamosc Action to be of much 
significance. In fact the German command was not aware that it was dealing with an organ.i7.Cd partisan force; the 
59 
perception lingered that it was still combating bandits. The Germans did acknowledge that "criminal'" activity was 
on the rise in the Lublin District during this time frame. The two German officials w):to recognized the significance 
of the combat during the Zamosc Action were local administrators and commanders. In their reports, their adversaries 
were referred to as organized,1well-armed partisans.
26 
After the Zamosc Action subsided in July 1943, the Home Army returned to standard resistance operations 
of sabotage, diversion, intelligence and the training of new soldiers. The next major military came in the spring of 
1944 and was code-named Operation Tempest (Akcja Burza). Tempest was developed for Home Army units to open 
the way for Russian forces by disrupting the rear areas of the German lines. This action would also silence the critics 
of the Home Army by demonstrating that the Home Army was actively talcing the fight to the Germans. But the 
real, and primary objective of Tempest was for the Home Army to assert Polish sovereignty in the face of a 
traditional enemy. The Soviets claimed that the land seized by them in 1939 had always been Soviet and this 
developed into a major point of contention between the Soviets and the Polish Government in exile.27 
Polish leaders were divided on how to deal with the Soviet advance into Poland. Civilian leaders wanted to 
keep the Home Army underground and intact in case resistance would have to be continued against the Soviets. 
Military leaders, primarily Generals Kazimirez Sosnkowski and Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski, believed that the Home 
Army should demonstrate Polish participation in the liberation of their homeland, thereby refuting any Soviet claims 
to the contrary. Sosnkowski ordered Home Army leaders, at all levels to come forward and ider1tify themselves as 
hosts of the Soviet Army in Poland. If this were not done, Sosnkowski and Bor-Komorowski asserted, Polish 
Communists would step in and take the credit for the work of the Home Army. Therefore, the decision was made on 
12 February 1944 to initiate Operation Tempest.21 Home Army command and soldiers alike embraced Operation 
Tempest. General Bor-Komorowski encouraged his soldiers to demonstrate an "undaunted attitude" to combat the 
German occupiers to the end, thus depriving the Soviets of the "spiteful propaganda" claim that the Home Army ard 
the democratic-oriented Poles were non-participants.
29 
The primary operational region for Operation Tempest was eastern Poland directly behind the retreating 
German lines. Participating units were assigned prewar unit designations in order to boost troop morale and to 
emphasize the connection of .the Home Army to the exiled government in London. Operation Tempest began with 
the attack on Wilno on 7 July 1944. Wilno, in northeastern Poland, was of critical importance for two reasons: it 
was the center of the ancient Polish-Lithuanian culture and it was a region claimed by the Soviet Union. During the 
initial stage of Tempest, the Home Army liberated six towns prior to the attack on Wilno. The attack was begun by 
four Horne Army battalions (approximate strength, 5500) advancing from the south. Simultaneously, Home Army 
units inside the city began a small-scale uprising. By 13 July, the Home Army had secured the city before the 
arrival of Soviet forces. 
When the Soviets arrived in Wilno, Colonel Aleksander Krzyzanowski complied with orders from London 
and presented himself to the Soviet command on 14 July. The next day Colonel Krzyzanowski and his staff officers 
met with the Soviet command regarding consolidation of Home Army units under his command with the Soviet 
forces. They never returned. With the disappearance of Krzyzanowski, two battalion commanders, Lt. Colonels 
Strychanski and Prawdzic-Szalski took command of the troops, leading them into the Rudnicka Forest to evade arrest 
and imprisonment by the Soviets. This force initially succeeded in evading the Soviets, but while attempting to 
reach the Bialystock Forest, most were surrounded by the Soviets and taken to the former German detention camp at 
Miedinki.30 The Battle for Wilno demonstrated the effectiveness of the Home Army's command structure and 
training. One of the first fundamentals of constructing a successful chain of command is the ability of subordinate 
officers to assume command in the absence of the senior officers. The actions of Lt. Colonels Strychanski ard 
Prawdzic-Szalski confirm this point. Furthermore, the adherence of the soldiers to the assumption of command by 
the subordinate officers demonstrates that the chain of command was working and the discipline of the military 
structure was in effect. 
Operation Tempest also targeted the city of Lwow, another city of ancient Polish heritage. The front lines 
had stabilized near Tamopol-Kolomyja by March 1944. The Home Army prepared to attack Lwow by increasing 
diversion and sabotage operations. Between March and July the Home Army's Fifth Infantry Division inflicted the 
following damage on the Germans: forty-six trains were derailed (twenty-eight locomotives and 177 rail cars were 
destroyed), seventeen tanks were damaged in transport and rail lines were disrupted in fifty-five different locations. In 
the process twenty-four Germans were killed and 160 were wounded. The fight for Lwow culminated in a combined 
attack by Home Army and Soviet forces. The city fell on 27 July after heavy street fighting.
31 
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During Operation Tempest the Home Army seized approximately twenty smaller cities and towns, the most 
important being Lublin, Lwow and Wilno. The Gennan reaction was to assign three infantry divisions to counter 
insurgency operations, mostly in the Bilgoraj Forest and the Lublin District. The Home Anny had taken the 
Gennans by surprise with its strength, estimated by the Gennan commander to be around 25,000. The Gennans 
realized that the Home Anny had trained a force for a general uprising, but considered the Home Anny to be unable 
to launch a large-scale operation. The actions in July 1944 were dccmed an experiment by the partisan leaders to 
determine the effectiveness of their training.32 
The Tempest Operation was not as decisive as the Home Army command had hoped for, therefore the 
decision to launch the Warsaw Uprising was made. Originally the decision not to include Warsaw in the Tempest 
Operation was to prevent additional hardships to the civilian population of a city thaf had endured so much. Up to 
this point the larger Polish cities had been the objectives of the Soviet advances, which, combined with stubborn 
Gennan defense, resulted in extensive destruction of the eastern cities. Therefore the Home Anny command, in 
conjunction with the exiled government, decided that Warsaw must be seized before any major damage could be 
inflicted upon the city. Additionally, the political impact which would result from a successful uprising would be of 
undeniable significance for the exiled government and the future of an independent Poland. Another factor was the 
general attitude of Poles that the dignity of their nation would be regained by demonstrating their will and ability to 
fight openly.33 
General Bor-Komorowski and the government delegate in Poland, Stanislaw Jankowski, determined that the 
uprising had to be launched five to seven days prior to the Soviet army's entry in Warsaw. The precise moment to 
act was crucial, but that time was arriving sooner than expected. First indications that the Soviets were moving on 
Warsaw came from the intelligence network east of the city. On 30 July reports indicated a strong Soviet armor 
spearhead near Wolomin and Anin with advance patrols in the Praga suburb of Warsaw. The presence of the Hennann 
Goering Panzer Division moving through Warsaw indicated the seriousness of the Soviet advance. On 31 July 
Soviet units were in Radosc, Wiazowna, Wolomin and Radzymin, all within twelve kilometers of Warsaw. 
Furthennore, the Soviet-controlled radio station, Kosciuszko, was inciting the citizens of Warsaw to rise against the 
Germans. General Bor-Komorowski concluded that the Soviet attack on Warsaw was imrninent.34 
Bor-Komorowski decided that the Home Anny should strike at 1700 hours on 1 August. To launch the 
uprising at this particular time was a deviation from the Home Anny's standard procedure of attacking at dawn or 
dusk, hoping to catch the Gennans off-guard. The city streets would be aowded at day's end, making it easier to 
conceal the movements of arms and soldiers. After the initial assault, darkness would conceal the consolidation of 
their gains.35 The uprising began as planned, except for a few minor infractions in fire discipline by overeager 
soldiers acting ahead of schedule. The Germans were not caught completely off guard, but the Home Anny secured 
over seventy-five percent of Warsaw before any concerted response by the Germans was made. The primary 
objectives were major administrative buildings, public utilities (the telephone exchange and electric plant), sites of 
historical and cultural importance and, most of all, taller structures in the city, corner houses from which 
commanding fields of fire could be established over German positions, and major intersections.36 After the central 
points were seized, the Home Anny soldiers, assisted by civilians, could construct banicades to seal off the sections 
under their control and to provide cover against the impending German attack.37 
The German response to the uprising took shape by the third day. Before the ground assault, the Luftwaffe 
conducted a massive aerial bombardment against the sections controlled by the insurgents, while the Dirlewanger 
Brigade (SS) conducted a brutal reprisal against Polish civilians in the district of Wola, murdering approximately 
30,000 people.31 The first attempt to drive armored wedges between the centers of Polish resistance were partially 
successful, with the Germans taking heavy casualties in men and vehicles. The Home Anny held on to most of its 
positions until the German superiority in firepower, mainly air and artillery, decided the outcome and forced the 
Home Anny to begin evacuating its positions.39 The Home Anny relied on ingenuity and will to continue the fight, 
but the odds were too great. The end came on 3 October, sixty-three days after the opening shots were fired, with 
surrender to the Gennans.40 • 
The Home Anny's actions during the uprising demonstrated its true military n'ature and its service to the 
Polish nation, two missions which are integral to all military organizations. The discipline displayed by the soldiers 
of the Home Anny during the Warsaw uprising was continuous and was demonstrated not only by their actions but 
also by their restraint in certain situations in which the lack of discipline would have resulted in the pursuit of 
revenge. The first example of military discipline by the Home Anny soldiers was their economy of fire when 
engaging the Germans and in their determination to hold their positions when coming under suppressive fire. 
Economy of fire was in part dictated by necessity, but holding a position under fire and then engaging that enemy at 
61 
close quarters separates genuine soldiers from anncd civilians. The restricted operational area inside Warsaw did not 
provide many options for retreat, thereby adding to the Polish determination to hold their position. But when 
retreats were ordered, the discipline became even more pronounced especially among those soldiers who had to 
provide the rear guard or to lead civilians out of the evacuated areas.41 
Disciplined soldiers are usually expected to perform acts counter to basic human instincts. An example of 
such discipline occurred with the sewers of Warsaw. The sewers were on average no more than one meter high arrl 
sixty centimeters wide. Illumination inside the sewers was prohibited thus adding to the difficulty of negotiating the 
narrow passages. Entering these dark, fetid tunnels evoked fears in many of the Home Army soldiers who had to use 
these tunnels as passageways, but there were soldiers who had the sewers as their primary area of operation. The first 
such group was the Kana/arki, who reconnoitered routes, served as guides and cleared obstacles. The next group that 
was constantly in the sewers in order to complete their assigned missions was the Laczniczki, who had no alternative 
but to use these routes for cover and concealment in order to deliver information and maintain the communication 
network.42 
The Germans used Polish civilians as human shields on several occasions in order to advance across open 
terrain. As the Germans advanced, the Home Army soldiers did not fire, remaining in position and waiting to engage 
the Germans in hand to hand combat. Several local commanders requested permission to take revenge on German 
prisoners, but these requests were denied by Hor-Komorowski. Orders to this effect were issued prior to the uprising 
based on adherence to international law. If the Home Army were to be accepted as a recognized member of the Allied 
cause, the command would have to enforce such conditions throughout the ranks. Furthermore, Hor-Komorowski 
wanted the Home Army soldiers to be above the inhumanity of the Germans and their methods of fighting. This was 
an ideal which was constantly reiterated throughout the battle. One aspect which differentiated the Home Army from 
other partisan units was that control over seized areas was turned over to the underground civilian authorities who 
handled the administration and legal matters. The more the Germans practiced brutality as a method of engagement, 
the more the Home Army refrained from such action and hardened its resolve to continue the fight. 43 
The largest exhibition of discipline came on the night of 1 September with the evacuation of Stare Miasto 
("Old City," the medieval s~tion of Warsaw). The necessity for evacuation was determined by a lack of supplies, 
compounded by the growing' intensity of the German attacks. Attempts were made the previous night to make a 
breakout in conjunction with the units in the center of the city, but this move failed. Therefore, the decision was 
made to evacuate Stare Miasto through the sewers. The maneuver required stripping the defense positions arrl 
queuing the soldiers and civilians at the entrance to the sewer which was located less than 200 meters from the 
German positions . The first evacuees began to enter the sewer at nightfall and by the next morning the rear guard 
was making its way into the sewer. In all, over 1500 soldiers and civilians were able to make it out of Stare 
Miasto.44 The discipline required to accomplish such a feat was enormous. The Home Army soldiers had to set the 
example for the terrified civilians and to maintain order while in the sewers. The fact that the m1ss10n was 
accomplished successfully further attests to the discipline and devotion to duty possessed by the Home Army 
soldiers. 
The Warsaw Uprising was the only large scale battle of the Home Army. The initial operations were 
designed to hold onto the city only until the Soviet forces could arrive. The goal was not only to assert Polish 
independence and sovereignty, but also to assist the Soviets in the liberation of Warsaw. Official recognition by the 
United States and Great Britain of the Home Army's status as a full fledged member of the Allied forces came only 
on 29 August as defeat was becoming imminent. The true attestation of the Home Army's status as an army came 
with the surrender: the enemy granted them the status and treatment accorded prisoners of war under the Geneva 
Convention.45 
The Home Army's performance as an underground force was generally successful. It was able to conduct 
sabotage operations and disrupt vital components of the German war effort. Tne greatest asset of the Home Army 
was its ability to maintain the secrecy of its existence and then to use the element of surprise to reduce the disparity 
in troop strength and weaponry with the Germans. Another asset, on par with the secrecy, was the motivation of the 
troops, which enabled the Home Army to experience the successes that it did. The Home Army had the advantage of 
fighting for a cause: the liberation and the protection of Polish citizens. The use of terror tactics by the Germans in 
suppressing the Warsaw Uprising only served to harden the Home Army's resolve to continue the fight, maintaining 
Polish dignity by not resorting to revenge and not surrendering after defeat had become inevitable. Any force fighting 
for the liberation of its home will possess a higher level of motivation against the occupying force, thus enabling it 
to achieve successes not commensurate with its size and strength. 
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women officers and non-commissioned officers was not recognized once the prisoners were interned at Ravensbrueck. 
The women were designated as auxiliaries and required to perform forced labor in German factories and labor camps . 
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The Times on the Far Eastern Crisis of 1937 
What Does the Times Say? 
by 
Jill S. Quittleba.Jm 
The Loncbn Times in the 1930. was often consirered the spokesman of the British 
government and freqiently, of Westem demcx:racies. But was the Times merdy a spokesman of 
British governmenta policy? Did it influence others by acting as a cisseminatcr of public and 
editorial opirfon? In ordo- to retcnnine the cinction of int'h.Jence of the Times, its leadng articles 
from July to December 1937 were examined to see how the paper, und:r the edtorship of Geofrey 
DawSJn, 1 interpreted the Far Eastern situation of 1937. 2 While examining the lead articles, particular 
regird was paid to British ecoromic concerns creited by the Un<h:lared War betv.een Chim and Japm, 
the Singapore straegy, and coocion of the United States to come to the aid of British Far Eastern 
interests. In this time of crisis Britain need:d a straegy to pro~ her Far Eastern interests. The 
ecoromic, military andciplomatic straegy the Times advocated to pro~ Britain's Far Eastern Empire 
is a pertinent q.iestion, esp<rially in liglt of the Times' pregimed role as spokesman for the Empire. 
The Times believed itsdf to be a rel~ for public opirion when in reality the papcr was more prornbly 
influencing public opinion. This stuq, also see~ to detcnnine if British foreign policy seems at any 
time to be influenced by the sug~tions of the Times. 
What the men of the news indlstry had in comrron was the Greit War, which in its 
restruction and disillusionment, had affected them as much as it had the poets and politicians. The 
new!papers on the Left wereout!pOken against the fascist dictators of the 1930., while those on the 
Riglt prea:hed mod:ration and good relitions with othc,- natbns, particularly Germany. Geofrey 
DawSJn, Editor of the Times, was of the latter disJX>sition DawSJn late,- ockrowledgcrl that he edited 
the papcr to soothe the Gennans, of lea.st until war appeared inevitable.3 His access to many men of 
officethroogh his friend.hip with Lord Halifax, Neville Chamberlain andAntrony Eden no ooul:t gave 
him freqient oppcrtunities to voire his opinion on foreign policy as well as hear their own.4 
The History of a Chmiged Situation 
Few crises or everts are absdutely sportancous. The international tension Britain foccrl in 
1937 was the result of many forces. In Eurcpe tension was fueled by the Sparish Civil War and 
increasing German and Italian militariz.ation; in the Far East the war bet~n Japm and Chim 
negaively impa;ted British comrrrrcial interests andmora sensibilities. Aft.a 1914 Britain had foccrl 
her own recline in ~~rid powc,-. The recline was l~y the elfect of ecoromic repieSsion, shifts in 
world powers and a long war. As a resut, Britain could no lonp real with a crisis in both the 
Western and Eastern hahes of her Empire. 
A beginning poirt that led to the Far Eastern crisis is dfilru.t to detcnnine, but aftc,- 1914 
the ch~e in the international scene proJll)ted the need for modficaticn of Britain's Far Eastem 
refense straegy. With the nava powo- of Gcnnany eliminatedandBritain's redx:ed aftc,- Work! War I, 
(paired with the ~wth of the Unik:d Stars and Japmesc powo-), the Pacific regbn accµred a new 
significanre in work! alfaiis. 5 In the past, Britain had only to real with othc,- Eurcpean navies in the 
Pocific which sulfercd from the same geogaptical proliems as she cid: rcmdeness from home ports. 
Aftc,- 1919 J apm emoged as a Nava Powe,- whose home bases lay in the Pocific. 6 
The Far East had lost none of its commercial atuaction afto- World War I and was consirered 
a hopeful means of resk>ring Britain's lagging post-war ecoromy. 7 The state of the British ecoromy 
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cluing the inter-war yeais made the maimcnancc of sepll'llle Pacific and homo-based flms impa;sible. 
Singapore was thczfore devdopcd as a nava base that would prolect the gato.vay to the Empire and 
the southern cbminions of Australia and New Zealand inducing impatant lines of commmication, 
fuel and trad:. 1 Singapore was designed to pro\ide a plare from which, in time of cil'l.'St neeQ the 
Roya Flol1 could prolfet Britain's Far Eastern interests, while at other Timer the Flol1 could reman 
in home or Medtmancan waters. In or<b' for the Singapore stntegy to work, Italy had to be neutral 
and Britain had to be free from other confficts.9 The bas~ which was competed in 1938, also served as 
a symool of British prestige in theFarEast Detmctorsofthebase saw its buikilp as hypocritica of 
the ideas of the Lea~e of Nations and as an invitation for an arms race with Jap111. Those in favcr of 
the base saw Singapore acting primarily as a psychological reterrent to Japmese aggression while 
allowing the United Kin!Jbm time to recoocile with Gennany. It was wicHy believed wring the 
1930s that Japa, would never atta::k until Britain was invdved in a war with Gennany. 
Japm's emergence as a majcr power after the war coircided with a significant growth in her 
ecoromy and population and with a growing belief in the need for increased territory and resoorces. 
On 18 September 1931, Japa, sei;rd control of Manchuria, setting up the stale of Manchukuo 10 in 
Manh of the following yeat Altrough the move ret10spectivcly came to be seen as the first step 
towatl World War II, and certainly towatl the destruction of the League of Nations and collective 
secuity, it initially caused very little tunnoil in British cirdes. The Lytkm Commission Repcrt 
stated that, while it unch'stoodJapa,ese motivations for seizing Manchuria, it cid not concbne the use 
of force. As a result Japm with:rew from the League in 1932, justifying the inva;ion as a move to 
staliliz.e her sphere of influence. 
The Shanghai Inco:nt which begin 18 January 1932 and laslr:d app10ximatdy ten chys, 
caused Britain to take can!ul notice of Japmese movement in China since British commercial interests 
were concentratcrl in the Shanghai area A learec in the Timer, on 23 January, shmw British feeling: 
"Dra;tic action in Manchuria, wheie Japm has indisputable riglts, is however one thing, and cpite 
another thing in China at a poim wheie international interests are centered and other Powers are as 
greatly conrerned as ~apm." 0 The policy of Britain towatl the Far East in the 1930s was two4"olct 1) 
frimd;hip with Japm, and 2) the p~atioo of the intq\rity of China. Uphdding the Nanking 
regime led by Chimg Kai.Shek was essential for British commercial exp111sion in China. Japm's 
inCl.l'Sion was vie\\Cd as evirence of a willingness to expmd; agwcssively, a cause for conrern for the 
cbminions of Britain's caslml empire. It also cast cbutt on Britain's ability to prolect its interests/in 
the region.12 Some Loncbn officials were plea;ed with Japa,'s inceac.ed military invdvement in 
northern China as a "useful diversion" from the southern regions of Asia, in particular, Hong Kong 
south to Singapore. 13 Altrough Britain did want to improve rehtions with Japm, she was not 
interested in granting concessions for fear that Japa, would eveitually be all<:M'ed to take over British 
interests in China. Moreover, by 1937 Britain realized the possibility of a two from war against 
Germany and Japa, and that help from the Unilr:d Stall:s woukl be nec:(M to make any impa:t on 
Japat's aggressive attitude. 
This remaned thesitwtion until July 1937 whcnJapa, and Chim bcg111 their long war. By 
August of that y~ Jap111ese fones, moving south and west from their bases in northern China, 
conw:rged aromd Shanghai and defeated the best divisions of the Kuomintang army and by Dectmber 
held the nationalist city of Nanking. 14 By late 1938 Japa, controlled all the majcr cities, ports, railway 
lines, and prod.Jctive seck>rs of northern and central China. The war, which la<.led ciglt yeais, only 
enchl with theJapmese sunenth- to Britain and the United Stall:s in 1945. 
The Times Reaction in 1937 to the Crisis in the Far East 
On 12 March 1937, the Timer ran a somewhat propietic lead artcle with the following 
obscrvatiorr "British observers who studed the proa:ss which begm with the sehure of Manchuria, 
its conversion into the client state of Manchulcuo, and the rupture betVleCll Japa, and the League of 
Nations asked thermelves whCJC it woukl stop. How long, they won<b'od, would it be bcfcrc the 
appetite of the military party threatened Central China and jeoplld.zed the vast int~ts and the 
~nized riglts of Orea Britain in the Yangtze valley. " 15 The inciient, as it turned out, .wa<. soon to 
come On the niglt of 7 July 1937 an aociJental cllNI betVleCll Chinese and Japa,ese fones on 
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maneuvers near Peking ignited a war that woukl never be declared Japmese military polry united 
China more, as the Times woukl later say, "thm Russian pro~anchhas succeeded in cbing in fifteen 
yeais. ul6 
The reaction in the Times, and in the rest of the British pl"C$, to the Sino-Japanese 
hostilities of 1937, was immaiate albeit somewhat subdied in liglt of other international concems. 
Alttx:>ugh interest waned at Times wring the rest of the yeai; 17 several cxbnrences eng~ed the 
attention of the paper and the public. These OCCUTences were the Japmese offensive at Shanghai, 
Roosevelt's Quarantine spee;:h, the Bru~els Coni:rence and the sinking of the American gunooat, 
Pan~. The leadng articles of the Times were the soul of the paper, and the most overt in advmcing 
peramal opinion. Witlfo them a stntegy for coping with the Far Easlml situation and with keq:ing 
British interests in that regbn secll'C is evid!nt. 
Des{ite the anonymous nat\I"C of these articles, Geofrey Daw!Dn, as Ecitor, must be 
consirered ultimately resixmsible for their con lent and any polry they reccmmend Daw!Dn's concern 
with appeasing Germany is evicent in the leadng articles throoghout 1937. The Times was <pile 
voca abmt what Britain should or should not cb ab01i Germany and Czechoslovada and criticism of 
Germany was liglt. 18 With Japm, however, things were different. Japm was constantly admooished 
abmt her behavior in China while Britain's polry towatl Japm and China, with few excq:,tions, 
appeared satisfactmy. Thrwghout the war, the Times was eaga- to advise Japm on how to refuse the 
situation. 
Japm was consirered to be an excdlent villain sinre it had invahl China and posed an 
ecoromic threat to the Empire. 19 The Manchurian incirent of 1931-32 had not elicited the same sort of 
reaction for several rea.9:ms, the most immolate and obvious being that Britain cid not have the same 
regree of ecoromic interest in Manchuria as it cidin the southern regbns. By August 1937 figlting 
spread to Shanghai wheie the interests of Britain excrecrd that of any comµirable area outsire of the 
United K.in~m. An article from the diplomatic corresponcr.nt in Shanghai ciiring the August 
offensive retals theregreeofBritish investment in the city: 
The position [in Shanghai] is critical andcomµex, and it is hardy suqrising that 
the!Pvest anxiety for British businesses, offices, investments, andgeneral 
interests should be expiessed in the City and elsewhere. British cira:t into-ests in 
China are worth abot.t L250.000,000, mare up of L200,000,000 in business 
investments andL50,000,000 in Government obligations. Of the totB sum abot.t 
LI 80,000,000 is tied up in Shanghai, and of this L180,000,000 a high proJX)rtion 
is in the Settlement district now being most heavily shelled and bomred; it is 
where most of the public utilities offices and works, and where most of the large 
meromtile businesses are estiblished 20 
Thrwghout August rearers of the Times were frecpently rerninred of the differences bet\\een 
the 1932 Manchurian sei2ure and the 1937 "deporable everts" in Shanghai.21 Of the thRC ways in 
which the Times says the two incents ciffenrl, chm~e to British holdngs is cleaiy felt to be the 
most impatant. China's post-1932 acxµsition of an air forre and of a railway linking the Nanking 
government with Shanghai asslrned a subsiciary role The stale of British prestige in the Far East 
was a particular cause forconcem: 
It is much to be feaied that the prestige of Grell Britain, andinckcd of all the 
Wescn Powers, will-with ratlrr less dist>rtion of the facts-be !Pvdy impared in 
Asiaic eyes by their impctencc to make good their lawid position at Shanghai in 
time of crisis. The situation is, of couisc, an impa;sibly cifficult one; but when 
in the couise of time the tire of war shall have ebbed from Shanghai, the pro~s 
of salvage work by the Foreign Powers woukl prombly have been improved by 
closa- Anglo-American ciplomatic coopc:ration at the outset. 22 
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The Times freqiently called for closer Anglo-Amtri::an ties and often implied that the called-for 
cooµ::ration was soon to come or had already been neg<tiatcd.23 This call for cooµ::ration plus 
aanooition of Japm's beluwior written in clea- terms and freq.lent reference to what the 'world thought 
abmt Japm fomm part of the Times' stntegy for dealing with the situation in the Far East 
The British public learned of the Far Easlrm sitwtion thrrugh daily rqxrts in the 
newspapers. British public opirion was unfavorable towatl Japmese military vieiJries in China 
becruse of the threat the figtting poscrl to British commercial interests. The.Times most asslredly 
symµithimd with China, as dd the British public. Aoniration for Chiiae val a and end.ranee was 
freqient in the leadng articles: China's stmtgth is a passive q.iality. No nation has survived more 
concµests, no nation.is more vulnerable or less mor1al. She yield; as a q.iidcsand yickk, andso far-
with very much the same consecpen::cs for the victor."24 Another noted: 'The Chirese civilian 
population is the most cncb:ing, the most fataistic, the best a,iqted to calanity of any civilian 
population in the world."25 
Roosevelt"s "'Qmrantine the AgA1C5!Dr" spee:h delivered in Chicago on 5 Octooer called for 
"positive endeavors to preserve peace" and spoke of a "q.i3'lllltine' for infocted stares. 26 Roosevelt was 
thought to be talking abmt Japm. The Times reaction to the spea;h was expiessed the next day: 
'The sigrificance of Mr. Roosevelt's appall to his own and to other frecoom-loving peopes to work 
together in defmce of peace can be missed nowrere and will nowrere meet with ~ satisfactioo 
than in Britain andtheDominions."27 Roosevelt's spca:h also focused the hopes of those who desired 
an ecoromic boyoott of Japm. Prier to the spee:h, several letm to the edlor appeared in the Times 
which suggested a boyrott, most nota:,ly one written by the ecoromist John Maynard Keyres. 
Regatling an ecoromic boyoott, the Times demumrl by asking, "Whit is to be said of inefective forre 
which destroys peace witrout frustrating the aggres!Dr?"28 A boyoott was not believed to be a certain 
way of curtailing Japm. If Japm was whisked out of northern China thca! was good likdihood that 
she would tum south towatl British interests. This evertuality, while never explicitly stared in the 
leadng articles, 29 seem; to be the impetus for the Times' disoouragement of an ecoromic boyoott. 
This anti-boycott policy forms another part of the Times' stntegy for sectring the Empire. 
Soon after, and largely as a result of hope elicited by Roosevelt's spca:h, the nations which 
hadsigred the Nino-Power pact in 1922 assembled in Brussels for a con&ence to consicrr the Sino-
Japmese conflict. The Times tricrl to curtail public and official supix>rt of a boyoott when it defined 
the objoct of the Conrrence as "to promote peace by medation, a puqx>se which canrot be promoted 
by violent atta:ks ' upon Japm or by clmrours for an ecoromic boyoott."30 Cona:rn that the 
Con&ence migtt tum into what the Times later called a "judcial trirunal with punitive functions" 31 
led the paper to suggest that Anglo-American coop:ntion was needrl 32 
Again on 2 November, the paper takes on its role as spokesman for the British government 
by saying, "Mr. Roosevelt has left the workl in no chutt of his aims, and they ffC idertical with those 
of the British Govcrnment."33 The same article continues with, 
Japmese action in the Far ~t has invdced the trcity obligations of the Unit:d 
States, and that the cause of peace has, in a cer1ain area and witlin cer1ain specific 
limits, invited and obtaned American coolffl!lion. The presence of the Unit:d 
States at Brussels is a fact of inestimable worth, and it may be taken as axianatic 
that American participation in the work of the con&cnce will hav~ in cveiy stage, 
at eveiy step, the most compete resix>nse from the British repiescntanvcs and from 
the Government and peope behind them 34 
On 1 November the Brussels Con&cnce opened with>ut theJapmesc bei~ invited. Nor is 
it likdy they woukl have sent a contingent. 1be Con&cnce closed with litde accanplishtrl and the 
prospects of peace not dscemcd. The Con&cnce (except for Italy) concbnned Japm's actions in 
China, but as the Timer staled, "womd up with the tacit IOll~sion that, while it deplored the 
conlll!Jlllion, it declined to play with fire. "3' The Times wrole a figtntivc, tho~h polite, "I told you 
so" after the Con&cncc by saying that, "it is dffirut to sec what other condusion the Con&ence 
coukl have reached. "36 No one courtry woukl take the initiative in "rcmmmending a less passive 
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policy" for cbling with Japm and hopes that the Uniled StalCS would be that courtr/, in ligtt of 
Roosevelt's Quarantine specclt, ciedcpidcly. 37 
On 13 Dcccmbcr Japm sank the Uniled StalCS gunlx>at, Pan!f, whim was patDlling the 
Yangtz.e near Nanking. The H.M.S. L.ad)bird was also hit alor~ with thn:e Starmrd oil ship;. Afttr 
the incident the Cabinet tried to secure American coopntion, and indeed the Uniled StalCS sho\\Cd 
gowing interest in cooµ:ration with the Roya Navy, but all Roosevelt would cb was send a 
contingent of U.S. cruisers to SinfW()rc. 
The Times was agha.t at the actions of the Japmcsc, saying "it begins to look as if the 
average Japmcse officer on scnice in Chim barely ecpas, in ciscretion and in sclf.contrd, a small boy 
with a cattpult. "38 Not resµrir:ng of gaining U.S. coopntion, theleadcontinucs by saying that while 
American interests in the Far East arc smaller in every way than Grcit Britain's, "the fact is that 
America's restinics arc linked far more closely to Chim's than arc our own." The reaconing behind 
this 'link' was obvbus: America had circa sea acass to the Far East and Britain cid not. The article 
continues: "In the present situation at all everts our interests arc the same, and America for the 
moment the nation most circt:tly ag!rievcd can unq.r.stiona:>ly rely upon Orea Britain to sup.(X)rt her 
in any action whim she may feel called upon to take" Stat:mcnts such as this beg the cpestion of 
who is spe.king, the Times or the British government? 
Effect or the Times on the Bridsh Govfl'Dmeot 
Al trough on the whole the war was seen as "inevitable, "39 ccommic and mora pressure from 
world opinion was hoped to persuare Japm to give up her aggression and bri~, her MOtmd to rea&>n. 
In contrast to the policy of appeasement taken in Eurq,c. Britain's atttud:: towatl Japm was finn. 
Bet\\CCll August an~ Nova-nbcr pressure on the Chamberlain gova-nment by Chim and the British 
public incseascd. In the face of such calls for actbn, however, this was a time when the British 
gova-nment sho\\Cd little interest in the Far Eastern situation. Suqrisingly afttr 1 July, theie were no 
meetings of the Foreign Policy Committee of Chamberlain's Cabinet until January 1938. The breac 
was ciJe to the summer vacaion and to &bi's absence while he participated in con&cnccs in Bru&<>els 
and Nyon However, the main Cabinet continued to meet as usua, and came together five Ti .. ,es over 
the summer.~ 
On 22 Dcccmbcr the Cabinet met to consid:r the latest incident in the Far East, the sinking 
of the U.S. gunlx>at Pan~ andthedun~ing oftheH.M.S. L.ad)bird by theJapmcse. &bi rcpcrted 
that Roosevelt had infcnned the British Amba.sad:>r in Wastington that a blodcare of Japm migtt 
occu- "after the next incant," but meanwhile he was willing to have nava staf con\a'Satirns with 
Britain.41 Altrough Chamberlain and &bi would have liked more immcdate Anglo-American action 
to pre\Cllt another incant, "there was a cistinct British reloctancc to make a show of forre alone" and 
"the Cabinet appeared to 8!rCC that Britain would be prqmed to make a joitt cbnrnstration with the 
United Stales if she was willing. "42 
In late July, the Times cited thn:e "solutions" to the situation of Japm in Chim: 1) peaceful 
comiromisc, 2) fulklress war, "a tra~". and 3) a loca miltary venture near the tir.t skinnish, 
"anti-dima,r.. "43 The Times' explicit statements con<:aning what action Britain should take i.1 Asia are 
few but sigrificant consicbing that the action was genmilly implemented The fir.t instance occu-s 
soon afta- the war bcgm when the Times called for Britain to sign the Lond>n Nava Treay of 1936. 44 
Soon afterwards, the treay was ratified 
In an article on how Japmcse military opcmtions wercendmgering Bri·tish in<btrial interests 
in Chim the Times ~ad this to say: 
It is noteworthy that the U.S. has warned Japm and Chim that they will be held 
rcsJX>nsible for any dun~e cbne to American property ~ a rcstit of the present 
hostilities. British interests and investments in this courtry cxard those of 
America many Times oves; and a similar notificatirn, whmcvcr its worth, would be 
welromed here 45 
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The next my, the Times repated that British rq>iesematives in China andJapm were to notify the two 
Govc.,-nments that Britain woukl hold them resµmsible for loss to either life or property incmed by 
British subjects wring the hostilities in Chim. 
ThePl"C$ Office of 10 Dowring Stm:t, under tigtt control by Chamberlain, acted as official 
spokesman of the govanment to the PCC$. Chamberlain believed the aole of the Pl"C$ was to echo 
the vie'M of himself and the govanment. Accming to the HisDry of the 'Times' assisting, "a 
Govc.,-nment of whaiever compe.xion to find a natx,nal policy had boocme one of the impcrtant 
functions" of the Timer. 46 With the afolClilentiooed e.xaptions, this is l~ly what the Timer cid 
However, the Times was not necessarily an echo; DaW!nn felt that a medan bet\\Cell public opinion 
andsup{X)rt of the govc.,-nment was whese the Times should stalrl 
The icbl that fora:s outside the govanment had influence on Britain's foreign policy of the 
1930; is not new.47 That the Times had a drc,:t influence on British foreign polx:y is prolm>ly not 
true Indirectly, however, the Times was cpile influential. The eff'ect it had on oth<r comtries which 
vie'M:d it as the voi~ of British polx:y is at Timer considerable. The Nazis, for example, were afuid 
of the impict that articles, written by a British coriespondent in Germany, would have on non-Nazi 
Germans who generally favcred the Times. 
The Timer' str.tegy for coping with the Far Eastern situation crak with four area;: 
ecooomics, ciplomacy, military and public opirion. First of all, the str.tegy to protect the 
commercial interests of Britain in China consisted of comJiaining. but not too loudy, that Japmese 
acfon was not good for business altlnugh British commeccial entaprise actually !!J'CW wring the 
war.48 The Timer cid not sup{X)rt a boyrott of Japmese good. and strove to cisrourage that as a polx:y. 
The assunption was that a boyrott woukl merely ant~onizcJapm ratrec than stop her. 
The Timer' ciplomatic str.tegy was more subtle. Freq.ient references to the United States 
and potential or actual coo)%1'3tion bet\\Cell the British andAmerican govanments were an attempt to 
coen:e the United Stales to take actX>n in the Far East Pro{X)nents of American int<rvention Ieart 
upon The Pan~ Incant as a sure thi~ to get American invdvement in East Asia, but isolationist 
feeling was too stroog. Several hist>rians have mentioned the possibility of a 'Far Eastem Muni::h' 
and al trough that evert ocars outside the tim~frame of this paper, it <hes not appmr to have taken 
plare.49 
As for military str.tegy, the lead. make no mention of the Singapore baseexcq>t in passing. 
However, a military str.tegy, of sor1S, is evirent in a very few references to Japm's presumed futU"C 
plara to use Chirese fora:s in figlting Russia in ensung yeais. 50 1bc str.tegy is actually one of 
warning abm:t fut•re entmglemeits in the Far East In September the Timer mentions its conrem 
ab01.:t J apm acting as a funher pohrizing eff'ect for the comtries at oppa;ite • ends in regatl to the 
situation in Spain.51 It was not until June 1939 that the Timer called for the Govc.,-nment to take 
immwiate actX>n in proll:lcting British interests in the Far East 
The fina part of the Times' str.tegy is the papa's use of negitive publicity espa::ially in 
regatl to Japm. Altlnugh propiganm is too stroog a worct the Timer wm. instrumenta in spelling 
out to the world theactx,ns of Japm in most unfavorabletenns and in backing the Chirese at least in 
a mora sense. 1bc public, continually reminded of "wodd cisgust" at Japm's actX>ns, teamed from 
the Times that Japm was "eaming the un<palifiedcond:mnatioo of a world on whom-whether she is at 
peare. whether she is at war, or whether she is making good the gaim of war~he vitaly and 
inC:.'l:apably cq,c:nds. "52 
In the l 930; with the devdopment of radio as a news mcdum just beginning, newspapers 
were the only souce ofinfamation from outside available to the majaity of the British.53 By 1937 
the newspaper ind5try was capa>le of reac.hing far more pcoJie than ever befcre and it was 
com~itive in reaming all cl!L$cs; thee was, in a sense, a paper for evezy 1"()Up. 54 Newspapers were 
also bei~ realiz.cd as a potential tool for the dsseminatX>n of govcmmental polx:y. The Times, for 
instance, had a long a<.scciation with the conservatiYC upper claq;, and WM ~ddy regll'Chl as the 
mouthpiece of the govc.,-nment, intanationally and at home. " It was not for notling that Times was 
thus taken to be the semi-official cond.Jit of the British govanment's thiridng abrmd, and evezy 
nuan:e of its long and elegant leadn wm. scrq,ulously sm:tiniz.cd in the chaocclleries and emba.sies 
of the world. "55 However, the policy of appeasement that it sup{X)rted collapsed in 1941 after the fall 
of Fraoce. At that time Britain had yet to seem: the m.sistance of the UniliCd States in protecting 
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Britain's Far Easlcrn interests . To say that the efect of the Timer on government policy was 
ultimately a suca:ss is not wholly an CXS!l8eratioo if one consid::rs suca:ss in tcnm of the paper's 
ability to infh.Jence public opirion andinaease public pl"C$ure on the Government. An ability which 
at Tim er seems to have had some effect on govcmmenta action. 
ENDNJTES 
1. Dawson was Editor of the Times from 1912 to 1919 and 1923 to 1941. 
2. Only in the summers of 1938 and 1939 did the Press and the public become as interested with 
the Far Eastern situation as they were in the autumn and winter of 1937. 
3. Dawson once wrote to a friend, "I always hate using forcible language when I know that it will 
not be foilowed by forcible action." Times archives, 17 February 1938. 
4. Halifax, with whom Dawson held a long friendship, was Lord President of Chamberlain's 
Cabinet until March 1938, afterwards he became Foreign Secretary until 1940. He was a supporter 
of appeasement and helped negotiate the Munich agreement. Through Halifax, Dawson became 
acquainted with Neville Chamberlain who, after succeeding Baldwin as Prime Minister in May 
1937, continued a policy of appeasement towards Germany and signed the M~nich Agreement. 
Dawson's relationship with Chamberlain began in 1917. Eden was Foreign Secretary from 1935 
until his resignation in 1938. 
5. British territorial interests in the Far East at this time included: Australia, New Zealand, Indian 
subcontinent, Malay Peninsula (Singapore), North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, Hong Kong, .-;everal 
Pacific islands, and commercial interests in China. 
6. The naval treaty made at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 between Britain, Japan, 
France and the U.S. gave Japan local supremacy in the Far East. 
7. G. E . Hubbard, British Far Eastern Policy. I.P.R. Inquiry Series. (New York: Institute of 
Pacific Relations, 1943), 33. 
8. The plan to create the Singapore naval base was included in the recommendations of Lord 
Jellicoe, a British admiral, after his visit to the Far East in 1919. The decision to construct the 
base was postponed until after the 1921-22 Washington Conference. The work was suspended after 
the Labour government came into power in 1924, but was rescued by the succeeding Co.,servative 
government and resumed the following year. The 1928 'ten-year' doctrine that there would be no 
major war for ten years from any given date, slowed construction once again. In 1932 the doctrine 
was put aside and construction of the base resumed off and on until its completion in 1938. 
9. The Singapore strategy had several weaknesses: 1) it assumed that Britain could avoid a 
simultaneous war on two fronts, Europe and the Far East; 2) it assumed that air and submarine 
technology would not quickly become a serious threat to capital ships; and 3) it carried an 
unspoken assumption that the U.S. would readily step in and protect the Pacific dominions if a 
two-front war was inevitable. Naval limitation in the Pacific was essential to Britain's defense 
policy and commercial interests, but it was to be backed up with the potential force of the 
Singapore base. 
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10. As a poirt of interest: Acccning to a Timts arti;Je on 12 Octd>cr 1937, nimty perrent of the 
illicit aug trace in herein, uphm, and other of what were tenned 'white chlg,,' came from 
Mandmkuo, and tho~ provinces of Northern Chim which Japm controlled Altrough chlg, were 
illegal in Japa, and Korea, in Manchuk:uo it was an open business. -
11. Times (Lorrl:m), 23 Jammy 1932 
12. Altrough Japm expmc:rd further into theChirr.se province of Jehol in early 1933, that same year 
Jap.n and Chim sigred the trure of Tangku which restored peare in the Far East, tho~h only for a 
time. 
13. William R. Keybr, TheTwertieth Century Worki (New York Oxfml Unhersity Press, 1992), 
243. 
14. After six months of war, Japm was in possession of a little over 300,000 sq.ure miles of Chirese 
territory in North China which may be comµu-ed with the 363,700 s<p.re miles of Manchuria or the 
comlfoed area; of Germany and Italy. Times, 15 Derenber 1937. 
15. Times, 12 March 1937, 17. 
16. Times , 23 Seplember 1937, 13. 
17. On 13 Octooer 1937, the Sino-Japanese war still held the first column in the Imperial/Fcreign 
News section, but a few days later interest had begun to turn to the Bru~els Conrrence, Palestine and 
Italy. Theiss~ of the pro{X)sed return of German colooies is another topr talcing prearl:nce at this 
time. ~y the end of Octooer, the war moval to the miclie of the page and Italy and Spain to first 
plare. 
18. See Times, 7 Jun~ 7 and9 Seprrnber 1938. 
19. Franklin Reid Ganron, The British Pres<1 and Germany, 1936-1939 (Oxi>rct Clmcncbn Press, 
197!), 2-3. Likewise, Russi.a was revolutionay, and Italy was causing trorble in the Meaterranean. 
Germany's government, on the other hancl was stalie and seemed interested only on its ecpaity in 
international status. 
20. Times, 19 August 1937, 12. 
2 1. Times, 16 August 1937, 11. 
22. Times, 26 August 1937, 13. 
23. Peter Low~ amt Brilain and the Origins of the Pacific War(Oxi>rct Claencbn Pres<1, 1977) also 
mentions this tend!ncy andcites leadng artrles from 15, 19, 21 June 1939. See also 15 November 
and 16 Derenber 1937. 
24. Times, 6 August 1937, 13. 
25. Times, 28 Sepanber 1937, 15. 
26. The Times cpoled most of the specdt on 6 Octd>cr 1937. The salient cpolc in reference to a 
cpamntine is as follows: "It seems to be unfcrtunatdy true that the epicbnic of workl lawlessness is 
spreading. When an epicbnic of physical ciscase starts to spread the commmity app10ves, and joins 
in a cparantine of the patients in orm to protect the health of the commmity against the spread of 
disease." Roosevelt staled further that, "War is a conlagion whelher it be ch:lared or uncklared" See 
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also William L. Lani:P" and S . Evcztt Gica.on, The Undx:lared War.lJ.S. Isolation (New York: 
Hruµ:r, 1953); and the papers of FDR. 
27. Times, 6 Octooer 1937, 15. ScealsoAppcncix B. 
28. J. M. Keyrrs, ~. 29 September 1957. 'Dm.f:r, 6 Octooer 1937, 15. 
29. 1In The Stoiy of the 'Times' (Lonbn: Michael Joseph, 1983), Oli\\'2' Wood; and James Bish:>p 
give.an accront of the Times and its suprort of appeasement and its rel.tionship with Germany, but 
no mention i;; made of Japm wring theundx:laredwar. By and large, historians of the Pl'CS'i, and in 
particular, of the Times, have dealt alma;t exclusively with Eurcpe. In ad:fition, the Hist>ry of the 
'Times' (Lonbn: Prirting House Scpire, 1952), bareiy mentions Japm wring 1937, neither cbes 
John Evelyn Wreoch's bio~hy of Daw&>n, Geoffrey Daw&>n and Our Times (Lonbn: Hutchinson, 
1955). 
30. Times, 22 Octooer 1937, 17. 
31. Time,·, 2 November 1937, 17. 
32. Times, 21 Octooer 1937, i5. 
33. Times, 2 November 1937, 17. 
34. Times, 2 November 1937, 17. 
35. Times, 30 November 1937, 15. 
36. Times, 25 November 1937, 15. 
37. Times, 25 November 1937, 15. 
38. Times, 14 December 1937, 17. 
39. Times, 12 July 1937, 12. 
40. Ian Colvin, The Chamberlain Cabinet: How the Meetings in 10 Downing Street, 1937-1939 Led 
to the Seccnd World War Told for the First Time from the Cabinet Papcn (Lonbn: Victor Gollancz, 
1971), 43. 
41. Ian Colvin, Chamberlain Cabinet, 72. 
42. Ibid 
43. Times, 22 July 1937, 15. 
44. Times, 19 July 1937, 15. 
45. Times, 20 Augu;t 1937, 10. 
46 .. History of the 'Times, Part Il (Lonbn: Prirting House Scpll"C, 1952), 1008. 
47. SeeFraridin ReidGanmn, The.British P~ andGmnany, 1936-1939 (Oxf>rd: Claencbn P~. 
1971). 
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48. Stqnen Lyon Endi::ott, Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933--1937 (British 
Cohmbia: Uni \Cf"Sity of British Coh.mbia P·~. 1975), 171. 
49. For <iswssion on a 'Far ~tern Munich' see Bracford A. Lee. Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 
1937-1939 (Stmford: StanfordUni\Cf"SityPress, 1973), 174-204. 
50. See Times, 16 Augu;t, 29 September and30 Novanber 1937. 
51. Times, 8 September 1937, 13. 
52. Times, 28 September 1937, 15. 
53. In 1938 there were52 momng, 85 evering and 18 Sunchy newspapers published in Orea Britain. 
Ganoon, British Press, 1. 
54. Des?te the readl of the papers and the.ir ability to infmn a vMt numrer of peope aboLt world 
everts, the majaity of peope see~ to pre& entcrtainmmt to infmnation. It is also interesting to 
note what constitutcdgoodsubject matrc fora paper of the Times renown. Thrwghout July, August 
and September of 1937, the ech:>rial pages and home news sections show an extraodnary concern 
aboll the gray scpirreJ population andproliems Msociatcdwith them 
55. Riclmd Cocla:tt, Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appcmement and the Man4>u!atim of the 
Press (New York St. Martin's Press, 1989), 12-13. 
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MINUTES OF THE MARCH 4, 1995, SCHA MEETING 
The sixty-fifth annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Association convened at Lander University 
in Greenwood on March 4, 1995. An estimated 95 members and guests showed up for the day-long meeting on a 
blustery March day. Following the 9:00 a.m. registration, informal gathering, coffee, and pastries in the Carnell 
Leaming Center, members assembled in respective presentation rooms for morning sessions which began at 9:30 
a.m. 
Session I, entitled The Unjted States in the Njneteen-Thjrties, was chaired by John Scott Wilson of 
USC-Columbia and featured presentations by a group of panelists from the Citadel. Tammy S. Sugarman presented 
"The Long-Term Origins of the Social Security Act of 1935"; Julie S!oan presented "The Controversial Acts: Who 
Supported Them and Why"; and Custis Byars presented "The Acts and the Election of 1936." Comments were offered 
by John Scott Wilson, Session Chair, and members of the audience. 
Session II was entitled Britain jn the Njneteenth and was chaired by Lori Loeb of USC-Columbia. 
Presentations in this session included Veronica J. Bruce, USC-Columbia, "Examining the Social Question of 
Poverty in Victorian Britain," and Karen Nickless, USC-Columbia, "Mrs. Frances Trollope and Captain Basil Hart: 
Two Views of Nineteenth-Century America." Session Chair, Lori Loeb, commented on both papers. 
Session III, chaired by Selden Smith of Columbia College, was entitled, Southern kipects. David C. Beny 
of Horry-Georgetown Technical College presented "'Like Blackbirds on a Wire': Black Labor in the South and the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers." Kari Frederickson of Rutgers University presented "A Family 
Affair: Gender, Race, and the Familial Metaphor in the Dixiecrat Movement." Belinda F. Gergel of Columbia 
College presented "The Israelites of Columbia: The Establishment and Development of an Ante-helium Jewish 
Community." Selden Smith, Session Chair, provided comments on these papers. 
Following these sessions, members had the opportunity to refresh with a coffee break while attending a 
poster session on teaching techniques and discoveries. Presenters of Poster Session papers and demonstrations 
included Calvin Smith, USC-Aiken, "Free-Writing and the History Journal"; Jill Hanson, USC-Columbia, ''The 
South Carolina Legacy Project"; W. Marvin Dulaney, College of Charleston, "The Avery Research Center for 
African-American History and Culture"; and William S. Brockington, Jr., USC-Aiken, "Making History Informative 
and Fun." 
At the conclusion of the Poster Session, members assembled for lunch and subsequent business meeting in the Grier 
Center. President Marcia Synnott called the Business Meeting to come to order and introduced Lander University 
President William Moran, who welcomed the SCHA to Lander and introduced Dr. Friederike Wiedemann, Lander 
University Vice President for Academic Affairs. Dr. Wiedemann also welcomed the group and commented on 
Lander's history and background. 
Following these welcoming remarks, President Marcia Synnott again took the podium and announced the 
winners of the competition for "Best Papers Presented at the Annual Meeting." lbere were two awards, each for 
$100: one for the best graduate student presentation and one for the best presentation from other members. Eligible 
papers included those presented in 1992 and 1993. The Winners were Fritz Hamer, "Barbecue, Farming arrl 
Friendship: German Prisoners of War and South Carolinians, 1943-1946" (graduate student prize), and Peter 
McCandless, "A Propitious Moment: Founding the South Carolina Lunatic Asylum" (other members prize). Both 
papers had been presented at the 1993 annual meeting. 
President Synnott then announced the following recommendations for editor of the J>rocm1jngs to replace 
retiring editor Peter Becker. Alexander Moore, Director of the South Carolina Historical Society, was recommended 
for Editor and Chris Hoebeke of the South Caroliniana Library for Assistant/Managing Editor. 
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President Synnott then a'>ked for reports from other officers . Treasurer Bill Brockington presented his report 
and noted tha1 there were now 148 paid members and that depa.rtment memberships had increased to twelve. Secretary 
Calvin Smith next reminded the members to please send items for the May Newsletter. 
The business session was then suspended for the introduction of Luncheon Speaker, Robert E. Herzstein of 
USC-Columbia, and his presentation on "Henry R. Luce and the Issue of Race in America." Dr. Herzstein is 
currently working on a new book on Henry Luce. In this presentation, he discussed Luce's influence to combat 
ra,:ism as an innovative journalist and publisher of~ and Uk magazines during the pericxi from the 1920s 
through the 1940s. 
President Synnott thanked the speaker and reconvened the Business Meeting for election of officers. The 
Slate of Officers recommended by the nominating committee for 1995-1996 consisted of: 
President - Peter Becker, USC-Columbia 
Vice President - Amy McCandless, College of Charleston 
Treasurer - William S. Brockington, Jr., USC at Aiken 
Secretary - Calvin Smith, USC at Aiken 
Members-at-Large of the Executive Board - Edward Lee, 
Terry Helsley and Katherine D. Cann 
There being no nominations from the floor, the slate was approved by acclamation. 
President Synnott then symbolically passed the president's gavel to Peter Becker, President-elect for I 995-
1996 who adjourned the business session and announced that afternoon presentations would begin at 2:30 p.m. in the 
Carnell Learning Center. 
Carolina." Next, Judith Lee Hunt, University of Charleston, offered ''The Circle Large and Small: Courtship, 
Marriage, and Childrearing in the Middleton Family." A. V. Huff, Furman University, then gave "This Is It': 
Furman University's Struggle With the South Carolina Baptist Convention, 1986-1992." Session Chair McCandless 
offered comments. 
Session V on Enyjronment Definjtjons and LjnkaKes was chaired by Joel ·c1eland of Lander University. 
Presentations were made by Bruce W. Jordan, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Mcxlels of Environmental Apocalypse: 
Are Things Getting Better or Are They Getting Worse?"; David L. Hess, "The Cross-Cultural Importance of~ 
.KkY_, Dr. Jose Riza, and the Chalcri Dynasty on the Teaching of History in South Carolina;" and James Dixon, 
USC-Columbia, "The Polish Home Army: Partisans or Organized Army" Session Chair Cleland made comments on 
these presentations. 
Session VI was chaired by Denis G. Paz of Clemson University and was entitled Britain Between the Wars. 
Three presenters from USC-Columbia made up the panel. John R. Kessinger, m, offered "Winston S. Churchill's 
World View, 1933-1935: The German Threat, British Air Defense, and the India Debate"; Jill Quattlebaum provided 
"The Times on the Far Eastern Crisis of 1937"; and Jane W. Squires presented "Oifford Allen, Renegade Pacifist." 
Session Chair Paz commented. 
Following these sessions the sixty-fifth annual meeting then concluded with an enjoyable reception at the 
home of Lander President William Moran. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Calvin Smith, Secretary 
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FINANCIAL STATEMENT. 1995 
S0u1h Carolina Historical Association 
READY ASSETS AND EXPENDITURES 
CHECKING ACCOUNT: 
Balance, December 31 , 1994 --------------- $1440.82 
Deposits , January 1 - December 31 , 1995: 
Individual Memberships, SCHA Annual Meeting 
Fees, Departmental Memberships, Library 
Memberships ----------------- S.3.8.18..4..5. 
Total $5279.27 
EXPENDITURES January J-December31 1995· 
Lunche,on----------------------- $903.00 
Speaker------------------- $250.00 
Outstanding Paper Prizes------------- $200.00 
Printing Cost of the PROCEEDINGS----- $1663.20 
Postage and Mailing------------------ $631.00 
Safety Deposit Box--------------- $ 25.00 
Work Assistant--(Mailing Proceedings) $125.00 
Office Materials------------------- $ 59.80 
Total-------------------- $3857.37 
Total Checking Balance, December 31, 1994 ----------lli.2.L.2.Q 
Total 
OTHER ASSETS 
GENERAL SAVINGS ACCOUNT· 
Carolina First Savings----------------- $1169 .12 
Carolina First CD-------------S~ 
Total General Savings ---------------- $5169.12 
PROCEEDINGS PUBLICATION ENDOWMENT RJND· 
Nationsbank CD----------- $2738.71 
Nationsbank CD-------- .$.lill.1.l 
Total Endowment Fund--------- $4377.42 
HOLLIS PRIZE ACCOL'NT-
BB&TCD 
BB&TCD 
·--- $724.81 
·------ $1087.09 
Carolina First Savings --------- i.JOli1 
Total Hollis Prize Account-------- $2115.57 
Respectfully Submitted, 
William S. Brockington, Jr. 
Treasurer, SCHA 
December 3:, 1995 
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$5279.27 

